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SUBSYSTEM RADIATION SUSCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS 
FOR DEEP-SPACE MISSIONS 
Wm. S. West 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
and 
W. Poch, A .  Holmes-Siedle, H. W. Bilsky, and D. Carroll 
RCA Astro-Electronics Division 
SECTION I 
BACKGROUND, INTRODUCTION, AND SUMMARY 
A. Background 
Since  the  early 1960's, personnel of the Goddard  Space Flight  Center (GSFC) 
have  been  interested in deep-space  missions  to  obtain  information  concerning 
the planets, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto, as well as informa- 
tion  concerning  the  interplanetary  medium.  Studies have been performed  to 
establish  the  feasibility of such  missions  and  various  reports  were  written by 
GSFC personnel and by  others. 
For  almost as long as these  missions  have been considered,  the  engineers. 
scientists, and managers at GSFC have  realized  the  necessity  for  systems, in- 
dependent of the Sun's energy,  to  meet  the  spacecraft  electric power require- 
ment. In  general, GSFC studies  have  indicated  that  there is a weight advantage 
in  using  small  nuclear  power  systems  such as radioisotope  fueled  thermoelectric 
generators (RTG's) instead of presently  available  solar  cells when missions go 
beyond 2.5 o r  3 AU. Further,  there are technological and practical  uncertainties 
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in  projecting  use of solar  arrays  in a range  starting beyond 3 to 5 AU* , whereas 
the  use of small  nuclear power supplies is technically and practically  feasible. 
However, the  use of small  nuclear  systems, while feasible,  nevertheless  pre- 
sents  technical  questions. An in-house GSFC study  identified  pertinent  tech- 
nological areas requiring  study  prior  to  the  use of these  nuclear  generators on 
spacecraft designed for  scientific  deep-space  missions.  These areas were  di- 
vided into  the following numbered  Tasks: 
Task Number 
I 
IIA 
IIB 
I11 
IV 
V 
VI 
V IIA 
VIIB 
VI11 
Task  Description - Title 
Analysis of Selected Deep-Space Missions 
Subsystem  Radiation  Susceptibility  Analysis 
for Deep-Space Missions 
Spacecraft  Charge Buildup Analysis 
Techniques for Achieving  Magnetic 
Cleanliness 
Weight Minimization  Analysis 
Spacecraft  Analysis and Design 
Spacecraft  Test Documentation 
Planar RTG -Component Feasibility Study 
Planar  RTG-Spacecraft  Feasibility Study 
RTG Interface  Specification 
Summary  Report of NEW MOONS 
*Goddard Space Flight Center unpublished report. 
Reference 
Document 
NASA TR R 4 7 2  
NASA TR ,371 
NASA SP 276 
NASA TR R-373 
X-701-69-174* 
X-701-69-175* 
X-701-69-176* 
X-701-69-177* 
X-701-69-178 * 
TM X63617 
X-701-69-190 * 
*Technical  uncertainties  involve  practical  design  questions  arising from the use  of  very  large 
solar array areas, their survival through meteroid  belts, and their system performance when oper- 
ating at the low temperature and low illumination levels anticipated. 
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A contract*  was  established for further study of these areas, This study 
was  entitled NASA Evaluation " With Models Of Optimized  Nuclear  Spacecraft 
(NEW MOONS). During  the  execution of the NEW MOONftechnoggy  study, 
GSFC was  assigned  the  task of conducting a Phase A study  covering a Galactic 
Jupiter  Probe.  These two study  efforts,  Galactic  Jupiter  Probe and NEW MOONS, 
were  directed  to provide  the  maximum  practical  benefit  to  each  other. In  gen- 
eral ,  the  Galactic  Jupiter  Probe  was  considered as a "baseline spacecraft and 
mission" o r  a 'Ireference  design"  during  the NEW MOONS technology study. 
On the  other hand, the  Galactic  Jupiter  Probe Study team  made  use of the  tech- 
nology and data as developed by the NEW MOONS Study .in areas of missions 
analysis, shielding, aerospace nuclear safety, thermal and structural  analysis, 
and other  related areas. 
" 
A s  the NEW MOONS contract  was being  concluded,  the  scope of Galactic 
Jupiter  Probe  project  was broadened and adopted the  name  Outer  Planets Ex- 
p1ore.r (OPE). The Outer Planet Explorer is considered  for a generally  more 
anrdlY1ous program than the  original  Galactic  Jupiter  Probe  (GJP)  in  that  the 
OPE is intended for a family of single- and multiple-planet  missions. t 
The  OPE, as presently  visualized,  encompasses  spacecraft  in  the 750- to 
950-pound class and also in the 1100- to 1400-pound class  whereas  the  GJP 
"reference-design  spacecraft"  for  the NEW MOONS Study was 500 to 600 pounds. 
This is a significant  practical  difference  from a flight  project viewpoint; how- 
ever,  the technology  and  techniques of NEW MOONS a re  generally  applicable. 
Specific  numeric  values will  be  different when solutions are developed,  but  the 
techniques and rationale indicated  in the NEW MOONS reports are applicable  to 
the  general  problem of integrating and using small  nuclear power systems on a 
scientific  spacecraft  designed  for  deep-space  missions. 
The NEW MOONS technology and techniques  reported  may  have  applicability 
o r  some  relevancy  to  additional  space  missions  that  may in the  future  use  nuclear 
systems  such as planetary  landers  and  rovers as well as applications  spacecraft. 
". I - = ~  . .. 
B. introduction 
Scientific  spacecraft on missions  into  deep  space  will  be  exposed  to  nat- 
urally  occurring  radiation and radiation  from onboard  nuclear  sources.  This 
*NASA Evaluation With Models Of Optimized  Nuclear  Spacecraft (NEW MOONS), Contract NAS 5 -  
10441, performed by RCA Astro-Electronics Division, Defense Electronic Products, Princeton, 
New  Jersey. 
?Also, see Frontispieces A and B. 
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radiation  may affect adversely  various  electronic  subsystems  and  materials 
such as electrical insulation,  thermal  coatings,  optical  devices,  and  electronic 
elements  unless  suitable  precautions are taken. This  report  discusses  the 
problem  generally. 
1. Statement of the Problem-Subsystems Radiation 
Susceptibility  Analysis 
Spacecraft  subsystem  performance  deterioration  caused  by  nuclear  radia- 
tion  can  be  classified  arbitrarily and rather  broadly  according  to  the  subsystem 
which is affected. One category or  class  consists of spacecraft  electronic  sub- 
systems which degrade as a result of damage  to  sensitive  components,  primarily 
bipolar and MOS transistors and diodes, both discrete and integrated  devices. 
Component damage  manifests itself in  the  form of electrical parameter  changes. 
The  net effect of these  parameter  changes throughout a circuit, e. g.,  the re- 
duction of transistor gain below (or the rise of junction leakages above) a certain 
value  may result in subsystem  performance below acceptable  limits  or  even 
catastrophic  failure. 
A second class of subsystem  degradation  may  occur  in  sensor  subsystems, 
Among the  scientific  objectives of the NEW MOONS mission, as described in 
Task I, are the  measurements of magnetic  fields and particle  radiation  during 
the  cruise  phase of the  mission and during  planetary  encounter.  These  measure- 
ments would involve the  use of onboard  magnetometers and particle  detectors. 
The  composition,  pressure, and temperature of Jupiter's  atmosphere  may  also 
be  measured  using  spacecraft-borne  IR, UV, and microwave  instruments  capable 
of measuring  the  intensity of radiation. All of these  instruments are operated 
by  electronic  components, which are susceptible  to  the  same  parameter  changes 
as the  electronic  subsystems. It should be noted, however, that a degree of 
degradation  tolerable  in  general  functional  electronics  (e. g. , power regulators) 
may not be  tolerable  in  the  carefully  calibrated  linear  amplifier  circuits  used 
for photometric and other scientific measurements. Optical systems (lenses, 
light-sensitive  surfaces,  etc. ) may  also  degrade and hence go out of calibration. 
A unique problem in this  subsystem  class is presented by the  particle  detectors. 
The  purpose of these  devices  is  to  measure  high-energy  space  radiation at the 
same  time  the  spacecraft power  supply (two RTG's)* is emitting  such  radiation, 
thereby  presenting a possible  interference  that  must  be  reconciled if accurate 
measurements of the  environment are to be made. 
*In general, this report does  not cover the effects of onboard RTG's on scientific data. Task IV 
concentrates on this facet of the problem. In this  task, IIA, emphasis is placed on damaging 
effects of radiation on various  spacecraft  elements. 
4 
The  third class of radiation  damage  pertains  to  materials  other  than  semi- 
conductors. This category spans all subsystems and covers thermal-control 
coatings , conformal  coatings,  seals,  lubricants , bearing  material,  wire  coat- 
ings,  insulators, etc. The degradation of bulk materials,  particularly of highly 
stressed  materials, is an  important  consideration  because  every  subsystem con- 
tains  some of them and precision  in  prediction of all conceivable  failure  modes 
is less feasible  than with electronic and optical  materials.  In  addition  many 
structural and  coating materials  may  be  directly  exposed  to  the  full  impact of 
the  space  environment including solar UV radiation and the very-low-energy 
protons  and  electrons which , because of their  limited  penetration  capabilities , 
only affect the  properties of outer  surfaces,  particularly  the  reflectance. A 
typical  example is the  discoloration of certain  types of white  paint. 
2. Task Objectives and Technical Approach 
The  objectives of Task IIA are as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Estimate  the magnitude of the combined  radiation  environment (Section 
11) and its effect on the  performance of sensitive  spacecraft  subsys- 
tems (Section III). 
Provide  system  engineers  and  subsystem  designers with information 
on critical  constraints (Section I). 
Define a radiation  hardening  program (Section IV). 
Provide a preliminary  assessment of the magnitude of the  programmatic 
considerations  to  be  encountered (Section V). 
The  approach to meeting  these  objectives  consisted of four  parts.  The first 
of these  was  to  determine  the  anticipated  types  and  levels of space  and RTG ra- 
diation  that  will  arrive at the  surface of the  spacecraft  over  the  prescribed 
mission  period.  This  analysis, as described in Section 11 of this  report,  was 
followed by the  preparation of internal  dose  level  estimates,  based on the cal- 
culated  environment and radiation  shielding  provided by the  spacecraft  structure. 
("Internal" includes  the  internal effects even within thin  coatings on the  surface 
of the  spacecraft.) 
The  second  part,  described  in  Section 111, consisted of assessing  the mag- 
nitude of the  radiation  hardening  problem  to  be  encountered  by  spacecraft  design 
engineers.  In  this  connection,  the  various types of critical components and ma- 
terials anticipated  for  use in the  spacecraft  were  discussed;  failure  mechanisms 
were  examined,  and  based on experience  and a large quantity of existing test 
data,  predictions  were  made with respect  to  the  level of component degradation 
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that  can  reasonably  be  expected  for  the  dose  levels  estimated  in  Section II, and 
the  resulting  effects on subsystem  performance. 
Throughout this  report, a spacecraft configuration has been  postulated  that 
is in  substantial  accordance with the  Galactic  Jupiter  Probe. A photograph of 
a 1/18 scp-le model of this  spacecraft is shown in the  Frontispiece.  Other  space- 
craft  configurations could  be used and the  analysis  techniques  presented  in  this 
report would remain  applicable. 
The  postulated  spacecraft  employs two RTG's,  each  rated at 1725 W(t) using 
Pu238 O2 as the  fuel. 
In the  third  part,  described in Section  IV,  radiation  hardening  concepts  were 
developed  in  detail.  The  goal of radiation  hardening is to  achieve  the condition 
whereby  spacecraft  subsystems, when exposed to  the  damaging effects of irra- 
diation,  will not experience  performance  degradation below acceptable  levels. 
There are various  alternative  approaches  to  achieve  this  goal.  The  techniques 
employed for  the  ideal  radiation  hardening  program are tailored  to  the  specific 
needs of the  spacecraft configuration  and the intended mission. In the NEW 
MOONS mission  the  seriousness of the  radiation  problem  may  vary  considerably, 
depending on the  precise  spacecraft configuration  and  device  packaging method 
chosen; on the  final  trajectory and mission  duration; and on the  actual  intensity 
of the  Jupiter  radiation  belts and solar flares which future  scientific  investiga- 
tions  reveal.  Thus,  the  treatment of damage  possibilities  has  been extended 
considerably beyond the "nominal" environment  models  used for  quantitative 
calculations. Therefore, two programs, producing different degrees of radia- 
tion tolerance, by somewhat different methods, were developed. These programs 
incorporate  sufficient  flexibility to serve the  needs of the  spacecraft, within the 
range of the  missions  postulated  in  Task I and the  generally  postulated  space- 
craft configuration. 
The  final  part of the  Task IIA effort  consisted of estimating  the  approximate 
impact of radiation  hardening on the NEW MOONS program with respect  to  time 
and cost.  Various levels of effort  have  been  evaluated and labor  estimates are 
given. In addition this  section  also  includes a development plan to take advan- 
tage of improvements which are desirable in the state of the art in  device,  ma-, 
terial, and system technology before  the  spacecraft is built; so that  the  benefits 
from  such  improvements  can  be  realized and potential  problems  eliminated. 
C. Summary 
The  Subsystem  Radiation  Susceptibility  Analysis  was  prepared in four  parts. 
The  work  performed on each of these  four  parts  will be  described  briefly and 
the  results  and/or  conclusions  summarized. 
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1. Analysis of the Radiation Environment 
Both the  space and RTG radiation  environments  were  evaluated, first sep- 
arately,  then in combination. The following regions were considered: pre-launch, 
near-Earth,  interplanetary  space  (Earth  to  Jupiter),  near-Jupiter,  and  inter- 
planetary  space  (Jupiter and beyond). It was concluded that,  in  the  near-Earth 
and  near-Jupiter  regions  the  particles of concern are high-energy electrons and 
protons. In interplanetary  space,  the only radiation  likely  to  damage  the  space- 
craft will  be  the  protons  ejected  from  the Sun in  the  solar wind and solar flares. 
Radiation from  the RTG's  will  consist,  primarily, of fast neutrons  and  gamma 
ray photons. Spacecraft  surfaces  may  also  be  affected  by  ultraviolet  radiation 
from  the Sun. Of the  space  regions  considered,  the  near-Jupiter is very sig- 
nificant.  This  conclusion would still hold even if future  studies  reveal  that  the 
Jupiter  environment is of a less severe  order than  was  assumed  here. It is 
emphasized  that  there is, indeed,  considerable  uncertainty as to  the  intensity 
and form of the  trapped  radiation  belts of Jupiter. 
The two effects  caused  by  the  energy  dissipation of bombarding particles 
were  discussed:  The first effect  concerns  single-crystal  semiconductor  com- 
ponents; it occurs when a high-energy  bombarding particle  collides with the 
nucleus of an  atom,  dislodging  the  atom  from its position  in the  crystal lattice. 
The  resulting  defect affects the electrical properties of the  crystal.  The  degree 
of bulk displacement  can  be  conveniently  expressed as the equivalent  fluence of 
the 1-MeV electrons which cause  the  damage.  The  resulting  unit of damage 
capability is called  the "DENI"* . The  second  effect  occurs when a bombarding 
particle  interacts with the  electron cloud surrounding  the  atom,  causing  the 
ejection of some of the  electrons  surrounding  the  atom.  The  result is ionization 
damage, which is due  to  the  subsequent  rearrangement of the  atoms  or  charges 
and  can  produce  changes in the  characteristics of the  material.  The  dose  from 
ionization  damage is usually  expressed in rads. t Bulk damage  has  serious 
deleterious effects on semiconductors, and  ionization damage  adversely  affects 
all spacecraft  materials as well as "planar"  semiconductor  devices  (these in- 
clude MOS devices, many  bipolar  transistors, and integrated  circuits). 
The  estimate of radiation  damage  due  to  the  near-Earth  environment,  the 
flight path  being  postulated as part of the  Task I effort, "Analysis of Selected 
Deep-Space Missions, I t  was  based on data on the Van Allen belt,  available in 
NASA documents (Ref. 1). The anticipated levels for interplanetary radiation 
*Damage-Equivalent Normally-Incident, 1-MeV Electrons/cm2. 
One rad is the  dose  resulting from radiation  incident on a  material  when  the  energy  deposited  in 
the material is 100 ergs per gram. 
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were  also  derived  from  published  data  (Refs. 2 and 3). The  near-Jupiter  environ- 
ment  was  based on particle flux data included  in the  Galactic  Jupiter  Probe 
Study and an  assumed  similarity of the  Jupiter  radiation  belt  to  the  Earth's 
Van Allen  belt.  The  estimate  prepared  for  each of these  three  environments 
was  summed  in  terms of estimated  total bulk damage and total  ionization  dose. 
An estimate of radiation  damage  stemming  from  the two  RTG's  was  also 
prepared  for  three  RTG-spacecraft  separation  distances,  calculated on the  basis 
of the  essentially  inverse-square  relationship between radiation f lux  and dis- 
tance  from  the RTG. The  total  radiation  environment  external  to  the  spacecraft 
was then  obtained by summing  total bulk damage  and  ionization  dose as a function 
of RTG-spacecraft  separation  distance. 
Internal  radiation  levels  were  estimated  for  exposed and protected  levels 
within the  spacecraft.  The  range of difference  in  internal  dose  levels is based 
on the  amount of "equivalent" shielding  surrounding  any component as a result 
of spacecraft  configuration and internal packaging. 
Table 1 summarizes  the  worst-case  damage  levels  from  the  combination of 
all radiation  sources.  More  detailed  data of this kind are presented  in  Tables 
4 and 5 in  Section II. 
I Notes for  Table 1 
1.  For the 5-year mission the regions considered were near-Earth. Earth to Jupiter, nearqupiter.  
and Jupiter and beyond. However. for worst-case presentation a 9-month pre-launch period is 
assumed  during which time the RTG's, fueled with PuO,. are  assumed  to be located 18 inches 
from  electronic  subsystems.  This  period of time  is occupied with the  integration of the  space- 
craft and pre-launch check-out of the spacecraft  at  the launch site. 
2. The energy  spectrum for the RTG's is given in Appendix II. The f l u x  and fluence are discussed 
in Section I D .  
3. The  proton and electron  flux  near  Earth and near  Jupiter are dependent upon the  distance from 
the  planets.  These data are given in  Section IIC-2 for near-Earth and Section IIC-4 for  near- 
Jupiter.  The  solar wind as well as the solar  flare proton  flux varies  inversely as the square of 
the  distance  from  the Sun (see Section IIC-3). The solar flare flux is  highly sporadic, but an 
average flux was used  based on measurements for the  period of 1956 to 1961. 
4. For an  estimate of damage to electronic  subsystems only the  naturally  occurring  electrons and 
protons noted were used. 
5. The tabulated particle data are in terms of integrated fluence (5 > E). 
6. Exposed internal  location is  equivalent  to  a  spherical  shiel4,of 100 mils of aluminum around a 
component. 
7. Typical  internal  location  is  equivalent to a spherical  shield of 270 mils of aluminum around a 
component. 
8. Two RTG's a re  used,  each  containing 1725 watts (t) of 5-year-aged Pu02 fuel with naturally oc- 
curring oxygen. 
9. A detailed  explanation of the  units D E N  and rads are found in Section LI. B. 
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2. The Accommodation of Radiation Damage Effects 
in Spacecraft Subsystems 
Whether o r  not a spacecraft  subsystem  can  survive a particular  radiation 
environment  depends  primarily  on  the  effect of the  environment on those  com- 
ponents  whose parameters wi l l  be  significantly  altered at the  anticipated  dose 
levels.  Subsystem  performance  degradation  can  usually  be held within tolerable 
limits by providing  adequate  allowances  in  the  design of the  subsystems  for  the 
anticipated component parameter  changes. Such changes  can  usually  be  accom- 
modated  by  the  application of various  circuit  design  techniques  such as feedback, 
for  example,  to  maintain  amplifier  gain  in  spite of significant  transistor  Beta 
reduction. If such  measures unduly complicate a circuit  design  then  considera- 
tion  can  be given to  other  possible  approaches  to  the  problem  such as the  addition 
of shielding  to  reduce  the  dose  levels  affecting the more  sensitive  components. 
Measures of this kind form  part of the  subsystem  design  procedure  called  "radia- 
tion  hardeningf which is outlined later in th i s  report and  described  in detail in 
Section IV . 
A difficulty ar ises ,  however, if  the  design  cycle of already  available  space- 
craft subsystems did not  include a radiation  hardening  procedure. In situations 
of this kind, a detailed  worst-case  analysis of all the  circuits  using  radiation- 
sensitive  components  must  be  made  to  determine  the  dose  levels  corresponding 
to  the  threshold of just  acceptable  subsystem  performance. If these  threshold 
dose  levels are below those  predicted by an  analysis of the  anticipated  environ- 
ment,  then  suitable  preventive  measures  must  be  taken. If component substitu- 
tions  or  circuit modifications  to  reduce  sensitivity to radiation are impractical, 
then  the only remaining  solution  to  the  problem  may  be  to add the  shielding 
needed  to  keep  component  degradation  to  within  acceptable  limits.  Radiation 
hardening  by  this  Tvafter-the-fact7T  method is usually much more involved and 
costly  than is needed if radiation  hardening  forms  part of the  normal  design 
procedure as recommended  in  the  present  project.  Radiation  testing of complete 
subsystems  has  also been considered as a possible method for  determining  the 
overall  radiation  susceptibility of particular  subsystem  designs.  Unfortunately, 
unlike  vacuum or thermal  testing,  radiation is frequently  destructive. In cases 
where  damage is reversible, high annealing  temperatures are required. Restoring 
complete  subsystems to their  original condition by such  an  annealing  process  does 
not appear  feasible at th i s  time.  Conceivably, it would be  possible  to irradiate a 
sufficient  number of subsystems so that  the  behavior of similar  unirradiated  units 
could  be  predicted on a statistical basis. In most  instances,  however, the  cost of 
following a test procedure of this kind  would probably be  prohibitive. This would 
not exclude a "proof-of-principle" test or  a test to  destruction of a single  engi- 
neering test model o r  a breadboard of an  electronic  package  during  the  design 
phase of a program. 
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It is assumed,  therefore,  that  the  design of subsystems  for  the NEW MOONS 
program wi l l  include a radiation  hardening  procedure  based  primarily  on con- 
servative  predictions of the effect of the  anticipated  environment on  individual 
radiation-sensitive  components  obtained by careful  testing of piece  parts. Any 
radiation tests or  preconditioning of components  for  flight units would be done 
on only a few selected  types  and would be  carried out before  assembly  into  elec- 
tronic  packages. 
Based on estimates of the NEW MOONS environment,  the  prediction of 
damage  effects  includes  analyses of radiation  susceptibility  in  three  important 
areas: (1) electronic  subsystems which degrade in performance as a result of 
component damage; (2) detector  subsystems which are subject  to  the  same  effects 
as electronic  subsystems,  and  are,  in  addition,  subject  to  inaccurate  measure- 
ments if flooded by excessive  local  radiation  emanating  from  the  RTG's; and 
(3) bulk materials,  such as thermal  coatings,  optical windows, etc., which are 
also  subject to deterioration  primarily  from  particle  bombardment and  conse- 
quently may not adequately serve  the  purpose for which they were intended. 
In  accommodating  the  probable  effect of the  NEW MOONS environment  on 
spacecraft  subsystems, it is necessary  to  consider  only  those  components  that 
wi l l  be  affected at the  anticipated  dose  levels as generally  indicated  in  Figure 1. 
This  Figure shows the  dose  level  ranges  that  can  be  expected  to  produce  signifi- 
cant changes in the  characteristics of various  devices and materials.  The  data 
presented in Figure 1 are based on the  results of extensive tests,  comp;iled 
principally by the Lockheed Aircraft Co. , The  Battelle  Memorial  Institute, and 
RCA (Refs. 4 and 5). A t  the  worst-case  dose  levels  estimated  for  the NEW MOONS 
environment as summarized in Table 1, the  components of interest are transis- 
tors ,  integrated  circuits and germanium  devices, MOS devices,  diodes, and thyris- 
tors.  Each of these  devices w a s  treated first in terms of the  physics of radiation- 
induced failure, then in terms of sensitivity  to  the  dose  levels  anticipated  for  the 
NEW MOONS mission.  The  evaluation of the  radiation  sensitrvity of these  devices 
is empirical to the  extent  that  the  predictions are based  on  past  experience  and 
experiments  made on earlier projects.  (Devices  in  use at the  time of the  mission 
may  incur a different set of damage  problems.) They wi l l  serve only as guide- 
lines  to  indicate  where  performance  deterioration  due  to  radiation  damage  can 
be  clearly  anticipated. 
3. Recommended Radiation Hardening Program 
Radiation  hardening is a comprehensive  program involved in  every  phase of 
spacecraft  planning and design  functions.  Activities of radiation  specialists  and 
11 

T ". ... ... ... - 
ENVIRON- szi MISSION - 
MENTS - 
(5 YR) - 
E 
- 
SPACE- 
CRAFT 
PARTS 
AND 
MATERIALS 
10' 
DEFINITION OF t: t EXPRESSESTHE 
OVERALL PROTECTION  SUPPLIED  BY  OTHER 
SPACECRAFT  PARTS, IN TERMS  OF MILS OF 
SPACE  ENVT. ( t  = 270 mil) A ALUMINUM,  DISTRIBUTED  EVENLY  AROUND 
.............................................................................. ::::A:;<:: :.:. ............................................................... "1- ......................................... . ...... ......  : : . . :.fRTG* AT 1 w .  PLus NOMINAL SPACE  ENVT. ( t  = loo mil) 
I 
i i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
_I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
LOW.FRE~UENCY TRANSISTORS 
~ O L A R  CELLS 
I 
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRANSISTORS 
/ 
I 
OF MATERIAL ( 3 R  DEVICE) 
BEGINS  TO  SHOW SIGNIFICANT 
DEGRADATION (e.g.l5% FOR 
DIODES 
I 
I - MOS  AND JUNCTION F.E.T. 
li3sssm SILICON RESISTORS 
OF MATERIAL (OR DEVICE) 
BEGINS  TO  SHOW SIGNIFICANT 
DEGRADATION (e.g.l5% FOR 
TRANSISTOR  GAIN) 
1013  1014  1015  1016  10" lo1' EQUIVALENT 1-MeV 
ELECTRONS/cm2  ("DENI") 
I I I 1 I I I 
10'0  10"  1012  1013  1014  1015  1016 NEUTRONS/cm2  (E > 10 KeV) 
SCALES OF BULK DAMAGE UNITS$ 
NOTES: (1) uv dmage   i s  not included. (2) Mission i s  5-Year Interplanetary with  Jupiter flyb; and 18" RTG/spocecrah separation distmce, as defined in Section IIA. 
(3) See Figure 2 for Zone definition. 
2 RTG's each 2 1725 WATT (T)  See Table 4. Some l imitations to the  use  of  these  scales are given on pg. 21 (footnote). 'No RTG. 
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Correlated With Bulk Damage Levels  in  Various  Zones  of  the NEW MOONS Spacecraft 
design  engineers will  need  coordination  throughout an overall  program  such as 
the  development of a spacecraft  to  perform  the NEW MOONS missions.  During 
the  various  program  phases  the  major  anticipated  corresponding  project  and 
radiation  hardening  activities are listed below. 
I. DEFINITION  PHASE 
General  Project Activity Radiation  Hardening  Activity 
Mission  Description  A alysis of the  Space  Environment  a d 
Spacecraft Concept 
Subsystem  Performance  Components 
Specifications 
Spacecraft  Subsystems Layout Materials 
RTG Radiation  Environment 
Estimates of Dose  Levels Affecting 
Determination of Critical Parts and 
Estimates of Spacecraft  Radiation 
Zones  and  Degradation of Parts and 
Materials as Laid Out 
Recommendations for Radiation  Testing 
11. DESIGN  AND DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
General  Project  A ivity  Radiation  Hardening  Activity 
Spacecraft  Structural  Design  Refinement of Environmental and Dose 
Subsystems Design 
Build  Subsystems  Breadboard Shielding Estimates 
Level  Data 
Map Breadboard  Spacecraft  to  Verify 
Design  Reviews  Radiation  Testing of Critical Com- 
Build  Breadboard  Radiation 
ponents  and Materials 
Spacecraft  An lysis of Problem Areas Caused by 
Device o r  Material Degradation 
Recommendations for Shielding or  Alter- 
nate Radiation Problem Solutions, in- 
cluding special  onboard  dosimetry* 
*Such dosimetric experiments would be complementary to the scientific  experiments  and  would mon- 
itor  dose  levels  within  the  spacecraft at various  locations to confirm hazard estimates.  
14 
111. HARDWARE  PHASE 
General  Project  A ivity  Radiation  Hardening Activity 
a. Prototype 
Build  Prototype  Subsystems Proof-of-Principle  Radiation 
Subsystems  and  Systems Subsystems 
Exposure  Tests on Selected 
Testing 
Build Prototype  Spacecraft 
b.  Flight 
Build Flight U n i t s  Life  Tests on Selected  Subsystems 
A s  indicated  previously, a suitable  radiation  hardening  procedure should be 
included as an  essential  part of the NEW MOONS program  to  ensure  the  survival 
of all subsystems without performance  deterioration beyond acceptable  limits. 
Both the project definition phase and the  hardware  phase wi l l  involve a coopera- 
tive  effort  between  design  engineers and radiation  specialists.  This  cooperation 
is an  essential  part of the  radiation  hardening  procedure  even  during  the  early 
part of the  program  because  tradeoffs at this  stage wi l l  probably involve  such 
questions,  for  example, as the  optimum  placement of subsystems on the  space- 
craft  structure.  Those  subsystems  particularly  sensitive  to  radiation  from  the 
RTG's  should,  other  factors  permitting,  be  placed at the maximum possible  dis- 
tance  from  these  radiation  sources. 
Two alternative  programs  for  radiation  hardening NEW MOONS components 
are  described  in  this  report. Both are predicated on the  results of previous  tests 
and the  need  for  supplementary  radiation  testing of critical components  and  ma- 
terials. Although a large quantity of component radiation test data is available 
as a result of extensive tests by RCA and other  organizations,  there is a continuing 
need for updating  information on older component types and thoroughly  evaluating 
new ones.  Differences  in  the  effect of radiation on semiconductor  devices  even of 
the  same type are not uncommon. The  reasons  for  this  variability are not always 
clear. Variability  can arise from  changes  in  manufacturing  process  techniques, 
from  some  inherent  difference  in  materials  from  batch to batch, or  from inade- 
quate  control of manufacturing  processes with regard to reproducibility. 
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The two radiation  hardening  programs  under  consideration  represent 
different  approaches  to  the  same  end,  each with its  particular  advantages and 
disadvantages. The first  of these  programs,  based on worst-case  prediction 
data,  appears to  have the  advantage of economy in  both program  time and cost if 
the  damage  hazard is not, after analysis, found to  be  too  serious. For this  type 
of test program,  small  statistical  samples of each  device are irradiated and sub- 
sequently  measured  for  change  in  electrical  perfor'mance.  These  measurements 
form the  basis  for  predicting  the  worst-case  level of radiation  degradation  ex- 
pected  for a particular  device  from a specific  manufacturer.  The  design  engineer 
then  applies  the  prediction data to  his circuit and  determines what measures may 
be  taken  to  avoid  failure. If the  device  degrades within tolerable  limits, no major 
circuit  changes is needed. If the  device is not  within tolerable  limits, he has an 
ar ray  of alternatives, e.g., choose  another  device (and test it), redesign  his  circuit 
to  accept  reduced  performance, find a more  protected  spacecraft  location  for  the 
circuit,  provide  additional  shielding, or  seek  other  possible  alternatives. 
The  second  radiation  hardening  program  under  consideration is based on the 
promising  experimental  results  from  recent RCA tests of a radiation  precondi- 
tioning  procedure.  The  object of this  procedure is to  determine  in  advance with 
high accuracy  the  anticipated  effect of space  radiation on particularly  critical 
transistors.  Test  samples  in  this  case would be 100 percent of the quantity  needed 
for a particular  device  plus a percentage of extras. The  subsystem  design engi- 
neer would submit  performance  criteria  to  the  radiation  evaluation  project  in 
terms of allowable  degradation.  The  total  batch would then  be  irradiated and 
subsequently  measured  to  determine  percent of degradation. All those  devices 
that were found to be within tolerance would be  baked;  the baking procedure  pro- 
duces  an  annealing  effect which serves  to  restore the  device  to  near its original 
(pre-irradiation)  performance  level. For any  subsequent  irradiation (to the  same 
dose  level  used  for  testing),  the component is expected to degrade to approximately 
the  same  level  measured after the initial irradiation. By way of this irradiate- 
measure-anneal  cycle  then, the  designer is supplied with space-qualified  devices, 
suitable  for  spacecraft  integration, whose performance is within tolerance and 
whose  subsequent  degradation  during  flight is known. 
This  screening  process not only makes  possible much greater  uniformity 
of radiation  resistance in semiconductor  devices  used but also,  most  signifi- 
cantly,  obviates the possibility of inadvertently  incorporating a "maverick" 
into a critical  circuit. A device is called a ''maverick" if its parameter  changes 
are greatly in excess of the amount that would normally  be  expected on a statis- 
tical basis  from  radiation  testing a batch of devices of the  same type. While 
the  incidence of "mavericks" is exceedingly  infrequent, their  occasional  oc- 
currence  represents a small but definite  possibility of a catastrophic  failure 
even at relatively low dose  levels.  For  very long spacecraft  missions in par- 
ticular, it is extremely  important  to avoid the  possibility of incorporating  such 
anomalously  sensitive  devices in critical  circuits. 
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Although the  worst-case  prediction  program  incorporates, by comparison, 
a small test effort, it still retains  an  element of reliability  risk  in  that  the  de- 
sign  engineer  receives only statistical estimates of worst-case  degradation 
which involve inherent  uncertainties. In  addition,  since  he  must  design for  
worst-case  performance  he  may  have  to  penalize  his  system unduly to  anticipate 
such  changes.  This  can  lead  to  redundancy (added weight  and  added  power drain) 
o r  consideration of a possible  reduction  in  subsystem  performance  requirements. 
Obviously,  such a design  change  in one circuit  can often affect all subsequent 
circuits in the  electronic  chain and lead, in the  end,  to a much larger and longer 
design or redesign  effort. 
The  recommended  choice of radiation  hardening  programs  will  be  strongly 
influenced by the  final  estimate of the  somewhat  uncertain  space  hazard and the 
final  spacecraft RTG configuration,  since  dose  levels will  depend on the  place- 
ment of the  RTG's on the  spacecraft  structure,  It is also  reasonable to consider 
a combination of the two proposed programs,  where  worst-case  testing would be 
suitable  for  devices in less critical circuits or ,  where  due  to  location,  dose  levels 
would be low. In the opposite instance, however, in unprotected locations o r  
where  dose levels may be high,  preselection  seems to be the  best  approach  to 
ascertain  that  subsystem  performance  will not degrade below tolerable levels 
due  to  radiation  damage of components. 
Onboard  flight  dosimetry  data  telemetered  from  early  flybys would provide 
an  important  contribution  to post-launch analysis.  Feedback or guidance is 
thereby provided for later phases of the  program.  Furthermore,  decisions on 
the  real-time  management of each  spacecraft in flight  could  be  influenced by a 
knowledge of the  true  degree of radiation  damage  existing in a payload at a given 
stage.  In  the  same  sense as temperature  telemetry assists such  decisions, 
radiation-damage  telemetry would be a factor  in  assessing  the  practical  life- 
expectancy of the  system of unexpected failure  modes  threatened  to  curtail  the 
mission. 
4. Impact of Radiation Effects on the NEW MOONS Program 
(Time and Cost) 
Radiation  hardening as a design  parameter  inevitably  has  some  time and 
cost  implications. A well-planned radiation  analysis  effort need not add greatly 
to  the  time  required  to  bring a spacecraft  from concept to launch  phase,  since 
the  work involved can  be  dovetailed with the  routine  design  process.  However, 
the  services of "radiation effects" specialists  grounded  to  some  degree  in  radia- 
tion  physics, test procedures, and design  engineering are required. 
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SECTION II 
ANALYSIS OF THE RADIATION ENVIRONMENT 
A. General 
The  flight  path of the NEW MOONS spacecraft,  for  the  purposes of this dis- 
cussion, is based  on  data  taken  from  the  Task I report.  Over a 5-year  period, 
the  spacecraft is expected  to follow a trajectory  essentially  in  the  plane of the 
ecliptic  from a near-Earth  parking  orbit  to a near-encounter with Jupiter and 
then  continuing on well  beyond Jupiter.  The  distance  from  the  center of Jupiter 
to  the  spacecraft at its closest  point to the  planet is taken as 8.4 Jupiter radii ( R j  ). 
From a 200 mi  (nautical)  parking  orbit  near  the  Earth  the  elapsed  time  to  reach 
Jupiter at about  5 AU will take  about 549.5 days.  The  remaining  part of the 5- 
year  mission  period wi l l  take  the  spacecraft  to  nearly 16 AU. 
A substantial  part of the  radiation  dose  accumulated by spacecraft  components 
during  the  mission is expected  to  come  from  exposure  to  relatively  intense radia- 
tion  during  passage  through  the  Earth's Van Allen  belt  and the presumed  equiva- 
lent  belt  surrounding  Jupiter  even though the  exposure  times wi l l  be  relatively 
short ,  about 1 hour near the  Earth, and  about  15  hours near Jupiter. * In inter- 
planetary  space,  although  the  radiation  intensity  in  this  region is much lower  than 
it is in  the  belts,  the long exposure  time wil l  allow a significant  buildup in dose 
levels.  Radiation  from  the  RTG's wi l l ,  of course,  contribute  continuously  to  the 
dose  received  by  the  spacecraft. 
Radiation  from  the  RTG's  consists  primarily of fast neutrons and gamma 
rays. In contrast,  the  source of space  radiation  encountered  during the 5-year 
mission  consists  mainly of high-energy  electrons  and  protons. In addition, bom- 
barding  electrons,  interacting with the  material of the  spacecraft, will also gen- 
erate X-rays of the  same  general  nature  as  the  gamma  rays  from  the  RTG's. 
Intensity of radiation  in  the  near-Earth  region  reaches a maximum at about 
1500 mi  (nautical)  above  the  equator  because of the  high-energy  electrons  and 
protons  trapped  in  the  Earth's  magnetic  field. In the  region  between  the  planets, 
the  only  radiation  likely to affect the  spacecraft wil l  be  the  protons  ejected  from 
the Sun in  the  solar wind and  solar  flares. In addition,  ultraviolet  radiation  from 
the Sun can  affect  the  outer  surfaces of the  spacecraft.  Present  evidence  suggests 
that  a radiation  belt of the  same  general  characteristics as that of the  Earth's 
Van Allen belt,  but of considerably  greater  intensity, exists within the  presumed 
strong  magnetic  field  surrounding  Jupiter. 
* See Appendix I for variations of fluence with variations in radius of c l o s e s t  approach. 
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Estimating  the combined  effect of subsystem  exposure  to  the  space and RTG 
radiation  environments is a complex  procedure.  It is first necessary  to  deter- 
mine  the  anticipated  types  and  levels of space and RTG radiation  that will  arrive 
at  the surface of the  spacecraft  over  the  prescribed  mission  period.  This  deter- 
mination is then followed  by the  preparation of internal  dose  level  estimates, 
based on the  calculated  external  environment  and  the  radiation  shielding  provided 
by the  spacecraft  structure and the  protection  provided  a  particular  device  by 
surrounding components  and enclosures.  Estimates of the impact of these dose 
levels on individual devices  and  circuits  form the basis  for  determining the 
overall  effect  on  subsystem  performance and the  measures  that  must  be  taken, 
such a s  added shielding,  to  prevent  performance  deterioration beyond acceptable 
limits. 
The  approach  used  to  arrive at a  final  estimate of the  internal  radiation 
environment  and its effect is outlined  briefly  in Section ID. The  remainder of 
this  section,  then,  describes  each  step of the  analysis  in  detail,  providing  esti- 
mated  results and conclusions. 
B. Technical Approach 
1. General 
In predicting  the combined  effect of various  types of radiation on materials, 
particularly  semiconductors, it is necessary to distinguish  between two types of 
radiation damage: bulk damage and ionization  damage. 
a. Bulk Damage.  Bulk  damage is the effect  produced by particle  bombard- 
ment  described a s  the  displacement of atoms  from  the  crystal  lattice of a  semi- 
conductor as a  consequence of collisions.  The  resulting  defects  affect  the  elec- 
trical  properties of the crystal;  in  the  range of interest, t he  principal  effect is 
normally  a  reduction  in the lifetime of the  minority carriers.  
The bulk-damage-producing capability of bombarding particles is strongly 
dependent  on their  energy,  charge, and mass.  Electrons in the 8-MeV range, 
for example,  produce about 15 times  more  damage  in  silicon  than 1-MeV elec- 
trons. 1-MeV neutrons produce more damage than 1-MeV electrons. To facili- 
tate  comparisons of bulk-damage-producing capabilities,  a  method  was evolved 
by  Bell  Telephone Laboratories (BTL) and RCA for  converting a mixed-particle 
energy  spectrum into units which express  the  damage this spectrum could cause 
(Ref. 6). 
A s  described in Section IC-1, the  degree of bulk displacement  can be  con- 
veniently  expressed as  the  equivalent  fluence of 1-MeV electrons which cause 
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the  damage, and the  resulting unit of damage  capability is called  the DEN. 
Several  investigators (Refs. 1 and 7) have determined  efficiency  factors  ex- 
perimentally  for  different  energy  ranges which, when multiplied  by the  par- 
ticle population in that  energy  range, give the  damage-producing  potential in 
DENI’s. 
These  damage  efficiency  factors depend strongly on the  nature of the bom- 
barding  particles,  their  energy, and the  type of semiconductor  device  subjected 
to  bombardment. Also of importance is the  injection  level at which the  device is 
to  operate as well as the  type of doping impurity and its concentration  in the sili- 
con. However, so long as these  factors  are  remembered*, a similar bulk-damage- 
summing  procedure  for  mixed  fluxes of particles is practical  for  the  purpose of 
making a worst-case  engineering  estimate of device  degradation  during a mission. 
Some  definitive RCA work  in  this  field is given in  Reference 7. 
b. Ionization Damage. Ionization damage is the effect produced in a material 
by the  passage of high-energy particles o r  photons which eject  some of the  elec- 
trons bound to  atoms. Subsequent rearrangement of the  atoms  or  charges  may 
produce  changes  in  the  characteristics of the  material.  This is the  type of 
damage which most  affects all common  spacecraft  materials (e.g., plastics, 
optics)  and is a primary  cause of degradation  in  “planartf  semiconductor  devices. 
Ionization damage wi l l ,  for  example,  turn  glass brown  throughout its thickness, 
whereas, in the case of bipolar  transistors, only the  surface of the  transistor 
chip is sensitive.  This  circumstance has lead to the  description of ionization 
damage, as it pertains to transistors,  as “surface damage.” 
* 
Limi ta t ions  to the Use of Bulk Damage Efficiency Factors 
The term, “Bulk Damage Efficiency Factors,’’ as used   in   th i s   foo tnote   concerns   the   conver -  
s ion  from  “Equivalent 1-MeV Electrons/cm ’ (DENI)” to “Bulk  Damage  Units - Neutrons/cm’ 
( E  > 10 KeVY’. 
The   f luence  of 1-MeV electrons  which  produce a given  amount  of  damage  in a so la r  cell is 
about  l o 3  t imes   h igher   than   the   f luence  of reactor   neutrons  required to do  the  same  damage  (Ref .  7); 
on  the  other   hand,   with  bipolar   t ransis tors ,   the   factor  is  about  10’. The   reason   for   th i s  is the  dif-  
fe rence   in   “ in jec t ion   leve l”   in   the   two  s i tua t ions .  In ear l ier   explanatory  sect ions  (see e.g., 
Fig.   1B)  the  la t ter   factor ,  lo2,  is takeh  as a working  ratio to deal   with  the  normal   s i l icon  junct ion 
dev ices   u sed   i n t e rna l ly   i n   t he   spacec ra f t  (e.g., t rans is tors ,  SCR’s, diodes ,   in tegra ted   c i rcu i t s ,  
e tc . )   in   which  the  e lectr ical   degradat ion is controlled  by  the  degradation  of  minority-carrier  l ife- 
t ime  and   the   in jec t ion   leve ls   a re   h igh .  
The  case of the  MOS dev ice  is different ;   here ,   the   only  important   effects  of neut rons   on   the  
s i l i con  is to reduce  majority-carrier  conduction  (Ref.  20); the  ra t io  of damage  efficiencies  for  neu- 
t rons   and   e lec t rons   wi l l   be   d i f fe ren t   aga in   here ,   a l though  the   ra t io   o f   damage   e f f ic ienc ies   o f   the  
two   pa r t i c l e   t ypes  is still in   the   reg ion  of 10’ (see,   for   example,  H. Stein  and R. Gereth,  J. Appl. 
Phys .  39 (6), 28701968). Note also, however, that in most common radiation situations,  and with 
state-of-the-art  MOS dev ices ,  i t  is not   the  bulk  damage  effect ,   produced  by  neutrons,   which  domi-  
n a t e s   t h e   e l e c t r i c a l   c h a n g e s   i n   t h e   d e v i c e .   L o n g   b e f o r e   t h i s   e f f e c t  is significant,   the  ionization 
e f fec t   has   p roduced   very   ex tens ive   changes   in   the   device .  
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In a similar  manner as that  described  for  bulk  damage,  the  ionization- 
damage-producing  capability of a mixed  radiation  environment  can  be  summed 
and expressed  in  rads. By definition, 100 ergs  of ionization  energy  deposited 
in a gram of material  constitutes a dose of 1 rad.  The amount of energy  ab- 
sorbed  per  gram of material  per  particle or  photon depends  on  the  energy  and 
type of the  incident  radiation.  For  electrons,  this  variation  in  absorbed  energy 
v s  particle  energy  in  the  range  from 0 to 8 MeV is relatively  small. For the  
protons  in  the  range  from 0 to 1000 MeV, however, it may  be  several  orders of 
magnitude. Thus, it will  be  seen  that  calculation of the  ionizing  dose will ,  as for 
the bulk damage  calculations,  be  complicated by the  need  for  using  energy-de- 
pendence factors for  electrons,  protons,  neutrons,  and  gamma  photons. 
The  advantage of using  the DEN1 and rad  system  in  estimating  the  radia- 
tion  dose  affecting  a  subsystem is that  contributions  from  various  sources can 
be converted into the  same  units  and added arithmetically. 
2. Procedure for Estimating Total Radiation Dose 
from the  Space  Environment 
To estimate  the combined  effect of the  various  types of space  radiation on 
particular  spacecraft  subsystems,  four  different  kinds of information are needed: 
The  number and directionality of the  particles which the  spacecraft will  
encounter  during  the  mission,  classified  according to their  energy con- 
tent  for  each of the  radiation  regions  (near-Earth,  Interplanetary-Earth 
to  Jupiter,  near-Jupiter , and  Interplanetary-Jupiter  and Beyond). 
The  relationship  between  the  energy  content of the  particles and their 
damage-producing  capability. 
The  relationship  between  the  energy  content of the  particles and their 
ability to. penetrate  materials,  such as aluminum,  used  in the construc- 
tion of the  spacecraft. 
The  radiation  shielding  provided by adjacent  devices  and  enclosures 
surrounding  individual  components. 
The  relationship  between  the  damage-producing  capability of the  incoming 
particles and the  shielding  effect of the  intervening  materials  and  structures 
protecting  sensitive  components is then  expressed  as  a  "damage  profile"  for 
each of the two types of damage, bulk  and ionization. 
3. Procedure for Estimating Total Radiation Dose from Two RTG's 
Major  differences  in  the  nature  and  source of the  radiation  from  the  RTG's 
compared with space  radiation  dictate  a  somewhat  different  approach  to  the 
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evaluation of damage  effects  from this source.  The fast neutrons and gamma 
rays emanating from the RTG's are highly penetrating  compared with most of 
the  electron and proton population in  space.  Protecting  sensitive components 
from RTG radiation  by  providing  sufficient  shielding could impose a severe 
weight penalty on the  spacecraft.  However, the essentially  inverse-square  re- 
lationship between radiation flux and distance  from  the RTG 'can  be  used  to  deter- 
mine  radiation  levels  at  various  distances  from  the  RTG, and a safe  distance  for 
the  placement of sensitive components can  then  be  determined. By using  isoflux 
maps, which indicate the contours of equal  radiation flux in  the  region  surrounding 
an RTG,  the  relationship between dose  level  and  distance  may  again be plotted  in 
terms of rads and DENPs. 
NOTE: Radiation  effects on spacecraft  subsystems  can  be  reduced by 
shielding  techniques and by separation  techniques and  combinations of these. 
The  weight considerations  associated with reducing  the  radiation background at 
the  scientific  experiments is covered  in  Task IV. 
4. Calculation of Internal  Environment 
In estimating the radiation  dose  affecting a particular  component, the con- 
tributions  from  various  sources  expressed  in  compatible  damage units can be 
added arithmetically.  Dose-vs-distance  curves will provide  the  information 
necessary to  estimate  the  dose  from the RTGfs,  assuming  that no special 
shielding is added to attenuate  neutron and gamma flux. 
In estimating  the  dose  contribution  from  space  radiation,  the  necessary  data 
are taken  from  damage  profiles, which show how the  anticipated  dose  from  the 
space  environment  affecting  a component wi l l  vary  as a  function of the  thickness 
of a  hypothetical  uniform  spherical  shell of aluminum  surrounding  the component. 
The  data  from  the  damage  profiles  are  then applied to  a  Sector  Analysis* of the 
spacecraft  structure, which is, in  effect,  a  technique  for  calculating  the  amount 
of shielding  surrounding  any  component,  based on the  spacecraft  configuration 
and  packaging. The  values of equivalent  shield  thicknesses  for  various  particle 
paths through the spacecraft a r e  determined, and through the use of the damage , 
profiles,  the  net  level of internal  radiation  to which a  component will  be exposed 
can be estimated. In addition to analytical techniques for determining spacecraft , 
shielding  exposure of a  breadboard  radiation  spacecraft  to  a  suitable  radiation 
source with appropriate  detectors  at  various  locations within  the spacecraft  a 
more  precise  estimate of the  thickness of an  idealized  aluminum  shield  can  be 
obtained. An idea of the large  variety of radiation  exposure  conditions  produced 
within the  structure of a  spacecraft is shown in  Figure 2. 
* 
Discussed  in  Sections IIE and IVB of this report. 
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Figure 2. The Various Radiation Zones on a Spacecraft 
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The  final  summing of the combined dose-levels  from  space  and RTG radia- 
tion in two categories of ionization and bulk damage  is  then achieved by 
adding the damage  values  for  space  radiation to that for RTG radiation  for  vari- 
ous  distances of the RTG from the spacecraft  structure.  The  procedure  described 
above is shown in block diagram  form  in  Figure 3. 
C. Detailed Analysis of External Radiation Flux 
From Space Environment* 
In estimating  the  anticipated  radiation  dose  from  the  space  environment  that 
will  affect  sensitive components  within the  spacecraft,  the  result of exposure  to 
each  of  the  different  radiation  regions  has been  evaluated.  Damage vs  shield- 
thickness  profiles  for  the combined  effect of the  various  types and energies of 
space  radiation  particle  were  then  plotted. 
In general,  a  review of Table 1, Summary of Worst-case  Estimates of 
Radiation  Damage Levels  for  a 5-Year NEW MOONS Mission,  indicates  the  rela- 
tive  orders of magnitude of radiation  dose  attributable  to  various  regions of the 
mission.  Assuming  that  the  total  "mission  dose"  for components in a  typical and 
exposed spacecraft  location is 100 percent,  then,  for ionization damage, the per- 
cent  distribution  among  the  various  regions, including the RTG contribution in 
the  region, could be thought of in the following terms: 
I - 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Region 
"_ -~ -~ 
Integration and Pre - Launch 
Near-Earth 
Earth  to  Jupiter 
Near-Jupiter 
Jupiter and Beyond 
. .. . .  ~ -~ 
I 1 
Dose (percent) 
~ 
Typical Location 
11 
Neg . 
25 
10 
54 
Exposed  Location 
2 
Neg. 
4 
86 
8 
While this is not a  complete  presentation, it does  serve  to  illustrate  the  relative 
area of concern.  Each of these  areas is discussed  in  the following sections: 
1. Integration and Pre-Launch 
Radiation  to  the  spacecraft  during  the  integration and  pre-launch  period is 
due to the RTG environment  and not space  environment  but it is noted here be- 
*References  are  given at appropriate  points  in  the  text to the  principal  sources from which  the 
basic  space environment data were taken. See References 1,  2, 3, 9, and 13. 
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Figure 3. Procedure for Estimating Combined Radiaticn Damage Levels Within Spacecraft Structure 
cause it represents  the first region,  ground, of exposure of the  spacecraft to a 
radiation  field. Ground testing  can  add  greatly  to  the  radiation  dose  level de- 
pending on the  exposure  period  and  the  proximity of the  RTG's to sensitive  space- 
craft components. A worst-case  estimate  has  been  made  based on a 9-month 
exposure and an 18-inch RTG-spacecraft separation distance. The magnitude of 
the  dose  level  accumulated  under  these  conditions is given in Table 1. A thorough 
discussion of RTG-produced radiation is given in Section IID, "Radiation  Dose 
from RTG's. It Although the ground region is of concern,  this  report  deals  pri- 
marily with the  flight  portion of the  mission, and subsequent  discussions  do not 
include  the  integration and pre-launch  dose  level. 
2. The Near-Earth Region 
The  electrons  and  protons  trapped  in  the  Earth's  magnetic  field  occur 
principally  in a region  referred  to as the Van Allen  belt.  This is a region of 
intense  high-energy-particle  radiation  that  surrounds  Earth  outside  the  atmos- 
phere.  Trapped  electrons  have  energies  from a few hundred  electron  volts to 
over. 8 MeV, protons  from a few  kilovolts  to  over 1000 MeV. However,  the popu- 
lation of both particle  types is concentrated  toward  the low energy  region. 
Passage through  the  Earth's Van Allen  belt wi l l  subject the spacecraft to 
relatively  intense  radiation  for a short  period of time.  Information  needed  to 
estimate  the magnitude of the effect  includes the trajectory through  the  belt  and 
the  variation of radiation  intensity with altitude.  Curve A in  Figure 4 shows  the 
variation  in  spacecraft  altitude  above  Earth  from  the  time it leaves a parking 
orbit* 100 mi  (nautical)  until it is well beyond the  most  intense  region of the 
radiation  belt.  The  altitude  curve is based on a computer  run,  prepared for 
Task I ,  determining  the  flight  path  during the initial  phase of the  trip to Jupiter. 
Figure 5 is a typical map showing the distribution of electron flux with 
energies > 0.5 MeV in t h e  Van Allen belt,  averaged  over a 24-hour period. 
Estimates of t h e  particle flux affecting the  spacecraft  during  this  part of the  
journey are based  on  data  available  in NASA publications. One of these  publica- 
tions lists the  anticipated  electron and proton  environment in late 1968; these 
data  were  used unchanged (Ref. 1). The e r r o r  in using  the  same  data  for launch 
dates  in 1974 is not expected  to  exceed a factor of two since  the  particle popula- 
tion  in  the Van Allen belt is apparently  reaching a relatively  stable  level  after 
being greatly  disturbed by the  'fstarfish"  explosions  in 1962. This  situation could 
be drastically  altered if nuclear  experiments  in  space are resumed. 
Curve B in  Figure 4 shows the  variation  in  electron flux with time  corre- 
sponding to the  altitude  variation of Curve A. The area under  Curve B is, there- 
* 
Since  the  particle flux at the parking orbit altitude i s  only a small fraction of the flux at altitudes 
above about 300 mi (nautical), the dose contribution from exposure to radiation in the parking 
orbit  can  be  neglected. 
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fore, a measure of the  total flux of electrons  having  energies  above 0.5 MeV that 
strike  the  surface of the  spacecraft  during  passage  through  the Van Allen  belt.  The 
result of graphical  integration is an  electron  fluence of 3.8 x loio electron/cm2 of 
energy greater than 0.5 MeV. In obtaining  Curve B from  the NASA data, it was  
assumed  that  the  flight  path would not be  inclined  more  than  about 20 degrees 
from  Earth's geomagnetic  equator.  It was also  assumed  that  the  variation  in 
flux with longitude  could be  ignored without causing  serious  errors. Since  the 
NASA tables are based on 24-hour averages,  using  the  data  for  shorter  exposures 
wi l l  be somewhat in error,  particularly at low altitudes. 
Curve C in  Figure 4 showing the  variation  in  proton flux with time, was ob- 
tained in the  same  manner'as  Curve B. A graphical  determination of the area' 
under  Curve  C  gives a proton  fluence of 2.8 X l o 7  protons/cm2 of energy  greater 
than 15 MeV. 
The  procedure,  illustrated by Figure 4, w a s  repeated a number of times, 
each  time  using a different  value  for  the  minimum  particle  energy  and  different 
from  those  forming  the  basis  for  the  curves  in  Figure 4. The  results of such 
calculations are summarized  in  Table 2 ,  Column A.  Data of this kind,  combined 
with similar  data  from  exposure  to  radiation  over  other  segments of the  flight 
path,  form  the  basis  for  calculations of the  anticipated  total  radiation  damage or 
dose  levels  from  exposure to the  combination of the  space and RTG environments. 
3. Interplanetary Space (Earth to Jupiter) 
a. Solar Flares. The solar disturbances called flares occasionally eject 
into space  short but extremely  intense  clouds of high-energy  protons.  The  major 
proton  flares  occur at highly irregular  time  intervals, and there  are  rarely  more 
than  five  per  year.  Predictions of the  frequency  and  intensity of these bursts are 
based  largely  on  the  history of such  events  and are, therefore,  subject to con- 
siderable  error.  Observations of these phenomena  since  the  early  1800's  indicate 
that  solar  disturbances of this kind follow an 11-year  cycle of increasing and  de- 
creasing  intensity. A launch  date  in 1974 would coincide  approximately with a 
minimum  in solar activity. To determine  the  approximate  average  effect of this 
radiation,  an  estimate w a s  prepared of the  possible  total  integrated  solar  proton 
flux  on  the following basis: It was  assumed  that  the  solar  proton flux in  the re- 
gion near the  Earth but outside its magnetic  field would be  constant and  equal to 
the  average  measured  over the  period  from 1956 to 1961. This  average,  deter- 
mined  from  data  included  in  reports by Dr. W. Webber (Ref. 2) is shown in 
Table 3. It was also  assumed  that  this  flux will  vary  inversely as the  square of 
the  distance  from  the Sun. 
The  technique  used  previously  in  estimating  the  total  flux  from  trapped  pro- 
tons  and  electrons was also found useful  in  calculating  the  total  integrated  flux 
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Table 2 
Summary of Estimates of Particle  Fluence 
From  Space  Environment - 5-Year  Mission* 
-~ . .. . . . 
Particles 
" .~ - . 
Electrons 
per sq. cm. 
- - ~~ 
Protons 
per sq. cm. 
E ner gy 
(MeV) 
0.001 
0.5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Solar Wind 
1.001 to 0.050 
~ ~~ ~~ -~ 
> 0.1 
0.4 
1.0 
4.0 
10 
15 
30 
A 
Tmpped 
Particles 
Near-Earth 
(+ > E ) $  
2.7 x 10l1 
0.38 
0.092 
0.011 
0.0026 
0.00078 
0.00024 
0.000075 
0.000025 v 
~~~~ 
Not 
Applicable 
~ 
9.7 x 10'0 
4.0 
0.12 
0.050 
0.0080 
0.0028 
0.00068 v 
B 
hterplanetary 
Space+ 
(4 5 E) 
Not 
Applicable 
-2.9 X 1015 
Solar  Flare 
- 
- 
0.093 x l0,l2 
0.0099 
0.00248 
0.00136 
0.00050 
C 
Trapped 
Particles 
Near-Jupiter5 
" - - 
(+ > E) 
6.91 X 1013 
1.02 
0.306 
0.0613 
0.0143 
0.00368 
0.000956 
0.000253 
0.000068 7 
Not 
Applicable 
23 .O 
6.7 
0.050 
0.00118 
0.00027 
0.000015 
44.2 x 10l2 
V 
D 
Total 
(4 > E) 
6.94 x lo1' 
1.02 
0.307 
0.0614 
0.0143 
0.00369 
0.000958 
0.000254 
0.000068 v 
-2.9 X 1015 
44.3 x 10 
23 .O 
6.79 
0.0604 
0.00374 
0.00163 
0.00052 
12 
'I 
* 
For  a more  detailed  breakdown see T a b l e  1. 
t A  la rge   uncer ta in ty   ex is t s  as to the  f lux  and  energy  content  of the  solar   wind  protons.   I t  is 
thought   that   the   peak is in  the  region of 1 to 50 keV. At this energy level no semiconductor de- 
vice  would  be  adversely  affected,   s ince  this   energy  component   would  be  absorbed  in   the  f i rs t  
few microns of the   spacecraf t   ex te r ior   sur face .   The  effects on Therma l   Coa t ings   a r e   desc r ibed  
in Section 111. The   p ro ton   f l uence  from so la r   f l a r e s  is taken as t he   ave rage   ove r   t he   pe r iod  1956- 
1961 inc lus ive .  
F luence ,  q5, is g iven   above   spec i f ic   energy   va lues ,  E. 
5 See tex t   for   d i scuss ion  on the   uncer ta in t ies   o f   the   Jupi te r   rad ia t ion   be l t .  
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Figure 6. Solar Proton Flux and Distance Variations With Time 
Table 3 
Six-Year  Total - Solar  Flare  Protons in the Region  Near  the Earth 
(From Data by W. R. Webber) 
1 
4 
10 
15 
30 
protons/cm2 
1.5 x 1OI2 
0.16 
0.04 
0.022 
0.008 
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from  solar  flare  protons.  Trajectory  information  taken  from  the  Task I report 
provided  the  basis  for  Curve A on Figure 6 ,  showing how distance of the  space- 
craft  from  the Sun varies with time in days  from launch. Curve B shows the 
resulting  variation in  proton f lux  of energy above 1 MeV as  a function of time. 
Based on the  area underneath  Curve By from  the beginning of the  interplanetary 
portion of the  mission  to  Jupiter  encounter,  the  integrated f l u x  at the end of 
this period will  be 8.0 X loio protons/cm2. 
b t -  Solar Wind. Particle-measuring  devices on such satellites  as IMP 1 
have shown that  a  relatively  constant  stream of low-energy protons is continuously 
emitted  from  the Sun. A recent  article by N. F. Ness (Ref. 3) describes the gen- 
eral  characteristics of this type of space  radiation. The average flux in the re- 
gion near  the  Earth but outside  the  influence of its magnetic  field is in  the 
neighborhood of 2.5 X lo8 particles/cm*-sec. The average  energy of these 
particles is approximately 1 keV with a  maximum of the  order of 50 keV. 
In this energy  range,  protons will only penetrate  a few microns of the  outer 
surface and will, therefore, have no effect on such components as  transistors and 
diodes.  However, thermal-control  coatings applied  to  the skin of the  spacecraft 
may be appreciably affected by prolonged  exposure  to  the solar wind. The same 
would apply  to any solar-cell o r  sensor  cover  glasses (Ref. 8). 
The integrated flux from the solar wind at the  spacecraft  surface  can be 
estimated  in  the  same  manner  used  previously  in  evaluating  the  effect of solar 
flare  protons.  This  estimate is again based on an assumed  inverse-square 
relationship between proton , f l u x  and distance  from  the Sun. Integrating  the flux 
over the Earth to Jupiter  part of the  mission  period  gives an average  total dose 
of 2 . 5  X l o i5  protons/cm2 with energies between 0 . 1  to 50 keV. A dose of this 
magnitude will substantially  alter  the  reflectance  properties of certain  types 
of paints.  This  subject is treated in greater  detail in Section I11 of this  re- 
port including  an  evaluation of enhanced damage  from  the  effect of ultraviolet 
radiation. 
4. The Near-Jupiter Region 
Particles  trapped in  the  Jovian  magnetic  field will only  affect  the  spacecraft 
during the relatively short flyby maneuver. However, present estimates of 
the  number of trapped  particles  indicate  that  the  dose  accumulated  during only 
a few hours will be one of the dominant elements  in  the  radiation  environment 
and  sufficient  to  cause  significant  damage  effects  in  sensitive  components. The 
radiation  dose from this  source will, of course,  be  strongly dependent on the 
spacecraft  trajectory  in  the  near-Jupiter  region.  The  trajectory  used  in the 
calculations,  as shown in  Figure 7, was taken  from  the  Task I report.  Curve A 
in  Figure 8 derived  from  Figure 7 indicates  the  time  variation  in  altitude of the 
spacecraft  expressed  in  terms of the  distance  from  the  center of Jupiter  in 
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Figure 8. Variation With Time of Altitude and Proton Flux in the Near-Jupiter Region 
Jupiter  radii. It is assumed  that  the  trajectory is symmetrical about the  vertical 
axis at t = 0. The  effect of trajectories  that  will  bring  the  spacecraft  closer  to 
the  surface of Jupiter will be considered  later  in this section and in Appendix 11. 
The information  provided by the G J P  study  team  relating  the  near-Jupiter 
particle flux to  the  altitude above Jupiter  formed  the  principal  basis  for  calculations 
of estimated  dose  levels  resulting  from the Jupiter flyby maneuver.  These  data, 
however, are limited  to  the  electron flux in the  range  from 5 to 100 MeV and 
the  proton  flux in the  range  from 0 .1  to 4 MeV. Since, in the  Earth's Van 
Allen belt  the  electron  flux  extends  to  the  region below 5 MeV as far as 40 keV 
and the  proton  flux  extends above  4 MeV to at least 1000 MeV, it was  assumed 
that  electrons and protons  in  these  energy  ranges would also be trapped in the 
radiation  belt  that  presumably  surrounds  Jupiter.  The  particle  flux  data  from 
the  Phase A report  was  therefore  extrapolated  to include electrons  in  the  energy 
range below 5 MeV and protons in the  energy  range above  4-MeV. It was also 
assumed  that  the  energy  distribution of the  particles in these  energy  ranges 
would be similar  to  that  in  the Van Allen belt. 
In addition it was assumed  that- 
(1) The  angle of inclination of the trajectory with the  Jovian  geomagnetic 
equatorial  plane is sufficiently small so that Van Allen belt  data  taken 
for a zero angle of inclination  (equatorial  orbit) will be  applicable. 
( 2 )  Longitudinal and temporal  variations of the  Jovian  particle flux can be 
neglected. 
35 
a. Calculation of the  Trapped  Proton  Environment.  The two curves of 
Figure 9 allow a comparison of the  assumed  variation  in  proton flux as a func- 
tion of distance  from  the  center of Jupiter with the  equivalent  data  for  Earth. 
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Figure 9.  Comparison of Jupiter and Earth Proton Flux Above 0.1 MeV 
Proton flux models AP1 through AP5 prepared by Dr.  Vette (Ref, 1) and co- 
authors  formed  the  basis for the  curve  designated  TTEarth.T' This curve  shows 
the  total flux above 0.1 MeV while the  curve  marked  "Jupiter"  shows only the 
flux between E = 0.1 to 4 MeV. However, if the  assumption  regarding  the  simi- 
larity of the  energy  spectra is correct,  the  curve  for  total flux above 0.1 MeV 
for Jupiter will not be significantly  different  from  the one shown, since  the  flux 
of E > 4 MeV is such  a  small  fraction of the  total. 
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It will be seen  that  the  trajectory  as shown in Figures 7 and 8 will  bring  the 
spacecraft  into  the  region of maximum  proton flux, as  shown in  Figure 9. Expo- 
sure  to proton  bombardment will be  confined largely  to  the  region  traversed  from 
a distance of about 12  Jupiter  radii  to  the  minimum  distance  at 8.4 radii and again 
to  the  outer  part of the  belt a t  1 2  radii.  The  relationship  in  Figure 9 of proton 
flux of E > 0.1 MeV to Jupiter  radii was  used  to  construct  Curve B in  Figure 8, 
showing the  variation with time of the  proton flux  affecting  the  spacecraft. The 
area underneath  Curve B is, therefore,  a  measure of the  total  integrated  proton 
flux of E > 0.1 MeV encountered  during  the  Jupiter flyby.  Converting  the  hours 
to  seconds,  integrating  graphically, and multiplying by 2 (because of symmetry 
around  the  vertical axis at t = 0) results in a  total of 4.42  X loi3 protons/cm2 
of E > 0 . 1  MeV. 
The  energy  distribution of the  proton  flux in the Van Allen belt  near its peak 
at about 3 Earth  radii,  as shown in Figure 9 ,  was  taken as  the model for  the 
energy  distribution in the  region traversed  during  the  Jupiter flyby also  near  its 
proton  flux  peak.  Other  assumptions  could be made but the  assumption  that  the 
proton  energy  distribution  remains  constant in this  region probably provides  a 
substantial  margin of safety  since in the Van Allen  belt the  proton  spectrum be- 
comes  markedly  softer beyond the peak at 3 Earth  radii. However, the  total 
proton  population decreases  more slowly with altitude in the Van Allen  belt  than 
the  data  indicate is the case for Jupiter,  according  to  the  curves shown in Fig- 
ure 9 .  This condition, however, was  also recognized as  noted in a NASA study 
on the  Galactic  Jupiter  Probe. Column C of Table 2 shows the  resulting  estimate 
of the  total  integrated  proton flux and its  energy  distribution,  based on the model 
just  discussed. 
b. Calculation of the Trapped Electron Environment. The technique just 
described was also  used a s  the  basis  for an estimate of the  total  integrated  elec- 
~ .. ~ 
tron flux and its  energy  distribution.  Figure 10 shows the  electron flux variation 
with altitude  in  the  near-Earth and near-Jupiter  radiation  belts, Dr.  Vette's  re- 
ports (Ref. 1) provide  the  data  for  the Van Allen belt;  the equivalent data  for 
Jupiter  were taken from  the NASA Galactic  Jupiter  Probe Study. Of par- 
ticular  interest is the "valley" in the  curves, which is not in evidence in the 
proton  curves of Figure 9. 
The  various  factors  that  cause  the  valley in the Van Allen  belt  could  be 
altogether  different  in  the  belt  surrounding  Jupiter. If, indeed, the  electron con- 
tours  proceeded smoothly  upwards  with decreasing  altitude,  then  the  fluences 
accumulated  near  the  point of nearest  approach would be  larger by a  factor of 2 
to 3. The  valley  in Earth's  belt  arises  because  electron  trapping  on  certain 
magnetic  shells is inefficient and particles  are "dumped" from  these  shells, 
probably  into the polar  atmosphere. 
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Figure 10. 
The estimated  total  integrated  electron  flux of E > 5 MeV to  be  encountered 
by the  spacecraft was determined by the same  graphical  integration method  de- 
scribed  previously. On the  basis of the  area  under  Curve B of Figure ll, the 
total f lux  i s  9. 56 X lo9 electrons/cm2 (E > 5 MeV). The  energy  distribution of 
electrons at the  second "peak" in Earth's Van Allen belt  served as the model 
for  the equivalent  energy  distribution in the  region  around  the  second  peak of the 
Jupiter  belt  from about 8 to 11 Jupiter  radii, as shown in Figure 10. Column C 
of Table 2 shows  the  resulting  estimate of the  total  integrated  electron flux above 
given  values of minimum  particle  energy. 
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Figure 11. Variation With Time of Altitude and Electron Flux in the Near-Jupiter Region 
The highly speculative  nature of the assumptions  regarding  the  presumed 
radiation  belt  around  Jupiter should  again  be emphasized. Data of this kind  taken 
from the Phase A study  represent  a  compromise in the estimates  prepared by 
a  number of different  investigators.  These  estimates  are  based  primarily on 
observations of radio  emission  from  the  near-Jupiter  region.  The  motion of 
high-energy  electrons  trapped  in  a  magnetic  field around Jupiter  can  presumably 
account for  the  observed  radio  signals. The intensity of the  radio  signals and 
their  frequency  spectrum  provide  a  basis  for  estimating  the  strength of the  mag- 
netic  field  around  Jupiter and the  trapped  electron population. Estimates of 
trapped  protons  are even more  speculative  since  there is no direct  evidence of 
their  presence in the  near-Jupiter  region. An assumed  similarity of the  radiation 
belt around Jupiter to  the Van Allen belt  provides  the only  avail.able basis  for 
estimating the near-Jupiter  proton flux and its energy  distribution. 
As may  be  expected,  published  estimates of the  near-Jupiter  electron and 
proton flux vary  over  several  orders of magnitude.  The estimates  from  the 
Phase A report  are  apparently above the  average but less than  the  maximum and, 
therefore,  appear to be reasonably  conservative.  The  remote  possibility  that  the 
actual  particle flux values  may be above the  estimates by perhaps an order of 
magnitude  should  not  be  overlooked.  The problem of providing an adequate  factor 
of safety in this  respect will be treated  later  in  the  text. 
A substantial  increase  in  the  radiation  dose  affecting  spacecraft components 
would also  result if the  trajectory  were  altered  to  bring  the  spacecraft  closer  to 
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the  surface of Jupiter. Figures 9 and 10 show that as  the  spacecraft  approaches 
closer  to  Jupiter  than 8.4 R both the  electron and proton flux encountered fall 
substantially below the peak  values  at  around 9 Rj .  The electron flux, however, 
(Figure 10) reaches a valley  at about 6 Rj and  then rises to  a much higher  peak 
at 3 Rj. 
These  variations  are of particular  importance  since  the following discussion 
shows  that  the  electron flux will probably  be  the  principal  source of radiation 
damage  from  the  Jupiter flyby maneuver.  The  increase  in  the  velocity of the 
spacecraft  in  trajectories  closer  to  Jupiter will tend  to  reduce  the  dose  rate  in 
the  region of minimum distance  to  Jupiter. However, the  total  exposure  time 
will increase, and therefore  the  total  dose  from  exposure  in  the  Jupiter  radiation 
belt will also  increase.  Preliminary  estimates  indicate  that if the minimum dis- 
tance  from  Jupiter  were  decreased  from 8.4 Rj to 5 Rj  the  radiation  dose  levels 
would increase by a factor of about 3 and if the  distance were reduced  to 3 R j  the 
factor would be  about 10. The probability of such  increases will also  need con- 
sideration  in  determining what factor of safety  should be  applied  to  the  environ- 
mental  data  to  take  care of any contingencies.* 
5. Interplanetary Space-Jupiter and Beyond 
The assumptions and techniques  used for estimating  the  solar  flare  fluence 
and the  solar wind fluence  described in paragraph 3 of this Section,  Interplane- 
tary Space-Earth to  Jupiter, are equally  appropriate  for  estimating  the fluence 
for  Jupiter and beyond. Integrating  the  area  under  Curve B of Figure 6 from 
Jupiter  encounter  to  the end of the  5-year  mission  gives  an  integrated  flux, 
above 1 MeV, of 1.3 X 10" protons/cm2. The addition of this value, 1.3 x l o io  
protons/cm2,  to  that  accumulated  during  the  Earth  to  Jupiter  portion of the  mis- 
sion, 8.0 X 10" protons/cm2, gives the accumulated fluence 9 . 3  X loio protons/ 
cm2  for  the  5-year  mission  from  interplanetary  space. Column B of Table 2 
shows  the  energy  distribution of these  protons  assuming  that  variations of the 
distribution with distance  from  the Sun are negligible. 
The  solar wind fluence  for  the  Jupiter and beyond portion of the  mission  is 
0 . 4  x IOi5 protons/cm2 and is a total of 2.9 X l o i5  protons/cm2  for  the  5-year 
mission as shown in Column B of Table 2. The  damage  effects  to  the  outer 
surfaces of the  spacecraft  due  to  solar wind are  treated in Section III. 
6. Radiation Damage Profile From Space Environment 
The  relationship  between  damage-producing  capability of the incoming parti- 
cles and the  shielding effect of intervening  materials and structures  protecting 
* 
Also s e e  Appendix I concerning radiation environment of the  Jupiter flyby for various  near-Jupiter 
trajectories. 
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sensitive components can be shown graphically  in  a  particularly  useful  form 
called  the  "damage  profile. ' I  The  method for  preparing  such  profiles  from  the 
environmental  data of the  type shown in  Table 2 is described  in  detail in  the TOS 
Radiation Program Report (Ref. 9), dated  September 1965. Two profiles  are 
needed  to  indicate  the  separate  ionization-damage and bulk-damage effects. 
These  profiles show the  dose  level  dependence on the  amount of shielding sur- 
rounding  a  component  in terms of the  convenient  concept of a  component  at the 
center of a  uniform  spherical  shell of aluminum,  exposed  to  a  specified  omni- 
directional  particle  environment.  Figures 12 and 13 show the  damage  profiles 
derived  from  the  information  provided by Table 2. Curves are  plotted  in  these 
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Figure 13. NEW MOONS Spacecraft and 5-Year Mission Bulk Damage Profile 
From Space Radiation 
figures  to  indicate  the  contributions  to  the  total  dose  from  various  sources.  The 
overall  curves  represent  the combined effect of exposure  in  all  regions of the 
flight  path  over  a  5-year  mission and indicate how a  uniform  distribution of 
packaging  material will reduce the space  radiation  effects  incurred on the  mis- 
sion. To these, of course,  must be added the  level of damage  incurred  from  the 
RTG sources, dependent upon their location.  This will be a  sensitive function of 
distance but will be almost unaffected by the  spacecraft  structure* and hence 
would act  simply  as  a  "pedestal" €or these  curves. 
* 
The gamma rays and neutrons from the RTG will interact with spacecraft materials and produce 
secondary emissions. In general, these have not been considered in this study because of their 
relatively  insignificant  contribution to total integrated  dose. 
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In addition to  the  types of particle  radiation  described  thus  far,  it  will  be 
noted that in Figure 12, there is a  curve  for  bremsstrahlung  (brake  radiation). 
Electrons (but not protons), when slowed down in any  way, emit  some of their 
energy  as X-ray-type electromagnetic  radiation. In the  artificial  electron  belt, 
the  bremsstrahlung  includes photons in  the  range of energies  characteristic of 
gamma  rays, which will penetrate 300 mils of aluminum with only a  10-percent 
loss of intensity. The intensity of bremsstrahlung  generated is proportional  to 
the  atomic weight of the  target  material. It is fortunate,  therefore,  that  aluminum 
and magnesium, which are  the  main  structural  materials,  are  moderately ineffi- 
cient  in  generating  gamma  rays. 
The principal  source of possible  damage  to  the  exterior  spacecraft  surfaces 
is their  bombardment by the  extremely  large  number of low-energy particles, 
including solar  flare and solar wind protons,  trapped  protons, and trapped  elec- 
trons.  Table 2 provides an estimate of the  total  number of these  particles, but 
their energy distribution in the range from to 10" MeV is poorly defined 
for  lack of accurate  data on the  interplanetary  medium.  For this reason it is 
difficult  to  make estimates of the  dose  profile  in the external  parts of the  space- 
craft (e.g., within the  front  surfaces of lenses,  active  regions of thermal  coatings, 
solar-cell  cover  glasses,  etc.). However, rough calculations of the  energy flux 
values  indicate  that  materials  directly  exposed  to  the  space  environment  incur 
very-high-energy  deposition  levels at  the  surface. For example,  solar-wind  pro- 
tons will be  stopped  within a few micrometers of the  surface (of the  order of 
cm). A solar-wind flux, as  shown in Table 2 ,  of 2 . 9  x loi5 proton/cm2-5 years, 
with an average  energy of the  order of lo3  eV, is thus an energy flux of 2 . 9  X loi8 
eV/cm2-5  years.  This is equivalent to 4 X l o6  erg/cm2-5  years and given the 
above  stopping distance,  is  equivalent  to  a  total  deposition of 4 x 10" erg/cm3- 
5 years in a thin  skin. In material of density = 1 g/cm2  this  corresponds  to  a 
total  dose of 4 X l o 8  rads in 5  years. 
In a  similar  manner,  electrons in the  energy  range below about 0.5 MeV will 
deposit  most of their  energy  in  the first few thousanths of an inch of the  space- 
craft  surface. However, the available data  from  energy  distribution  measure- 
ments of these  particles is insufficient  to  define  the  detailed  shape of the  dose- 
vs-depth profiles in the  region near to and including  the outer  skin of the  space- 
craft. The  development of measurement  techniques  for  this  purpose and their 
implementation on a  suitable  spacecraft  system is recommended. The possible 
contribution  to  such  surface  damage  effects  from  ultraviolet  radiation also needs 
further evaluation (Ref. 10). 
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D. Radiation Dose From RTG’s 
As stated  earlier in this section,  the  dose  from RTG’s is different  in  nature 
from that of space  radiation,  necessitating a somewhat  different  approach to the 
evaluation of damage  effects  from this source.  The fast neutrons and gamma  rays 
emanating  from  the RTG’s a re  highly penetrating  compared with most of the  elec- 
tron and proton population  in space.  Protecting  sensitive  components  from RTG 
radiation by  additional  shielding  involves a weight penalty  that  can be justified 
only under particularly compelling circumstances. However, the essentially 
inverse-square  relationship between radiation flux and distance  from the  RTG’s 
can  be  used  to advantage in  the  placing of particularly  sensitive components. 
Estimates of the  anticipated  neutron and gamma flux  that the RTG‘s will 
generate  are  based on the assumption  that Pu02 will be used  as  the fuel.*  The 
characteristics of this fuel  from  the  radiation viewpoint are  discussed in detail 
in Appendix II. Two possible  methods  for  incorporating  the  fuel  elements into  a 
complete RTG unit are under  considerations: (1) a planar  assembly that resembles 
a flat.disk and (2) a cylindrical  assembly. 
Details of the planar  generator  design  were  studied in Task VIIA, Planar 
RTG-Spacecraft  Feasibility Study, and the cylindrical  design  is  discussed  in 
studies  by  Epstein, West, and Harris. 
The  radiation  patterns  presented  here are for  the  planar  RTG’s. For RTG’s 
of the  same  power in a cylindrical  configuration,  the  neutron  contours are  essen- 
tially the same. Different types of fuel would, in all probability, produce different 
radiation  patterns. 
In Appendix I1 the physical,  chemical, and nuclear  properties of PuO, a re  
presented on the basis of the latest  available  experimental and theoretical  data. 
A discussion of the  relative  biological  hazards of PuO, microspheres and PuO, 
cermets fuel form  is  also given. In addition, an evaluation is made of the feasi- 
bility of 0 1 8  depletion  from PuO, and the associated  reduction in neutron  emission 
rates. However, for this report, in estimation radiation damage effects from 
the RTG’s, the calculations  were  based on neutron emission  rates  associated 
with naturally  occurring oxygen. 
The RTG gamma and neutron  radiation  fields are presented  graphically in 
the form of isoflux  contour  maps. A separate  map was constructed  for  each of 
* 
NASA SP 7031, “Properties of Selected  Radioisotopes,” by Dale Harris and Joseph  Epstein, 
presents  a  selection of annotated references to technical papers, journal articles, and books 
covering  radioactivity of Pu and selected other radioisotopes of  interest. 
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the  three  selected RTG electrical power levels, i. e. , 50 watts(e), 75 watts(e), 
and 100 watts(e).  The effect of Oi8 depletion is discussed  in  conjunction  with 
the  isoflux  data. A description of the  nuclear  fuel  data and the method of 
analysis is also included. 
Conclusions  and  recommendations with respect to PuOz cermets, 0' 
depletion, and the  accuracy of the RTG radiation  field  analysis are also  presented. 
The isoflux  maps of Figures 14  and 15  were  taken  from Appendix I1 for a 
1725-watt (t) planar RTG, using  5-year-aged  Pu02  fuel  with  naturally  occurring 
oxygen. The isoflux maps indicate contours of equal  radiation flux in the 
region  immediately  surrounding a single RTG. These  maps are  similiar  to 
those for a  1520-watt (t)  cylindrical RTG, included in the Phase A study, 
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Figure 14. Neutron lsoflux Map of a Planar RTG 
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but a re  the result of more up-to-date  information.  The  Phase A maps  were 
based  on  emission  spectra  data  for  aged,  5-year-old  Pu238 0, fuel with naturally 
occurring 0, configured  for a cylindrical RTG, with a beginning of life (BOL) 
thermal output of about 1520 watts.  These  calculations,  aided by the QAD com- 
puter  program,  included buildup factors  for  the  gamma f lux .  
In revising  the  Phase A maps,  use was made of newer  information  from 
Mound Laboratory  provided by data  sheets  dated  July 1, 1967, and  November 9 ,  
1967. These  newer  reports  indicate  lower  gamma  fluxes  throughout  the  energy 
spectrum. To test the  validity of such  data,  Hittman  Associates,  Inc.,  calculated 
the  expected fluxes from a SNAP-19 and compared  the  results with measurements 
made by the  Martin  Nuclear  Division (Ref. 11). Excellent  agreement was obtained 
if buildup factors  were not included  in the  calculations.  Dropping  the  buildup 
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factors can be justified on the  theory  that  the  gamma-ray  mean  free  paths  are 
much greater than  the  thicknesses of RTG construction  materials, and, therefore, 
the buildup factors  related  to  scattering  effects  are  of. negligible proportions. 
Without the buildup factors  used  previously,  the  gamma flux estimates  based 
on the  newer'data  are about 25 percent of the  original  values.  This  difference is 
attributed  to  the two points  just  discussed: 
(1) U s e  of buildup factors will increase  the  calculated  gamma f lux  levels 
by factors  in  the  range  from 2.7 to 3.0. 
(2) The  recent  re-estimates of the  gamma flux account for  the  remaining 
differences between the  revised and the  earlier flux maps. 
The revised  neutron flux estimates, on the other hand, are  nearly the same 
as  those  used in the  Phase A study. 
In applying  the above radiation flux data to the  calculation of dose  levels 
from continuous exposure  to the RTG's,  the following assumptions  were  made: 
(1) Since both neutrons and gamma  rays  are highly penetrating,  the  attenu- 
ating  effect of intervening  structure and packaging, in  the  path of the 
radiation  reaching  a component, will be neglected,  since  these will 
probably  reduce  fluxes by  no more than  a few percent. 
(2) The ionizing dose in rads affecting components exposed to neutrons and 
gamma  rays is dependent on the  energy  spectrum of the radiation  source. 
The conversion  factors  used to calculate  the  ionizing  dose  from the 
RTG's  are- 
Neutrons  to rads 3 x l o 8  neutron/cm2  perrad 
Gamma  photons  to rads 2.2 x lo9  photon/cm2 per  rad 
(3) The  effectiveness of a  particular kind of radiation in producing  atomic 
displacements in the  crystal  lattice of a  semiconductor (bulk damage) 
is generally  based  on  the  results of exposing  representative  samples 
under conditions simulating the anticipated actual environment. The 
results of recent  experiments of this kind  (Ref. 7) were  used  as the basis 
for  estimating  the bulk-damage  effect from RTG neutrons in transistors. 
A n  average  multiplying  factor of 100 was used in converting  neutron 
fluence  to  the  dose  in DENI's. Although bulk-damage effects  can  also 
be produced by gamma  photons,  these  effects  are so small  in  comparison 
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with those  produced by neutrons  in  the  present  case  that  they  can  be 
neglected. 
The  neutron and gamma photon output from the  RTG's is assumed con- 
stant  over  the  period  used  as  the  basis  for  calculating  the  ionization and 
bulk-damage  dose  levels.  This  time  interval is taken as the  5-year 
mission  period. 
The  combined  flux from the two RTG's is assumed  to  be  twice  that  from 
a  single RTG. Lf the  distances  from  a  particular component to  the two 
RTG's is not  the same, then  the use of the  shorter  distance  in  calculating 
the  dose  can be taken a s  a worst-case condition. 
Figure 16  shows  the  relationship  between  dose  levels and distance  from two 
planar 1725-watt (t) RTG's, based on the preceding assumptions. Curve A indicates 
the  dose in rads  from  the combined  effect of both neutrons and gamma photons. 
The  major  part of this  effect  comes  from  the  photons,  since  neutrons have a 
relatively  limited ionizing capability. Curve B gives  the  bulk-damage  dose in 
DENI's. This  results  almost  exclusively  from  neutron  bombardment. 
These  calculations a re  based on the assumption  that  the  fuel  elements  in  the 
RTG's are  arranged in  a planar  configuration.  Gamma  rays  originating  in  the 
central  elements of the  fuel  assembly will therefore be attenuated  to  some  extent 
by the  surrounding  fuel  elements. As a consequence,  the  gamma  isoflux  contours 
(see  Figure 15) have a minimum  value  in  the  plane of the  fuel  elements. 
If, as proposed in  the  Phase A study, the RTG fuel is  arranged in a 
cylindrical  form,  the  orientation of the RTG axis with respect to  spacecraft  com- 
ponents  may result  in  somewhat  higher  dose  levels  for  this  configuration t.han 
was estimated  for  the  planar type  units. At the  same  distances  from  the two 
different  types of RTG's,  the  gamma flux may  be  higher by a factor of as much 
as 25 percent.  The  neutron flux levels  from  the two types,  on  the  other hand, 
will be essentially  the  same  since  the  isoflux  contours in both cases  are  nearly 
circular. 
For a  subsystem  in  an "exposed" internal  location, a 25-percent increase in 
gamma  flux  from  the  RTG's will increase  the  total  ionization  dose by about 
10 percent  at a distance of 18  inches  from  the  RTG's, about 4 percent  at a dis- 
tance of 36 inches, and about 1 percent  at 78 inches. Transistor gain will be 
affected to a somewhat greater extent  than is the  case with the  planar RTG, but 
the  differences will be small and can  be  accommodated  in  the  design with no 
difficulty. 
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DISTANCE FROM RTG'S (ft) 
Figure 16. Neutron Fluence and Dose in Rads v s .  Distance From Two Equidistant RTG's 
For  5-Year  Mission 
E .  1 Combination of Space and RTG Radiation 
The major  object of the  evaluation of particle fluxes and their  variation with 
shielding  and  distance  from RTG sources, given in  the  preceding  sections,  has 
been  to  evolve  a data  format in which, for any component  type and location, an 
estimate of the combined effects of the RTG and space  radiation  can  rapidly be 
obtained,  using  a  uniform set of ground rules. It is then possible to combine the 
environments  for any location L,, as  shown in Figure 17, for any semiconductor 
component. 
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Figure 17. Block Diagram of Analytic Steps to Estimate Internal Environment 
In estimating  the  radiation  dose  affecting  a  particular component,  the contri- 
butions from  the  various  sources  are  reduced to compatible  units of damage or  
effect and added arithmetically. The location of the component on the spacecraft 
will be of primary  importance  in  determining the  dose  from  the RTG's and from 
space  radiation. The dose-vs-distance  graphs in Figure 16 provide the infor- 
mation  necessary to estimate  the  dose  from  the RTG's, assuming  that no special 
shielding is added to  attenuate  the  neutron and gamma photon flux. 
In estimating  the  dose  contribution  from  space  radiation,  the  necessary  data 
a re  taken  from  the  damage  profiles shown in Figures 1 2  and 13. As indicated 
previously,  these  profiles show how the  anticipated  dose  from  the  space  environ- 
ment  affecting  a  component will vary  as a function of the  thickness of a uniform 
spherical  shell of aluminum  surrounding  the component. 
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The procedure  for  using  the  damage  profiles  to  estimate  the  dose  levels 
affecting  sensitive  components within a  complex and irregularly  shaped  space- 
craft  system is called "Sector Analysis."  This  procedure,  described  in  detail 
in  Reference 9 ,  involves  the  judicious  subdivision of the  solid angle surrounding 
a  component location  into a number of relatively  small  sectors,  over  each of 
which the  totai  thickness of protecting walls and enclosures  can be  taken as 
uniform. 
Such an  analysis  requires  an  accurate knowledge of the  spacecraft  geometry 
and physical  characteristics.  Data  are  required  for the  location of sensitive 
components,  the  thickness of intervening  walls, and the  kinds of materials  used. 
The  choice of the  number of sectors and the  solid angle  included in  each is gen- 
erally a matter of judgment. Frequently  the  major  part of the  radiation flux 
reaching  a  particular component enters  through  a  relatively  small  solid  angle. 
By dividing this  solid  angle  into five o r  six  zones,  the  spectrum of the  flux  pene- 
trating  each zone can  be  determined with a  reasonable  degree of accuracy. 
Past  experience,  from  analysis of such  satellite  systems  as TIROS M by this 
method,  indicates  that, with conventional  component  packaging for  space, using 
aluminum  boxes,  the  shielding  provided by the  enclosures and satellite  structure 
surrounding  a  typical component in a  moderately  well-protected  location  ("average 
location") will be  the  equivalent of about 270 mils of aluminum. The use of 100 to 
150 mils would be  more  conservative in estimating  damage.  That is, the  doses 
reaching  the component will be the  same  as if it  were  in  the  center of an alumi- 
num shell 270 mils  thick  (see  Figure 2). Similarly, the equivalent thickness of 
the  shielding  mass  surrounding  a component in  a  location with only  minimum 
protection  (Ifmost exposed location"),  such a s  a spot  just within the  outer skin of 
the  spacecraft, will be *only about 170 mils of aluminum. However, i f ,  a s  in the 
case of Mariner and Ranger,  the  spacecraft  has no overall enclosing "skin, and 
component  boxes are,  instead, slung on an open frame, then the  effective  equivalent 
shielding  thickness  is  likely  to be lower  than this. A nominal 100 mils  has been 
taken as  the equivalent  shielding for  the  "most  exposed  location" of internal 
electronic and mechanical  parts on the NEW MOONS spacecraft. 
In estimating  the  dose  levels  at  specific  locations within  the spacecraft by 
the  analytical method, it may  be  difficult  to  determine with adequate  precision 
how much  shielding is provided by the  surrounding  spacecraft  structure  including 
other  components of irregular  size and shape.  Under  such  conditions,  the e r ror  
introduced  in  dose  level  estimates will depend  to  a large  extent on the  shape of 
the  damage-profile  curves.  For  a  ffflatff  curve  the  error  may be insignificant, 
but if the  slope is very  steep  then even small   errors in estimating  approximately 
the  shield  thickness or angle  subtended by a  given shielding  element at the  point 
of interest will cause  large  errors in the  corresponding  dose  level  estimates. 
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Because of the  steep  energy  spectrum  model  used  for  the  space  environment, 
the  ionization  damage  profile  for  the NEW MOONS mission, as shown in  Figure 12, 
has a fairly  steep  slope. It thus follows that  dose  level  estimates  based  on  the 
conventional sector  analysis technique  have  a correspondingly  large  possibility 
of error .  Lf particularly  critical  internal components a re  involved, then  the  ex- 
perimental  determination of shield  thickness by laboratory  techniques  may  be  in 
order. Such techniques have  been used,  for  example,  in  determining  the  protec- 
tion  against  radiation  provided by the Apollo command  module  using  a  gamma- 
ray  source  eef.  12). If added shielding is needed to avoid serious component 
degradation, then the  more  precise  dose  level  information,  acquired by such 
lldose mapping" methods, will serve  to  minimize  the weight  penalty  involved 
in their  procedure. 
The values of equivalent  shield  thicknesses of 270 and 100 mils. of aluminum 
formed  the  typical or  ffaverageff and  exposed or worst-case  space  radiation con- 
ditions  to  be  entered  into  Figures 12  and 13.  The  contribution of radiation  from 
the two RTG's to  the  total  dose  was  also  calculated  for  three  different  distances 
of 18, 36,  and 78 inches, as indicated in Figure 16. The 18-inch separation is taken 
as  the  minimum  distance  to  a component, corresponding  to  an  assumed  worst-case 
condition  with respect  to  radiation  from  the RTG's.  The  36-inch separation  repre- 
sents an intermediate o r  average  distance  from  the RTG's to  a  component, and the 
78-inch separation is the  distance involved in  the  spacecraft  design  described  in 
Task V. 
Table 4 provides  a  summary of these  dose  calculations  for both  ionization 
and bulk damage  effects.  Dose  levels  are given for  various  combinations of dis- 
tance  from  the RTG's and shielding from  space  radiation.  The  shielding  equiva- 
lent of a  100-mil-thick  spherical  aluminum shell is taken as a  worst-case  condi- 
tion corresponding  to  a  location on the  spacecraft with minimum  protection  from 
space radiation. The 270-mil shield  thickness  corresponds  to a more  protected 
location  in  the interior  region of any of the  spacecraft  subsystems.  Table 5 indi- 
cates  the  contributions  to  the  total  dose  from  the  various  sources  under  worst- 
case conditions with respect  to  distance  from  the  RTG's (18 inches) and shielding 
against  space  radiation (the equivalent of 100 mils of aluminum).  The  dominant 
contribution  to  the  total  dose  under  these  conditions  comes  from  the  electrons 
presumably  trapped  in  a  radiation  belt  surrounding  Jupiter, a s  indicated by the 
asterisked  items in Table 5. However, i t  should be noted that  the  contributions 
from  other  sources  are significant and if further  analysis should  change  the  en- 
vironmental  models, one of these  might conceivably become  the dominant source 
of predicted  radiation  damage  effects  instead of the  trapped  electrons. 
The  dose  from  the  RTG's,  for  example,  may  become  much  larger if the  pre- 
launch  integration and check  out procedure  takes  a  substantial  period of time and 
if the  RTG's a re  in  close  proximity  to  sensitive  spacecraft  components  during 
Table 4 
Combined  5-Year  Dose Levels  For  Internal  Locations 
Radiation 
Source 
Space 
RTG's  at 18 
inches 
TOTAL 
~.. .  
Space 
RTG's  at 36 
inches 
TOTAL 
~- 
Space 
RTG's at 78 
inches 
TOTAL 
~ I " - ~ _ .  - - 
Typical 
Internal  hcation* 
Ionization B ~ &  D~~~~~ 
Damage 
3Rads A 
0.074  0.002 
0.42  1.02 
0.494  1.022 
I 
0.074 
0.105 
0.179 
" - - - - . " . .. 
0.074 
0.023 
0.002 
0.253 
0.255 
0.002 
0.055 
0.057 
~ 
Exposed 
Internal  Ucationt 
Ionization 
Damage Bulk Damage 
3.23  0.020 
0.42 1.02 
3.65 1 1.04 
I 
3.23 0.020 
0.105 0.253 
3.33 I 0.273 
3.23 0.020 
0.023  0.055 
3.25 0.075 
* Typical Internal Location = 270 mils equivalent all-around A1 shield 
Exposed Internal Location = 100 mils equivalent all-around A1 shielding 
A - Multiply each  number by l o 4  
A - Multiply each  number by 10 l4  
NOTE: This  table  assumes (1) No ground  operations with RTG. 
(2) Typical NEW MOONS mission and spacecraft. 
(3) Typical electronic components. 
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Table 5 - 
Type of 
Damage 
Effect 
Ionization 
Bulk 
Estimated  Worst-case  5-Year  Dose  Levels 
From Space and  RTG Radiation 
~~ 
Radiation  Source 
RTG at 18 inches 
Earth and Jupiter 
Radiation  Belts 
Solar  Flares 
Particle  Type 
gammas 
neutrons 
protons 
electrons* 
protons/  (alphas) 
Estimated  Dose With 
100 Mils Aluminum 
Equivalent  Shielding 
0.42 x l o 4  rads 
0.004 x lo4 rads 
3.2 X l o 4  rads 
0.024 x l o 4  rads 
I TOTAL IONIZATION DOSE ~~~ ~ ~~~ ~ 3.65 X l o 4  rads 1 
RTG at 18  inches 
Earth and Jupiter 
Radiation  Belts 
Solar Flares 
i 
gamma 
neutron* 
protons 
electrons 
protons/(alphas) 
nil 
1.00 X 1014 DEN'S 
0.00038 x 1014 DENI's 
0.0127 X 1014 DEN'S 
0.0033 x 10 l 2  DENI's 
TOTAL BULK DAMAGE 1.04 x 1014 DENI'S 1 
* 
Predominant  Source of Dose o r  Damage 
NOTE: (1) DEN1 calculated for p-type silicon, as in typical NPN transistors. 
Value differs  for n-type silicon. 
(2) Neutron spectrum  assumed  to  be  fission type. 
(3) Ground operations before launch not included. See Table 1 for 
effects of ground operations. 
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this time.  Table 1 shows the  contributions  to  the  total  dose  from a 9-month pre- 
launch  exposure  period but is not  included in  Tables 4 and 5 because only the 
flight  portion of the  mission is considered  here. 
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SECTION 111 
THE PREDICTION OF DAMAGE EFFECTS IN SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEMS 
A. General 
/' 
The prediction of damage  effects  in  spacecraft  subsystems depends primarily 
on the  results of exposing representative components.  to simulated  space  radi- 
ation. In this  manner,  expected  worst-case  changes  in component parameters 
can be related  to  estimated  dose  levels and the  subsequent  net  effect on sub- 
system  performance  predicted. However,  a  component is as  sensitive  as its 
subsystem  application  dictates. H large changes in performance  can  be  tolerated, 
the component is, by definition, less  Sensitive, and the  subsystem is '!hardff  in 
this  respect. If large  parameter  changes cannot be tolerated,  a  hardened  sub- 
system can be achieved by such methods as  selecting components  which, while 
perhaps  less efficient  than  the  component of first choice, are  relatively  resistant 
to  irradiation;  operating  devices  in a mode which minimizes  damage  effects; and 
by placing  particularly  sensitive components as  far  as  practical  from the  RTG's 
and in  "sheltered" o r  shielded  locations within the  spacecraft. In extreme  cases, 
limited  supplementary  shielding  may  sometimes  also  be  justified,  but,  normally, 
only as a  tfband-aidff  (i.e.,  small,  local  shield to close  a  small  aperture). 
Measures  such  as  these  can  raise  the  radiation  hardness of a  subsystem  several 
orders of magnitude. 
At the  dose  levels  anticipated  for  the NEW MOONS mission, only a few types 
of electronic component will be appreciably  degraded, so long a s  they are en- 
closed  in  normal  electronic  chassis and covers. If this condition is met, the 
degradation  problem is limited to a  number of low-frequency transistor  types, 
a small, but statistically  important  proportion of high-frequency transistors 
including possibly  a  "maverick" or  two, integrated  circuits,  some  phototran- 
sistors and other  optoelectronic  devices,  some  ultra-sensitive  types of MOS 
devices,  some  diodes,  those SCR's which a re  equivalent to wide-base transistors, 
and certain  optical  materials which may  be  employed  within the  vehicle. A s  
shown in Figure 1, Section I ,  resistors,  capacitors, non-optical vacuum tubes, 
etc., a re  well  outside  the  range of important  degradation.  The  probable  extent 
of the  anticipated  degradation of the  more  sensitive components in  electronic 
subsystems  has  been  estimated on the  basis of a  considerable body  of available 
test  data and experience.  Detector  subsystems, being in  a unique class  are 
considered  separately  in  Section ITIC although the effects on the  electronics of 
these  subsystems will be the  same  as  for  the  broad  class of electronic sub- 
systems.  Materials  problems  are  considered  last,  to  the  extent  that  current 
knowledge and experience  in this area  permits. In this category  fall  the  surface 
coating  materials which a re  exposed  to  the  full  vigor of the  space  environment 
and are ,  in some  cases,  very  sensitive  to  radiation. 
In the  paragraphs  that follow,  an attempt  has been made  to  explain  the  physics 
of component failure and under what conditions  failure can be expected.  It i s  the 
objective of this  section  to  outline  the  nature and scope of the  component and sub- 
system  problems which must be faced  at  the  circuit and layout design  stage  to 
obviate  the  possibility of subsystem  deterioration beyond acceptable  limits  during 
the  very long mission.  The  circuit and layout designs  must, of course, become 
more  specific  before  close  estimates of subsystem  lifetimes and failure  modes 
can  be  made. 
B. Electronic Subsystems 
1. Bipolar Transistors and Integrated Circuits 
a.  Physics of Radiation "~ Damage. In a  complex,  long-life  spacecraft 
containing  many  solid-state  circuits,  degradation of transistors will be  the  most 
widespread and serious  problem of the  designer.  The  damage  takes  the  form of 
degradation of gain, ,B, and increase  in junction  leakage currents  (ICBO,  etc.). A 
convenient way of expressing  the  damage done is in  terms of increase in recip- 
rocal of gain 1/p. Loss of gain is attributable  to two very  different  effects:  the 
first effect is  to  permanent  semiconductor  lattice  damage in the  base  region; 
this effect is  frequently  overshadowed  in  silicon  planar transistors by the  second 
effect, a surface-linked  loss of gain, which sometimes  starts  at  a  space  radiation 
flux level 50 times  lower  than  that  at which bulk damage  becomes  effective and 
hence at a much earlier  time  during  a  space  mission (Ref. 13). This  surface- 
linked loss of gain  appears  related  to  the  leakage-current  effect (Ref. 14). This 
damage  to gain is more long  lived  than the  leakage  effect but is  likewise  affected. 
by the  biasing  levels and the on-off duty cycle of the  transistor.  Unfortunately, 
the  degree of the  surface type of damage  is not easily  predictable and depends 
upon the details of the  surface  processing  used.  Each  manufacturer  uses  a 
significantly  different  process and may  even  vary  the  processing within his  plant 
and vary it from  year to year. One regularity noted is that it is most  effective 
at low operating  current  levels. A certain  transistor,  operated with a  collector 
current of 10 milliamperes  may not experience any appreciable  loss of gain, 
while the  same  transistor,  operated  at 1 0  microamperes, may  have fallen well 
below the  tolerable  level of gain.  This  current dependence corresponds well 
with a damage  mechanism which involves  the  upper  surface of the  silicon  wafer. 
Figure 18 shows a  typical  gain  degradation  curve  for  a  set of planar  transistors 
exposed  to  ionizing radiation  from  a Co60 source. * 
*See paragraph 2 of this  section for a brief discussion on similarity of CoG0 and space radiation. 
Also see Reference 6.  Bulk damage effects  such as  produced by neutrons from the RTG's are 
expected to be negligible at the anticipated  fluence  level. 
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Figure 18. Gain Degradation in 2N2102 Transistors Exposed to Gamma Radiation from 
Co60 ( I c  = 10 mA; 100% Duty  Cycle)  (Ref. 6) 
Figure 19 shows the  variability of surface  damage and its insensibility to 
initial ,8 among transistors of the  same  electrical type.  The  collector-base 
leakage  Current (IcBo) can  also be of serious  proportions. For example,  in  some 
transistors, in the NEW MOONS mission  conditions,  the  collector-base  leakage 
current (IcBo) value  could increase by over  a thousand times if bias  were con- 
tinually applied to  the  transistor  for  the  entire  mission  period.  Moreover, 
reasonable  amounts of shielding would not necessarily  completely  eliminate 
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Figure 19. Damage Factor vs. Beta (Ref. 15) 
this  leakage  problem,  since  the background of gamma  rays or  bremsstrahlung 
produced by the  space  radiation could still produce  increases in I,,, 
b. Transistor Degradation and its Impact on Circuit  Design 
(1) Degree of Damage 
As has  been noted in  the  preceding  section,  the  assessment of the 
impact of transistor  damage in a  mixed  radiation  environment  such 
as  that of NEW MOONS requires many  different  calculations.  Over 
the  range of situations  encountered in such a spacecraft,  the  impact 
of radiation  can  vary  from  negligible to very  serious, depending  on 
device  location, on device  geometry and processing, and on circuit 
application. Added to this, the  surface  effect  in one  batch of devices 
can  vary by two orders of magnitude. Thus,  the  situation  must  al- 
ways be analyzed  in  detail by means of an  engineering  analysis of 
up-to-date radiation  test  data and process  details for all  transistors 
of interest. Some techniques  for  making  this  analysis  were developed 
by RCA over  the  past 5 years on several  programs and now form 
part of the  normal  design  procedure in effect  at RCA-AED. In 
transistors,  the  principal  changes in parameters  caused by radiation. 
damage a s  described above are  (1) decrease in forward  current  gain 
(beta) and (2) increase in leakage current I,,,. 
Extensive  research  efforts  at RCA and a  number of other  laboratories 
(Refs. 16  and 17) have  brought  about a clearer understanding of the 
damage  mechanisms involved and a  method  for  distinguishing between 
the two kinds of damage  effects. In studying  the  effect of radiation on 
transistor  forward  current  gain, it was found convenient  to introduce 
a  parameter  called  the "Damage Factor" defined by the equation 
wnere 
Po is the initial value of beta, and 
p is the  value of beta  after  exposure  to  a  specified  dose  level. 
It was found that  the  combined  effect of bulk and ionization  damage 
on transistor gain  could  be described by the  equation 
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As mentioned,  changes in  gain and leakage due to  ionization in 
transistors  are not  yet predictable by means of an  analytical  re- 
lationship as are bulk damage  effects. Conceivably, continuing 
research on this problem  may  eventually  provide  such  a  relation- 
ship; but in  the  meantime,  the  result of exposing representative 
samples of selected  transistor types  to  ionizing  radiation  seems  to 
offer  the only  sound basis  for  predicting  anticipated  changes  in 
transistor gain. An extensive series of such  tests  formed  a  major 
part of an  investigation  to  determine whether sensitive components 
in  the TIROS Operational  Satellite (TOS) would survive  the  mission 
without causing out-of-tolerance performance. A radiation source 
ideally  suited  to  the  purpose is a Co60 gamma-ray  facility  since, in 
the  dose  range of interest,  this  radiation  produces  predominantly 
ionization  damage; bulk damage is also produced  but in insignificant 
amounts . 
The above tests  are then  suitably  analyzed so as to  supply  the circuit 
design  engineers with worst-case  degradation  data on all approved 
transistor types  in  a  form well suited  for  this  purpose. 
(2) Alternative Design Philosophies 
The  design  engineer  can  then  use  these  data  in several ways. In the 
case of a new design,  the  radiation  hardening philosophy, at  its 
simplest, would be for the designer to  choose  only those  devices  for 
his circuits  for which  he could accommodate  the given degradation 
without a loss  in  efficiency of his  circuit  design (this may  involve the 
selection both of a particular  manufacturer and electrical type 
number). In fact,  most  spacecraft  circuitry is adapted from  existing 
designs and in this case only a few available  electrical  types of 
device  may  fit  the  requirements  electrically. The worst  case of 
radiation-induced  degradation in  these  may be  too great  to be ac- 
commodated  suitably by means of circuit  design. In this case,  some 
positive  hardening measure  must  be adopted. One such is special 
"pre-selection," within  a  given electrical type of device,  for  special 
resistance of the  device to  radiation.  This  approach is described  in 
detail  later. It has  great  advantages  over  the second possible 
measure,  namely,  relocation of the  device  to  a more  protected 
location or,  least  advisable, addition of slabs of dead-weight  shielding. 
Depending on the demands  made on the  equipment,  the  problems due 
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to radiation  may  be  very  widespread or may  narrow down to a few 
problem  areas with clear solutions  available. One conclusion  can 
quickly  be drawn  from  the above: in  the  design of a  spacecraft,  the 
evaluation of a given detailed  electrical and mechanical  design  for 
radiation  effects  must  be  made  early and thoroughly. This is be- 
cause, while the  changes  required  may  be  radical or  may be insig- 
nificant,  only  thorough  evaluation  and  testing of all  transistor  devices 
of interest to  the designers, including testing of a  number of alterna- 
tive  types, will give the  designer  an  opportunity  to  produce  electrical 
and mechanical  designs which take account of the wide variety of 
possible  device  degradation  values without impairing  the  overall 
efficiency of the  design. 
(3) Some Examples of the  Impact of Device  Degradation on Design 
Both bulk and ionization  damage  effects can  induce  beta  loss  in  the 
same  transistor type, bulk damage  generally  predominating  in 
transistors with a low-frequency  gain-bandwidth product (f ,) and 
ionization dan'age  in high-frequency transistors. The  effect of 
ionization  damage is also  strongly dependent on  the magnitude of 
transistor  collector  current,  becoming  much  more  severe  at  lower 
values of I,, particularly at values below 100 microamperes. 
Only a few transistors,  serving  specialized functions,  such  as  power 
handling, will have low values of f,. Most of the  modern  switching 
and amplifying  types will have values of f ,  above about 15 MHz. Above 
this  level  the  predominant  damage would  be from the  ionization  effect. 
The degree of bulk damage will,  of course,  rise  sharply  as  the de- 
vices a re  moved closer to  the RTG units.  Thus,  clearly,  power- 
handling subsystems should be located away from  these  sources of 
bulk damage and also a suitable  amount of packaging  placed  around 
them to cut down the  bulk-damaging  component of the  space 
environment. 
To illustrate  these  effects,  the  estimates of transistor  beta  loss, in 
terms of the NEW MOONS mission,  listed  in  Table 6 were  prepared 
for two different  types of transistor. The first, a type 2N1486 
silicon NPN power  transistor  has a  nominal gain-bandwidth product 
(f,) of 1.25 MHz. Because of this  relatively low value of f,, most 
of the  beta  loss will come  from bulk damage  effects. The second, a 
type 2N2222A device, is a  silicon N P N  transistor with a  gain- 
bandwidth product of about 400 MHz. Beta  loss, due almost  entirely 
to ionization  damage  effects, was calculated  for  several  different 
values of collector  current. 
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I- 
Transistor 
Type 
Table 6 
Typical Transistor Degradation  Data - 5-Year  Mission 
2N1486 
2N2222A 
Distance 
From 
RTG 
(inches) 
18 
36 
78 
18 
18 
18 
300 
300 
300 
0.1 
1.0 
10 
Initial 
Beta 
35 
60 
.10 0 
35 
60 
100 
35 
60 
100 
30 
60 
120 
50 
10 0 
150 
70 
140- 
220 
Typical  Internal 
hcation* 
- 
Final 
Beta 
~~ ~ 
11.0 
12.7 
13.9 
21.9 
29.6 
36.9 
29.3 
45 .O 
64.5 
26 
45 
73 
44 
78 
106 
64 
118 
177 
~~ 
I CBO 
Change 
( P A )  
0.4 
V 
0.04 
Exposed Internal 
Location* 
Final 
Beta 
10.5 
12.0 
13.1 
20.0 
26.2 
31.7 
25.9 
37.5 
50.0 
18 
27 
34 
24 
39 
58 
27 
48 
80 
I CBO 
Change 
(PA) 
1.5 
V 
0.15 
"Typical Internal Location = 270 mils equivalent all-around Al shielding 
Exposed Internal Location = 100 mils equivalent all-around Al shielding 
IC = Transistor Beta = Forward I,,, = Collector-Base Leakage 
Collector  Current  Current with Emitter Open 
Current Gain 
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A typical  problem  facing  the  circuit  designer is to  accommodate an 
anticipated  beta  loss without compromising  the  design  in  other 
respects. For example,  severe  beta  loss  such  as  that shown by the 
2N1486 at  18  inches  from the RTG's would probably  require  special 
treatment. One solution to this problem is to find a  substitute 
transistor type  having a  higher f,. Another possibility is to relocate 
the  assembly  incorporating  the 2N1486. Doubling the  distance  from 
the RTG's would increase  the  final  beta  from 11 to 21.9 for an 
original  beta of 35 and from 12.7 to 29.6 for an original  beta of 60. 
If, in spite of such  measures,  beta  loss is still  larger than can  be 
tolerated  in  a given circuit, then  the use of two transistors in cas- 
cade would probably  maintain  adequate  gain.  The  penalty would, of 
course, be the increased  power  requirements  for the additional 
transistor. 
It is seen above  that the only way to  determine  the  impact of a 
radiation  environment of the NEW MOONS type is to test and 
thoroughly analyze  the  devices  such as  transistors known  to be 
basically  sensitive to radiation, followed by an analysis of how 
radiation-induced  parameter  changes  in  devices will be reflected 
in  circuit and system  degradation. 
c. General Results from Transistor Radiation Tests. Radiation tests of 
electronic  components conducted by  RCA over  the  preceding  4-year  period, 
primarily  as  part of the TOS program, have  provided  extensive test  data on 
a wide variety of transistor  types. Since the radiation  levels  estimated  for 
the TOS and NEW MOONS missions  are  the  same  order of magnitude,  some 
general  observations  derived  from  these  tests  are of use in evaluating  the 
impact of radiation on the  design of transistor  circ:lits  for NEW MOONS sub- 
systems. 
(1) The  damage  factor, A l/,B,, as  a function of dose is essentially 
independent of the  initial  beta  indicating,  as  expected,  that this 
factor  provides a suitable  normalization for initial  gain  value. The 
data in Figure 19 illustrates  this point. The relationship between 
final  beta and initial  beta of 50 samples of the RCA 2N3241 tran- 
sistor  after  exposure to a  dose of 2 X l o 5  rads  appears  to be com- 
pletely  random.  This i s  in accord with the  theory of surface  re- 
combination in transistors (Ref. 15). 
(2) The relationship between the damage  factor and collector  current 
nearly always falls  approximately on a straight  line on  log-log 
paper,  as  in  Figure 20. The  damage  factor  in the 1- to  10-micro- 
ampere range is normally  at  least an order of magnitude larger 
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Figure 20. Degradation of Fairchild 2N1711 Transistors vs.Collector Current 
at Gamma-Ray Dose of 5 X lo4 Rads (Ref. 15) 
than the value at 1 milliampere. This, again, is in accord with the 
theory of surface  recombination  in  transistors. 
Samples of the  same  transistor .type from  different  manufacturers 
are likely  to show marked  differences in behavior. 
Samples of the  same  transistor type,  even when from  the  same manu- 
facturer, but from  different  batches,  are  likely to show substantial 
differences in behavior. 
Damage effects depend primarily  on  the  total applied dose and may 
be almost independent of dose rate. This conclusion is based on data 
from RCA tests of the  same  transistor  types exposed at  dose  rates 
differing by three  orders of magnitude (Ref. 18). However, a small 
amount of annealing at room temperature  appears to result in some- 
what less  damage when transistors  are exposed at very low rates.” 
*In-flight test data  on  the  IMP-F  spacecraft   tend to support   th is   observat ion  a l though it is not 
cons idered   def in i t ive   because  a suff ic ient   dose  level   has   not   been  accumulated.  A summary of a 
paper ,   “Resul t s  from the Radiation Damage Effects on MOSFETs Experiment on Explorer XXXIV 
(IMP-F)”, by John L. Wolfgang, Jr.,  Flight Data Systems Branch, Spacecraft Technology Division, 
Goddard  Space  Flight  Center,  Greenbelt,  Maryland,  which  contains  these  data is reprinted  below. 
SUMMARY 
Metal Oxide  Si l icon  Field  Effect   Transis tors   (MOSFETs)   have  been  used  extensively  in   the 
main spacecraft  encoding systems on IMPS D, E, F, and G. Three of these   payloads  (IMPS D, E, 
and F)  have   amassed  a combined  total of over 174 million  device-hours  in  orbit as of June  1, 1968. 
In order  to  correlate  f l ight  radiation  damage  with  laboratory  studies  and to verify  encoder  shield- 
ing, an engineering experiment was flown on IMP-F. This experiment monitors 8 gate  threshold 
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(6) Changes in collector-base leakage current (IcBo) as  a function of 
dose  often  exhibit a more  irregular  pattern  than  for gain. Transis- 
tors of the  same  type  from  the  same  manufacturer  may  differ by 
several  orders of magnitude  change in  leakage  current (A ICBO) with 
increasing  dose. While most  transistors show a  general  trend to- 
wards  higher  leakage  currents  as  the  dose  level is raised,  a  substan- 
tial  number,  after  an  initial  rapid  rise,  reach  a peak and then  show a 
gradual  decrease. It is thus  more  difficult  to  devise  a  rational  pre- 
diction  for junction leakage effects  under  radiation. However, a for- 
tunate trend  has be'en observed  in  testing  from 1965 to  1968, namely 
a  reduction  in  the order of magnitude of ICBo increases.  Whereas, 
in 1964-65, A I,,, values of lo- '  amperes  were not infrequently  ob- 
served  in  small  devices  (specified to operate  at  room  temperature 
at ICBO levels of less than amperes), similar devices tested in 1967 
and 1968  have rarely  experienced  changes of more than  amperes. 
This indicates  that  the  manufacturers'  efforts to improve  collector- 
base junction passivation  for  general  reliability  reasons have also, 
fortuitously,  suppressed  the  radiation-induced  leakage phenomena. 
d. The "Maverick" Problem. Although the great  majority of transistor 
samples  tested have followed a  log-normal  distribution  pattern with respect  to 
their ionization  damage  factor,  there have  been  notable  exceptions. Figures 21 
and 22 show  the results of two tests,  each of which uncovered  a  case of one ex- 
ceptionally  radiation-sensitive  transistor in a  group.  Similar  tests by Peck and 
co-workers (Ref. 14)  also  indicated  that  an  occasional  f'maverickff of this kind 
might  be discovered in an otherwise  normal group of transistors,  all manufac- 
tured and processed in essentially  the  same  manner. 
To design  all  circuits to tolerate  such  abnormal  sensitivity would penalize 
the  design with respect to size, weight, power  drain, and complexity. On the 
other hand, the  effect  occurs  sufiiciently  frequently  that  the  possibility of such 
an occurrence cannot  be  overlooked if high reliability, of the  type required  in  a 
5-year  mission, is required. 
readings and 6 drain-to-source leakage readings. These measurements are performed on devices  
distributed under three shielding  thicknesses  0.25 gm/cm 2, 1.0 gm/cm ', and 2.0 gm/cm2. 
After 60 orbits of IMP-F "9 .5  x 10 l o  electrons/cm2  (energy > 0.55. MeV) dose  has  been re- 
ceived by the 0.25 gm/cm2 shielded devices. The gate threshold shift of the devices  is lower 
than the threshold shift of similar devices, at-the same dose of 1.5 Mev electrons in laboratory 
studies,  indicating  possible minor annealing i s  occurring over the highly elliptical orbit in flight. 
No  measurable  leakage  has  been  noted  in  the  devices during the first 60 orbits. 
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Figure 21. Result of Co60 Gamma Ray Irradiation of Motorola-Type 
2N2222A Transistors (Damage vs. Collector Current)(Ref. 15) 
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The  behavior of the  "maverick" is so widely different  from the norm  that 
the  occurrence of such a degradation  effect could be catastrophic  to  a  spacecraft 
mission. If degradation  levels  used  in  design are  not to be set   at  an unreasonably 
high, and hence  penalizing,  level,  the  rfmavericks"  must  somehow  be  eliminated. 
Some degree of improvement  may  be  obtained by selection of certain  device 
manufacturers;  however, what is also  needed i s  a  relatively  simple method  that 
will identify the  ffmavericks'f  in  a population, so  that  statistical  methods  for 
predicting  transistor  performance can  be  used with confidence  on the  remaining 
"normal"  devices.  Preliminary  experiments  forming  part of a  joint BTL-RCA 
program in 1964 (Ref. 19), showed that  gamma-irradiated  transistors could be 
restored to very  nearly  their  original  beta by a  heat-treatment  process. When 
these  transistors  were  irradiated  a  second  time,  their behavior followed the same 
general  pattern  observed  during  the  first  irradiation. A procedure of this  kind, 
which represents,  in  effect,  a  preselection  process  whereby  these unusually 
sensitive  devices could be identified and eliminated, is described in Section IV. 
e.  .Integrated  Circuits and Germanium Devices. All the  general  considera- 
tions  discussed  here have  been found to apply both to transistor o r  diode elements 
in  integrated  circuits as well as single or  "discrete"  transistors on individual 
silicon  chips.  Comments  concerning  passivation apply, of course, only to. silicon 
devices,  since  grown  oxide  passivation is not used on germanium  surfaces. The 
other  elements of integrated  circuits  (resistors,  capacitors)  are not likely  to 
contribute  to  radiation-induced  degradation. 
2. Metal Oxide Semiconductor (MOS) Devices 
a. Physics of Radiation Damage. The principal effect of ionizing radiation* 
on MOS devices is a  shift  in the drain-current vs  gate-voltage characteristic 
along the voltage axis. The  slope of this  characteristic, which represents the 
transconductance of the  device, is not significantly  affected  until  the  dose  level 
exceeds about l o 5  rads. Therefore, the effect constitutes a change in the 
operating  region of the  device  rather  than a true  degradation  in  performance, a s  
shown in  Figure 23. However,  unless  the  circuit is designed to adapt to these 
changes,  the  net  result is a  degradation of circuit  performance  that could be 
catastrophic. Such a  case would occur,  for  example, if the  threshold voltage of. 
a p-channel changed from -1 to -11 volts, but the  circuit was designed so that  a 
-10 volt signal  gate  bias was used  to  command  a  fully  rron'r condition of the  de- 
vice. In a p-channel enhancement-type MOS device, such as the MEM-2017FY 
the  gate  voltage needed  to turn on drain  current  (termed  the  threshold  voltage, 
V,) usually  becomes  increasingly  more  negative with increasing  dose  (the shift 
*Bulk  damage  effects   in  MOS d e v i c e s   e x p o s e d  to neutrons  from  the RTG's will be ins igni f icant  at 
the  an t ic ipa ted  neut ron  f luence  leve ls .  See Figure  1. 
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Figure 23. Changes in Operating Region of MOS.Device Caused by Ionizing Radiation 
is termed A VT). This  effect is also  strongly dependent on the bias applied to 
the  gate  during  the  irradiation  process  (termed  irradiation  bias, VI ). At high 
values of negative V I ,  the  threshold voltage shift  may  be 10  times  the value at 
zero V I .  However, at  negative  values of V I ,  there may be a  minimum  in  the 
V,-vs.-V, curve in the region of -2 to -5 volts.  This, of course,  constitutes an 
optimum  biasing  point  for  tolerance  to  radiation.  The  presently  accepted  model 
of how the  negative shifts in  threshold voltage occurs is as follows: the  incident 
radiation  creates  electron-hole  pairs  in the gate-insulator  film. The holes, 
having low mobility  in  the  oxide  get  trapped  almost  immediately while the  elec- 
trons  shift  under  the  action of an  applied or  built-in electric field. Many elec- 
trons  recombine with a trapped hole;  however, some of the  electrons  drift out of 
the  oxide at  the  metal silicon-dioxide interface.  This  leaves behind a  net  trapped 
positive hole charge  in  the  insulator.  This  trapped  positive hole charge  produces 
a negative  image  charge  in  the  metal  gate and the silicon. The  negative  image 
charge  produced  in the silicon  implies  a  shift in the  threshold voltage toward 
more negative  voltage. 
Detailed  discussions of the probable  causes of the  radiation-induced  threshold 
voltage shifts  may  be found in a number of recent  articles on the  subject (Refs. 20 
and 21). Unfortunately, the degree of charge-trapping  capability (i. e. , the  effec- 
tive  radiation  sensitivity) of the oxide varies  very widely with the oxide  growth 
process  used (Ref. 22). Therefore, although existing theory provides a satisfactory 
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explanation for  the  observed  behavior of irradiated MOS devices,  the magnitude 
of the shift in V, cannot be  predicted with the  same  certainty  as  can be attained, 
e. g. , in predicting  the  degradation of silicon  solar-cell  performance  under  radia- 
tion. Thus,  for any particular  device  type  (or  other  group  prepared by the same 
gate-oxide  growth process)  a  radiation  test is needed as  the  basis  for  predicting 
how a  particular device  group will  be affected by a given space  environment.* 
The  broad  variety of results  observed in RCA-AED tests of a  range of commer- 
cial  devices is shown in Figure 24 (Ref, 23). RCA-AED has studied this problem 
intensively  for  several  years. The present  conclusion is that, with correct de- 
vice  selection and correct  circuit  design, even the  existing  commercial MOS 
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Figure 24. Typical Range of  Threshold Voltage Shifts in MOS Devices 
device can  be  used at  the  radiation  levels  expected in the NEW MOONS mission. 
Such devices  have,  indeed,  already been  used on AED-designed  spacecraft  under 
similar radiation conditions (Refs. 24 and 25). In addition, new types of gate in- 
sulator  are being  developed which should largely  remove  the  problems  described 
above, 
b. MOS Device Tolerance Levels. Exposures of MOS devices to gamma ra- 
diation  have  been  made by investigators  using  the Co60 facility  at  the United States 
~ 
*See footnote on p. 65 concerning IMP-F experience. 
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Signal Corps Fort Monmouth test  site (Ref. 26) and the RCA Laboratories 1-MeV 
Van de Graaff generator (Ref. 22). Simulation of space  radiation by gamma rays 
is justified on the  basis  that the  predominant  damage  effect  from  electrons and 
protons  in the devices in question will result  from ionization of the same  nature 
as  that produced by gamma rays (Ref. 6). * The  results of these  tests have for 
some  time been in general  use by spacecraft  circuit  designers. The results of 
the  gamma-ray  tests lend themselves well to the  radiation  considerations  present 
in  the NEW MOONS mission. 
Of particular  interest in this application is the  fact, as described above, that 
the  shift  in  threshold  voltage with radiation  dose in MOS devices is strongly  de- 
pendent on the material  forming  the  insulating  layer,  its  thickness and its area. 
Figure 25 shows the threshold voltage change as a function of dose  for a particu- 
larly  susceptible MOS device  taken from a sample of four  devices  exposed  to 
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Figure 25. Typical MOS Transistor Worst-case Changes in Threshold Voltage 
gamma  radiation  from a Co60 source.  The dependence on the  bias applied 
to the  gate  during  the  irradiation  process (VI) to the extent of the shift  in  thresh- 
old voltage is also shown. 
~ - - 
"For bulk effects a neutron source, such a s  a reactor, should be used. 
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Thus,  even if MOS devices  used  on  the NEW MOONS spacecraft have this 
high level of sensitivity  to  radiation,  then  the  value of A V, will  be in the  range 
from about 2 to 8 volts,  depending  on  the  effective  level of gate  bias  throughout 
the  mission.* This value  assumes a dose  level of about 3.6 X l o 4  rads,  previ- 
ously  estimated as the  worst-case  combined  ionization  dose  from  space  radiation 
and the  RTG's. Note that bulk damage in the  fluence  range of interest  has no 
effect at all on MOS device  performance. 
The  possibility  that  threshold  voltage shifts of such  magnitude  can  cause  the 
malfunction of circuits  using MOS devices  will not  depend on the  allowances 
made by circuit  designers for this effect.  This  difficulty  can  often  be  avoided  in 
logic  circuits by applying  sufficient  drive  voltage  to  the gates to  accommodate 
the  anticipated  change  in  threshold  voltage.  Simply  providing  an  "average  loca- 
tion" for  the  circuit (7 X lo2 rads) would, i t  is seen,  also  reduce  the  radiation 
problem  to  insignificant  proportions.  Precautionary  measures of this kind will,  
therefore, allow the  use of presently  available MOS devices  on  the  spacecraft. 
Moreover,  recent  research  at AED has  brought  to  light a number of MOS gate- 
insulator  materials which, as well as being highly practicable  for  use in  high- 
performance,  mass-produced MOSFET's, are  also  very much  less  affected by 
radiation (Ref. 24). The one most  likely  to  be  widely  used  is  pyrolytically 
deposited  aluminum  oxide,  which  exhibits A V, shifts of less than 1 volt at l o 6  rads 
of ionizing  dose and VI values of -10 volts.  It is reasonable  to assume then,  that 
the  very  useful  attributes of MOS devices in logic and sensing  circuits  need not 
be sacrificed  because of the NEW MOONS radiation  environment. 
c. -  . . . - . Devices for Special  Circuitry: FET's v s  Bipolar  Transistors. In some 
spacecraft  subsystems,  such as the  scientific  measurement  circuits,  some  solid- 
state  devices will be  required  to  maintain  their  electrical  parameters to very 
close  limits  (e.g,,  less  than 5 percent) or ,  at the  least, to  degrade at a  predictable 
rate. Thus,  some  devices will  have to  be  selected and  individually screened  for 
low sensitivity and predictability. It is useful  here  to  compare  the  problems of 
MOSFET's  and  bipolar  transistors. 
From  the model of radiation-induced  charge  buildup  in MOS structures 
which was  discussed  above, it could be seen  that  the  amount of charge buildup, 
for any  given  fluence of radiation, will depend on the electric  field  in  the oxide 
and the  type and distribution of traps  in  the  oxide.  The  silicon-dioxide  insulating 
film,  an  amorphous  material, is formed, in most  cases, by thermal  oxidation of 
silicon  in  the 1000 to 1200°C range.  Consequently,  the  type  and  distribution of 
traps  in  the  oxide will depend  on  such  parameters as- 
* I t  is expected that a cyclic  bias  sequence  between  two  logic  levels,  about 0 and 10 volts ,  would 
g ive  a shift in V, of value intermediate between shifts produced by DC bias  values of 0 and 
10 volts .  
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(1) Oxidation temperature. 
(2) Oxidation atmosphere (steam or  dry oxygen). 
(3) Impurity content of the oxidation atmosphere. 
(4) Annealing treatments  performed  on  the  oxide after the  oxidation  has 
been  completed. 
Consequently, a fairly  large  degree of variability  between  different  oxides 
with respect  to  their  radiation  sensitivity  can be  anticipated.  Indeed,  oxides 
prepared  under  almost  identical  conditions  have shown fairly  large  differences 
in  the  amount of oxide charge  introduced by radiation. 
Since it has been found by RCA-AED (Ref. 18) that  the  variability in the 
charge buildup process  over a single wafer is usually  small, a useful  screen- 
ing technique would be to  irradiate  several  devices  from  every wafer from 
which  devices  to  be  used on the  spacecraft will  be taken. On the other hand 
since  the  radiation-induced  oxide  charge  can be annealed  thermally (30OoC 
for  1 hour), it may well be  practical  to  use in flight  the  actual  devices ir- 
radiated after they are restored  to  initial  performance by annealing. 
A s  described in Paragraph  B-la of this  section,  the  bipolar  transistor 
suffers  from a  "surface  effect"  in  the  passivating  oxide  layers  which  has  features 
similar to the MOS oxide  effect but depends  more  heavily on surface  recombina- 
tion  phenomena. In addition,  the  bipolar  transistor  can  suffer  degradation  from 
"bulk damage."  The surface oxide properties of the  bipolar  transistor are nor- 
mally  much  less well controlled  than  for  the MOS transistor  gate  oxide. As a 
result,  the  repeatability of radiation  sensitivity of MOS devices  from a given 
MOSFET production  line is much  better  than  that  for a given  bipolar  transistor 
production  line. 
d. General-firpose Circuitry: MOS v s  Bipolar Transistor. It is seen 
above t h a t h e r e  the  bipolar  transistor sutfers several  damage  effects,  the MOS 
device suffers one;  all of the  effects  in  bipolar  devices are prone to important 
variations (Refs. 15 and 27), whereas  the effect in the MOS device is the  more 
controllable at the  present  time.  Thus,  as an overall  result,  the  amount of engi- 
neering  analysis and test  effort  required to produce  electronic  circuits of uniform 
and predictable  hardness is probably  greater  for  the  present  generation of bipolar 
transistors  than  for  the  present  generation of NIOSFET's. However,  the  correc- 
tive  action  required is different  in  each  case.  The  choice of device will probably 
be  dictated  mainly by the  routine  electrical  requirements of the  circuit  under- 
going  design  (impedances,  current  demands,  etc.), and the  corrective  action will 
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be  decided  on  grounds of ultimate  effectiveness of the  circuit,  in  terms of per- 
formance  versus weight  and power,  before,  during, and after the  irradiation re- 
ceived  in  flight.  Thus, both MOS and  bipolar  devices  should  be  used,  each  in its 
correct  place,  radiation  simply  being  regarded as a stress for which  allowance 
is to  be  made.  The  complementary  symmetry MOS (CMOS) flip-flop is particu- 
larly  attractive  for  use  in NEW MOONS spacecraft  subsystems.  This  circuit 
element  has  one of the  lowest  standby  power  drains  obtainable  for  electronic 
memory  elements. 
Recent  tests (Ref. 28) of complementary  symmetry MOS (CMOS) devices in 
a logic  circuit  configuration  showed  that  these  devices  were still operable  after 
exposure to 2 X lo7 rads. Not all circuits  will  perform as well since survival 
at dose  levels of this magnitude  depends  largely  on how well the circuit  can con- 
tinue in operation  in  spite of the  expected shifts in  threshold voltage.  With proper 
care  in  circuit  design, CMOS devices  can,  therefore, be  used as memory  elements 
for  the NEW MOONS spacecraft without danger of failure. 
3. Junction FET's 
The  junction  field-effect transistor  (JFET) is a three-terminal  device which 
overlaps in some of its uses with  the  bipolar  transistor and the MOSFET. The 
"surface  effect''  in this device  has  been found, by test, to be  small as compared 
to  these  other  devices, while  the "bulk effect" is also  negligible.  Thus,  although 
the  circuit  applications of the  JFET are somewhat  limited,  the  device  type  can 
be  used  effectively at high radiation  levels, at which  the  other  devices are nearly 
useless. However,  in  the NEW MOONS mission,  such a situation is unlikely  to 
arise except  in  the following applications: 
(1) Calibrated  sensor  circuits  in which no change in device performance 
can  be  tolerated without loss of sensor  accuracy. 
(2) Devices which must be mounted very  near  to  the RTG. 
(3) Devices  with  near-zero  protection  from  the direct space  environment. 
(4) Actual  values of the  Jovian  radiation  environment  turn out to be several 
orders of magnitude greater  than  in  the  present  model. 
4. Effect of Radiation on Diodes 
Devices of this kind that  depend  on  the  properties of a single  crystal, but 
also  have  planar,  passivated  junctions, are subject  to  both bulk damage and 
ionization  damage  effects  from  particle and gamma photon irradiation. In the 
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usual  space  environment,  the  ionization-damage effect strongly  predominates 
over  the bulk damage effect at the  dose  levels typical of several  years'  exposure 
in a space  environment.  However,  neutrons  emitted  by  the  RTG's  will  add 
substantially  to  the  possibility of appreciable  bulk  damage effects particularly 
in  wide  base  diodes. 
The  principal  damage  effects in these  devices are limited to changes  in 
leakage  current and forward  voltage  drop. At the  maximum  dose  levels  listed 
in  Table 5 the  worst-case  change  in  leakage  current is not expected  to  exceed 
20 percent, and the  change  in  forward  voltage  drop is not  expected  to  exceed 
30 percent.  Likewise,  zener  diodes  experience  very  little  change  in  zener  voltage 
in  the  dose  ranges of interest.  Parameter  changes of this magnitude will pre- 
sumably  have little effect,  assuming  that  allowances  for  changes  such as these 
have been made in the  circuit  design.  These  estimates are based on the results 
of tests by RCA (Ref. 9) and BTL.  The RCA test program  for  diodes was  con- 
ducted much along  the  same  line as for  transistors. 
It may be  concluded,  therefore, as indcated in Figure 1, that  diodes are,  in 
general, not significantly  affected by radiation at dose  levels  that  cause signifi- 
cant  degradation  in  most  transistors. 
5. Silicon-Controlled Switches 
The range of devices  termed  silicon-controlled  switches (SCS) can  be  re- 
garded as a pair  of back-to-back transistors,  e.g., a p-n-p-n structure. At a 
certain point  in  degradation of gain  in these  transistors,  the SCS will fail to "fire" 
o r  go into its low-conductance state.  Tests (Ref. 9) of several  types of these de- 
vices  under  conditions  equivalent  to  several  times  the NEW MOONS mission 
radiation  damage  levels showed no noticeable change in  their  triggering  charac- 
teristics. However, newer devices could, paradoxically, be more sensitive 
either  to  surface  effects or to bulk damage. Thus, although serious  effects  are 
not expected,  any SCS device  employed in the  spacecraft should  be  included  in 
the  radiation test series. 
6. Effect of Electronic Component Performance Variation or Degradation on 
Subsystem Performance 
In the  previous  paragraphs  various  mechanisms of component  performance 
variations have been  described, and indications  were  given of the  types of varia- 
tions or  failures  that  can  occur.  In  the  text  that  follows, a description of a radia- 
tion test of a complete  sawtooth generator  circuit is given  to illustrate  the  effect 
of radiation-induced  component  failure.  The  example  given is that of an actual 
test  performed  for  the TOS Radiation  Test  Program (Ref. 9). 
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a. General. Because of its importance in both Advanced Vidicon Camera 
System (AVCS) and Automatic Picture  Taking (APT) camera  systems (Ref. 9), a 
circuit of this type (complete  sawtooth  generator) was selected for irradiation 
as an operating  assembly.  The AVCS camera  uses this basic  circuit  in both 
horizontal- and vertical-deflection  generators,  the  APT  camera only in  the  hori- 
zontal-deflectioh  generator. 
Survival of this circuit  for the  duration of the TOS mission was in  question 
since  it  used  several 2N930 transistors  operating with collector  currents  in the 
10-microampere  range  in  high-impedance  circuits.  Other  tests have shown that 
these  transistors  are  particularly  susceptible to  radiation  damage  effects  at 
these low currents. The two 2N930 transistors  used  in  the  differential  amplifier 
in  the  vertical-deflection  generator were selected  for  an  initial ,B of 200. 
The circuit  assembly  subjected  to  irradiation  was  a  flight-qualified  vertical 
sawtooth  generator  circuit  module of the same  type  as  that  included  in  the AVCS 
camera  system. 
b. Test Facilities and Procedure. To operate the sawtooth generator during 
the  test  in the normal  manner,  a  suitable  sync  generator  was  needed  to  supply 
input  pulses  at  the  specified  rate of once every 6 seconds with a duration of 
7.5 milliseconds.  Special  emphasis  was  placed  on output pulse  stability with re-  
spect  to both amplitude  and  duration. 
The  sawtooth  generator output was fed to  a  differential  preamplifier  to  meas- 
ure  the  positive and  negative  voltage  swing of the  sawtooth wave form. Voltage 
was  applied  to  the  generator  through  a  clock-operated  switch  that  periodically 
turned  the  power "on1' and rroffrr  to  simulate  the  operating  conditions  for  the TOS 
satellite.  rrOnrr  time  during  the  test was approximately 20 percent. 
The sweep  generator was located  in  the Co60 hot cell, but the  voltage  sup- 
plies and synchronizing  generator  were  located  outside the  hot cell  in  the  control 
room.  Thus,  they were not exposed  to  the  gamma  rays  and could be  checked 
during and after the  experiment. 
The initial  exposure to Co6' radiation was at  a  dose  rate of 2080 rads/hour 
for 49 hours.  This rate was increased  to 5800 rads/hour when a  total  dose of 
1 X 10' rads was accumulated. 
c. Summary of Test Results. At 4 X l o 4  rads, the output sawtooth ampli- 
tude had decreased by 2 percent. At slightly  over l o 5  rads the  circuit no longer 
produced  a  usable  sawtooth. As determined by post-irradiation'  measurements, 
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failure was caused by one of the 2N930's in a low  level  differential  amplifier. 
Beta of this transistor had  dropped  to 8 percent of its original  value. A summary 
of post-irradiation test results is given  in  tabular  form below, Experimental re- 
sults are shown graphically in Figure 26. 
2N930 
- ~ ___ 
Transistor No. 1 200 
Transistor No. 2 200 
I I 
. . " 
d. Discussion of Test  Results.  The  results of earlier  radiation  tests  of  in- 
dividual 2N930 transistors  indicated  that if these  devices  were  used in the saw- 
tooth generator  circuit  there would be a strong  possibility of circuit  failure  at 
low radiation dose levels. While some of the individual transistors* exhibited 
a relatively  small  loss of beta at l o 5  rads,  others  retained  less than 1 percent 
of the  original  beta.  This wide variation in susceptibility of these  transistors to 
radiation is well illustrated by the  post-irradiation  measurements of the 2N930 
transistors in the  sawtooth  generator  circuits. 
As  a consequence of this  early  failure of the  sawtooth generator due  to a 
badly degraded 2N930, an effort was  made to find possible  substitutes. A radm- 
tion testing effort to find a suitable  substitute was initiated.  From  these  rather 
limited  tests i t  was  found that a 2N930 transistor  produced by another  manufac- 
turer was  a much better  choice  for  this  circuit. The relatively  limited  variation 
of beta  loss with radiation shown by tests of six  samples was  considered a major 
advantage. 
e. - Conclusion. "The  above example is of a typical  ultra-sensitive  general- 
purpose  circuit which might  be  used  in  the NEW MOONS Mission.  Clearly, 
during  mechanical  layout of the  vehicle,  such a circuit would be  specially  con- 
sidered for location, avoiding "most exposed" positions. Reference to Figures 12 
and 16  show  that by locating  the  circuit  more  than 24 inches  from  the RTG and in 
a not-too-exposed  location,  effectively  building up local  shielding to the  equiva- 
lent of 200 mils of aluminum  in all directions, would reduce  the  radiation  level 
to 5 X lo3 rads and hence  solve  the  radiation  problem with a good margin  of 
safety (less than  0.02-volt  shift in centering  voltage). 
*The  individual 2N930 transistors tested and the 2N930 transistors used in the sawtooth generator 
circuit were all made by the same manufacturer. 
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This case  illustrates  that,  in  the NEW MOONS mission,  radiation  problems 
are real but  with early  anticipation  need  not  have a serious  impact on  design 
freedom o r  ultimate  design  efficiency, 
7. Subsystem Performance Deterioration for the NEW MOONS Mission: 
Comparison With State of the Art 
The  dose  levels  listed in Table 5 of Section I1 formed  the  basis  for  estimating 
the  cumulative effect that  the  combined  space and RTG radiation  environment 
will have on  sensitive  Jupiter  Probe  electronic  components  and  the resultant 
degradation of subsystem  performance. As in the case just  described, in designing 
the  spacecraft  subsystems,  adequate  allowances  must  be  made  for  the  anticipated 
component  degradation  to  keep  subsystem  performance  from  deteriorating below 
tolerable  levels.  The  radiation  allowances  must  be  combined  with  similar  en- 
vironmental  specifications  for  other  factors  that  can  affect  subsystem and device 
performance, such as temperature variations and aging. These specifications 
limit  the  choice of components  available  to  the  design  engineer and impose con- 
straints on the  circuit  design of spacecraft  subsystems. If radiation  damage 
strongly  predominates  compared  with  other  deteriorating  effects,  then  special 
measures may be  needed  to avoid failure. Such measures may  include,  for ex- 
ample,  the  addition of protective  shields  around  particularly  sensitive  components. 
A detailed  discussion of possible  ways of protecting  sensitive  components is given 
in  Section IV. 
The potential  magnitude of the  difficulties  to be encountered in  the  design of 
radiation  hardened  subsystems  for  the  spacecraft  can  be  evaluated  on  a  broad 
general  basis by comparing  the  estimated  dose  levels  for  the NEW MOONS mis- 
sion with those  previously  calculated  for  other  missions.  Table 7 compares  the 
worst-case  dose  levels  (i.e.,  most  exposed  location and RTG's at 18, 36, and 
78 inches) for the NEW MOONS mission with the  dose  levels  previously  estimated 
for  several of the TIROS missions  under  similar  worst-case  conditions. 
The TOS dose  levels  formed  the  basis  for  estimates of component  degrada- 
tion  which were then  used in designing TIROS subsystems  to  accommodate  the 
anticipated radiation-damage effects. Because of the 1962 "Starfish" nuclear 
explosions in space,  the  radiation  environment  that  formed  the  basis  for  the 
original TOS dose  estimates was particularly severe. Special measures were 
taken  to  avoid  failure  including  additional  shielding  for  the  protection of circuits 
in  the  camera  electronics  subsystem which were found to be  unusually  sensitive 
to  radiation.  The  radiation  environment in 1965 that w a s  used as the  basis  for 
TIROS M dose  estimates was  much less severe  because of the  decay in the 
number of high-energy  electrons  trapped  in  the Van Allen  belt at the  time of the 
1962 explosions. 
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Table 7 
Comparison of Worst-case  Radiation  Dose  Estimates 
Mission 
" 
Jupiter  Probe (5 years) 
RTG separation  18  inches 
RTG separation 36  inches 
RTG separation 78 inches 
TOS 
6 months, 750 mi. (nautical) 
1962 environment 
TIROS M and ITOS* 
6 months, 775 mi. (nautical) 
1965 environment 
"Improved TIROS Operational Satell ite.  
Rads A 
3.65 
3.33 
3.25 
190.0 
10.0 
DENT'S A 
1.04 
0.273 
0.075 
.83 
.10 
A Multiply  each  number  in  the  column by lo4 
L& Multiply  each  number  in  the  column by 1014 
A s  Table 7 shows,  the  estimated  ionizing  dose  that will affect  the NE" 
MOONS spacecraft  components at a spacecraft-RTG  separation  distance of 
18 inches is approximately a factor of 3 less than  the  dose  level  used as the 
basis  for  designing TIROS M subsystems and over 50 times less than  the TOS 
levels. 
The anticipated bulk damage  affecting  the  spacecraft  components  situated at 
18 inches from an RTG is, however,  substantially above the  levels  calculated  for 
the TIROS components. This condition is largely  due to the  effect of neutrons 
emitted  from the  RTG's  and,  therefore,  depends on the  distance between  the 
RTG's and components sensitive to bulk damage. Fortunately, relatively few 
components of this kind (namely  transistors o r  thyristors with very wide base 
widths) are normally  included  on a space-approved list of standard  parts  because 
of the  limited  need  for  such  items, so that  electronic  subsystems with  such 
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components can probably, with careful  packaging,  be  loc'ated at distances  from 
the  RTG's  much  greater  than  18  inches. For a 36-inch  separation,  the bulk 
damage is intermediate  between  the TOS and ITOS levels, and for a 78-inch 
separation,  slightly below. The 78-inch separation was used as the  basis  for  the 
spacecraft  design  study of Task V. 
Assuming  that  the  radiation-sensitive  component  types  used for the NEW 
MOONS spacecraft will be  generally  similar to  those  included in the TOS series, 
radiation  hardening  subsystems  to  the  required  level as part of the NEW MOONS 
design  program will present about  the  same  problems  encountered and solved 
for TOS. At the  78-inch  separation  distance  postulated  in  Task V, the  data  in 
Table  7  indicate  that  the  overall NEW MOONS radiation  environment will proba- 
bly  be  somewhat less severe  than  the TIROS M environment.  However,  the un- 
certainties in estimating  the  Jupiter  environment,  in  particular,  are  considerably 
greater  than  the  difference shown in  Table 7. This  indicates  that  the  precautions 
used  in  evaluating  radiation-sensitive  components  for  the NEW MOONS space- 
craft should he given at least as much  attention and care   as  w a s  done for TOS. 
The absence of any subsystem  failures  traceable to radiation  damage on any of 
the  satellites  in  the TOS ser ies  indicates  that  the  measures  taken  to  avoid  such 
failures  have  been  effective. 
It should  especidly  be  noted  that, while a "radiation  specification"* was 
placed  on  every  transistor  used in the TOS/ITOS series,  no serious  design  com- 
promises  resulted.  Thus, unless allowances  are to be made for contingencies 
not  dealt with here (unexpectedly large  Jupiter  belts  or  solar  flares,  or RTG 
emissions; new "Starfish"  belts about Earth),  the  application of a similar  careful 
routine  device/material  evaluation  should  produce  the  required  hardness  level. 
C. Detector Subsystems 
The  scientific  payload of the NEW MOONS spacecraft will include  detectors 
designed to measure  even  the  relatively low levels of particle  radiation  in  inter- 
planetary  space. To satisfy  this  requirement  the  background count level  from 
RTG radiation at the  detector  locations  should  not  exceed 10 counts per  second 
from  the two RTG's.  The  measures  proposed for meeting this requirement  are 
discussed  in  the  Task IV report. 
The  radiation  effects on the  electronics  supporting  the  sensor  subsystem, 
however,  must  be  treated  in  the  same  manner as described  for  electronic  sub- 
systems and components  (Paragraph B of this  section). 
*See Appendix 111 for typical specification. 
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D. Materials 
Particle  radiation can cause  significant  changes in most bulk organic  mate- 
rials and in a limited  number of bulk inorganic  materials  (prime  examples  are 
glasses,  pigments,  insulators, and many highly crystalline  materials).  The  im- 
portance and  magnitude of the  effect  depend,  respectively,  on  the  allowable  toler- 
ances to  change in the  property of interest (e.g.,  coefficient of friction,  elasticity, 
light  transmission,  conductivity,  etc.)  and  on  the  exact  rrmixrr of the  frequently 
very  complex  mixtures  used  for a given  purpose  (e.g.,  ratio of phenyl  to  methyl 
groups  in  a  silicone  elastomer).  Thus,  the  only  statements which can be made 
here  concern  the  critical  classes of materials and critical  applications  expected 
in  the NEW MOONS mission. 
The materials which will be most  affected by radiation  are  those  directly 
exposed  to  the  space  radiation or   in   direct  contact  with  the  RTG's.  The  material 
properties which a re  usually  most  sensitive  to  radiation a r e  (1) optical  absorp- 
tance o r  reflectance, (2) the  properties  determining  material  behavior  such  as 
elasticity,  friction,  viscosity,  etc., and (3) electrical  insulation  parameters. 
In the  anticipated NEW MOONS environment,  therefore,  the  principal  prob- 
lems  in  this  respect  will  involve  the  thermal  control  coatings and optical win- 
dows.  It is assumed  that no organic  insulating  materials  will  be  directly  exposed 
to  space  radiation,  since  these would be  adversely  affected at the  expected  dose 
levels at the  spacecraft  surface. However, a metal  covering  over  the  insulating 
material as thin  as 10 mils would provide  adequate  protection  against  the  effects 
of direct  exposure (see Figure 27). 
The interconnecting  electrical  cables  from  the RTG to  the  spacecraft, how- 
ever,  require  special  attention  because of the  high  operating  temperature of the 
cables  created by the  proximity of the  cables  to  the RTG. As shown in  Figure 1 
the  estimated  5-year  radiation  dose  level is sufficient  to  focus  attention  on  elec- 
trical  insulating  materials when exposed  externally.  Moreover,  the  coupling of 
the  high-temperature  environment  with  the  radiation  environment  requires  that 
special  attention be paid  to  organic  insulators. A radiation  hardening  program 
such  as  proposed  in  this  Report wi l l  uncover this need  very  early  in  a  spacecraft 
program when a list of materials is furnished  to  the  radiation  specialist (see 
Figure 28). At th i s  point in the  program  the  necessary  steps  to obtain  suitable 
materials,  such  as  ceramic  insulators or  protective  coatings,  can be taken. 
The properties of paint  can  also  be  significantly  affected by ultraviolet  radia- 
tion.  However,  paint  formulations with improved  resistance to U V  have been 
developed  and are generally  used as thermal  coatings on the  outer  surfaces of 
near-Earth  satellites with partial  success. In interplanetary  space,  however, 
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Figure 27. Damage Profile from Space Protons, Electrons, and UV in Coatings ( 1  to 5 years) 
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where  the  outer  skin of the  satellite will be  exposed  over a long  period of time 
to a relatively  large flux of low-energy  protons  and  also  to UV, the  combination 
may  produce  unexpectedly  large  changes  in  the  properties of thermal  control 
coatings. As noted later in the  text,  limited  experimental  efforts  to  determine 
the  nature and extent of such  effects are  currently  in  progress. 
The  radiation  problem  encountered  in  the  surface  region of spacecraft  pro- 
tective  coatings is illustrated  in  Figure 27. A very  large  energy flux in the Van 
Allen Belts and  in the  interplanetary  medium is concentrated in particles which 
are  very  easily  stopped  (ranges  from 0.1 to 100 micrometers).  Each  particle 
may carry  several  thousands of electron  volts of energy.  This is all  deposited 
in a very  thin  skin  area of the  coating.  Thus,  the  absorbed  energy  density  in  this 
skin, i.e., the  radiation  dose, is very high.  The  additional  photochemical  effects 
of UV radiation  aggravate  the  problem.  Unfortunately,  the  important  reflective 
and emissive  processes of thermal  control  coatings  take  place  in  this  damaged 
skin  region. 
1. Effect of Radiation on Thermal-Control Surfaces 
There  are many  different  mechanisms by which radiation  affects  thermal 
coatings, as shown in Figure 27. As  indicated  previously,  the  principal  source 
of ionizing  radiation at the  surface of the  spacecraft will be  the  low-energy  pro- 
tons  from  the  solar wind.* These  low-energy  protons are  particularly  effective 
in producing  ionization  in 3 thin  surface  skin, a few micrometers  thick, as shown 
in  the  lower  view of Figure 27. Changes  in  the properties of this  region  can up- 
set the  thermal  balance of the  spacecraft.  Doses  in  the  first few micrometers 
of the  spacecraft  surface  may  exceed I O 8  rads. At this dose  level, the change 
in  reflectance would presumably  be  comparable  to, o r  exceed,  the  effects  listed 
in Table 8 (Ref. 29). 
The  coatings  applied  for  thermal  control of the NEW MOONS spacecraft may 
be different  in  composition  from  the  types  listed  in  Table 8. Thus,  carefully 
combined  environment tests to  determine  the  changes in properties of the  par- 
ticular  formulations  used would be in order. 
An in-orbit  paint  degradation  test was performed  for Lwtiar Orbiter V, with 
interesting and pertinent  results (Ref. 30). The  objective of this  test  was to ob- 
tain  temperature  data on four  thermal-control  paint  coupons to evaluate  degra- 
dation  characteristics as a function of time.  The  test  consisted of orienting  the 
spacecraft on the  sunline 1.5 hours  prior to  apolune for a period of 2 hours to 
- . . .. .  - - - . - - - -. __ 
"Neutrons are relatively ineffective in producing ionization damage. Ionization damage i s   t he  
principal cause of changes in the reflecting properties of paint.  See  Table 8. 
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maximize  the  effect of solar  radiation. The  data  points  acquired  at  thermal 
equilibrium with no lunar  infrared energy are shown in Table 9. Data  from  the 
prime  mission are included  to  establish  the  starting  reference  and show the 
overall  trend.  Temperature  correction was applied  to  account  for  solar  constant 
changes and spacecraft  heat  sources. 
During 122 days of exposure  to  the  cislunar  and  lunar  environments,  the 
paint coupons degraded as follows: (see also Table 9) 
(ST09)* S13G over B1056 final  absorptance (a) = 2.420 times  initial a 
(ST15)* Hughes Organic final a = 2.345 times initial a 
(ST16)* Silicone o r  Aluminum final a = 1.622 times initial a 
(ST17)* 293 final a = 1.481 times initial a 
There is growing  evidence  that  solar U V  radiation, if applied  in  combination 
with "soft" ionizing  radiation,  has a more  strongly  deleterious  effect on thermal- 
control  surfaces  than i f  these  forms of irradiation are applied  sequentially. Ef- 
fects  in vacuum are frequently  worse  than  effects  in air. Since it is suspected 
that  the  thermal  control of both  the  Mariner and Lunar  Orbiter  vehicles was  un- 
expectedly  poor due  to radiation-induced  degradation  caused by the  solar wind 
and/or  solar UV, this  question  should  receive  attention at all stages of NEW 
MOONS spacecraft  design,  especially  where  coatings of low absorptivity/emis- 
sivity ratio (i.e., white coatings) are involved. Such coatings a r e  usually made 
from  metal oxide  powders. In white pigments of this  type,  the  general  degrada- 
tion of binder and backing  adds  to  the  more  serious  darkening  (increase  in  solar 
absorptance) of the  pigment,  due  to  the  production of "color  centers" and possibly 
also due to the  photo-chemical  decomposition of the  oxides. 
Detailed  information  regarding  the  changes  in  the  properties of coated s u r -  
faces  is only recently  appearing  in  the  literature. For =ample, significant re- 
sults  were  obtained  through  a  3-year  program  sponsored by the NASA Goddard 
Space Flight Center (Ref. 10). A high-vacuum space-simulation facility was  de- 
veloped that  allowed (1) simultaneous  exposure of large  arrays of temperature- 
controlled  samples  to  electrons,  protons, and ultraviolet  radiation; and (2) high- 
resolution  measurement  "in  situ" of total  hemispherical  sample  reflectancc and 
ultraviolet  source  irradiance. Twenty coating types (organic and inorganic paints 
and specular  surfaces)  were  tested. All sample types were exposed separately 
to electrons o r  ultraviolet-rich  electromagnetic  radiation.  Selected  types  were 
*Characteristics of the paint samples  used for t h i s  experiment are l isted in Reference 30. 
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Table 9 
Thermal Coating Experiment  Data 
Mission Day 
I 
Thermal Point , Spacecraft Unaligned Spacecraft Aligned 
ST09 (S13G over Bl056) 
Telemetry ( O F )  
Temperature  corrected ( O F )  
ST15 (Hughes Organic) 
Telemetry ( O F )  
Temperature  corrected ( O F )  
ST16 (Silicone on Aluminum) 
Telemetry ( O F )  
Temperature  corrected ( O F )  
a s  
ST17 (293) 
Telemetry ( O F )  
Temperature  corrected ( O F )  
213  218  224 230 23 6  244 
4.3 19.5 30.8 39.8 46.8 52.7 
-9.5 6.5 18.5 28.2 36.0 42.2 
.162 .186 .206  .223 .237 .249
47.3 56.3 64.0 69.8 73.7 76.6 
37.4 47.5 56.0 61.5 65.2 68.0 
.240 .259 ,277 .289  .298 .305
16.5 23.3 18.7 32.4 35.2 37.0 
5.7 13.5 18.5 22.5 25.0 26.5 
.185  .197 ,206  .213  .217  .220 
c I I 1
~ 
i 
I 
to Sun 
271  300 335 
90.2 115.2 135 
82.1 106.3 125.4 
.339  .403  .458 
71.0 94.8 111.5 
60.5 82.7 97.8 
.287 .341 .380 
84.6 104.0 115.8 
74.2 92.3 102.1 
.320  .365  .389 
41.0 58.0 68.3 
29.5 45.6 54.5 
.225  .256 ,274 
exposed  to  both  sequenced  and  simultaneously  combined  electron and UV 
radiation.  Coatings  were  evaluated  on  the  basis of threshold and profile of dam- 
age. Laboratory high-rate exposure to simulate low-flux electron  effects of 
space was validated.  Generally,  types  resistant  to  degradation  from UV 
exposure  were  susceptible to electron-induced  reflectance  losses, and vice  versa. 
Combined ex-osures  revealed nonadditive synergistic  effects and  dependence 
upon the ordering of sequenced  exposures.  Current  test  practices  for  combined 
exposures  were  questioned, and the  need  for  standardization  examined. 
These  experiments  contributed  significantly  to  the  state of the art by- 
1. Identifying the thresholds and buildup of electron damage (50 keV) in 
many different  types of thermal  control  coatings. 
2. Verifying that no significant differences in effects of 50-keV electrons 
exist  in  coatings at 295"K, for  exposures  from  peak  space  rates  to  those 
greatly  accelerated  rates  used in the  laboratory. 
3. Establishing  the vital need  for "in situ"  testing  with lOW-energy electrons 
on  the  basis of substantial  reflectance  degradation and almost  complete 
in-air  recovery. 
4. Exploring the differences in damage effects resulting from either simul- 
taneous or  sequential  exposure  to  given  intensities of UV and  low-energy 
particle  radiation. 
5. Verifying preliminary data on the recovery of electron-induced reflec- 
tance  loss by the  subsequent  exposure  to  UV-rich  electromagnetic 
radiation. 
6. Demonstrating significant differences in results obtained from different 
sequences of exposure  to, as well as simultaneous  exposure  to,  elec- 
trons and UV radiation. 
The analytical  techniques  for  determining  radiation-dose  profiles  due to low- 
energy  particles in the  mixed-pigment  binder  layers of thermal  coatings  are not 
well developed. The effects constitute a major  potential  problem,  for which 
quantitative  prediction  methods or  corrective  techniques  must be developed. 
However, for  the NEW MOONS spacecraft,  one  alleviating  factor  must  be 
borne in  mind: the  vehicle  recedes  from  the Sun during  the  mission and thus has 
a reduced UV and  solar-wind  problem. 
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2. Optical Window Materials 
Optical windows in all spacecraft have  the  common  criterion  that  they  must 
be  highly transmitting  in a certain wavelength  range or  "spectral window.'' By 
introducing new defects  into  the  material,  radiation  can  frequently  introduce  ab- 
sorption  bands  into this ''window". Such an  effect is the  strong "browning" of 
common  optical  glasses  (lfbrownlt  or "flint" glasses  based on  silica) by develop- 
ment of a "color  center"  absorption band in the  blue and UV region of the  spec- 
trum. IR, visible, and UV photometry  can  be  hindered by this  effect. Any glass- 
vacuum  envelopes  (bulbs, TV tubes, photo cells,  etc.)  must be studied  for  this 
effect. Likewise, lenses, filters, solar-direction  sensors,  etc.,  can be strongly 
affected.  In  some  applications,  the  effects can be  alleviated by use of sapphire 
and fused  silica, both of which are  very  little  affected  in  the  dose  range of interest. 
If such  materials cannot  be  used as the  refractive  elements  themselves, it may  be 
necessary to shield  the  element with optically-ground  slabs of the  above materi- 
als,  acting as a clear  "filter" on the  optical  axis. Such protective  measures  were 
taken on T V  camera  lenses  on  early Nimbus and TOS satellite  flights. 
3. Organic  Materials 
Except  where  strongly  exposed  to  space o r  RTG radiation,  such as, perhaps, 
the  RTG-spacecraft  interconnecting  electrical  cables, it is not expected  that or-  
ganic materials  other than  those  used  in  optical  applications  (e.g.,  paint  binder, 
clear epoxy used as sensor  covers, o r  light  concentrators) wil l  deteriorate ap- 
preciably  from  radiation  damage  effects.  Lubricants,  sealants,  potting  com- 
pounds, structural  plastics,  bearing  surfaces, and hookup w i r e  insulation  nor- 
mally  withstand  penetrating  radiation  doses in excess of l o 8  rads  in vacuum 
without gross  degradation  in  their  functions.  Even  glass-filled  teflon  bearings, 
sometimes  regarded as a special  problem,  should, at the l o4  to lo5  rad  dose, 
perform  normally  unless severe demands on performance are made (e. g. , 
10,000 rpm  bearings,  etc. ). 
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SECTION I V  
THE  RADIATION  HARDENING PROGRAM 
A. General 
As summarized  in  Section  I, a well  organized  radiation  hardening  procedure 
should  be  included as par t  of the  normal NEW MOONS subsystem  design  ac- 
tivity  to  prevent  out-of-tolerance  spacecraft  performance  over  the  prescribed 
mission  period.  It is important  to  take  into  account  the  predicted  effects of 
radiation  damage  even  during  the  definition  phase of the  overall  project s o  that 
optimum  tradeoffs  can  be  made  early  in  the  program when special  requirements, 
such as the  favorable  location of radiation  sensitive  subsystems on the  space- 
craft ,  can readily be accommodated. It is thus imperative that a cooperative 
effort  involving  radiation  specialists  and  systems  and  subsystem  design 
engineers  be  instituted  at  the  outset  and  continued  throughout  the  program. 
A s  outlined in the preceding section and illustrated by Table 7 the ra- 
diation  environment  estimated  for  the NEW MOONS mission is approximately 
of the same order  of magnitude as that  calculated  for  the TIROS M and ITOS 
missions. In addition, it is reasonable  to  assume  that  many of the subsystem 
types  ultimately  selected  for  use on the  spacecraft  will  incorporate  components 
and materials similar to those used on TIROS. There is, therefore, adequate 
reason  to  anticipate  that a radiation  hardening  program,  implemented  early  in 
the  spacecraft-definition  phase,  should  yield a "hardened"  spacecraft  capable 
of surviving  the  deleterious  effects of the  combined  space  and RTG radiation 
environment  without  imposing  major  design  constraints  or  even  requiring any 
weight  penalties,  being  mainly  concerned  with  very  precise  specification  and 
control of semiconductor  and  other  material  compositions  and  the  design of 
circuits  with  unusually high tolerance  to  drift  in  device  parameters. 
The two radiation  hardening  programs  under  consideration are essentially 
the  same  during  their  initial  phases  but  differ  primarily  in  the  methods  used 
to  predict  the  effect of the  actual  radiation  environment on the  radiation-sen- 
sitive  components  included  in  the  spacecraft.  That  phase of the two programs 
common  to  both are detailed  in  part B of this  section.  The two different  com- 
ponent test methods  used as the  basis  for  predicting  component  behavior  under 
space  radiation  conditions  are  detailed  in  part C of this  section. 
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6. First Phase of the Radiation Hardening Program 
The  proper  time  to  initiate a radiation  hardening  program,  as shown in 
Figure 28, is early in the  design  program  as  the following information  becomes 
available o r  can  reasonably be forecast: 
(1) Mission  description. 
(2) Space radiation damage profiles. , , ,, 
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Figure 28. Radiation Hardening Program, Phase I - Analysis 
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(3) RTG spectrum and spacecraft separation distance, 
(4) Preliminary spacecraft layout. 
(5) Subsystem performance specifications. 
( 6 )  Preliminary circuit analysis. 
(7) Preliminary bill of materials. 
1. Radiation Environment Affecting the Spacecraft External Surface 
With the  spacecraft-RTG  separation  distance  established, a total  value  for 
combined  space  and RTG radiation  can  be  estimated by summing  the  value 
derived  earlier  for  space  radiation  (Section 11) and the  contribution of radiation 
from  the two RTG's ,  thereby  arriving  at a value for  any subsystem  location  for 
total ionizing dose (in rads) and total bulk damage (in DENI's). This is then an 
estimate of the  external  radiation  environment  to which exterior  thermal  coatings 
will  be  exposed. 
2. Radiation Environment Affecting Components and Materials 
Inside the Spacecraft 
The  next step  is  to  calculate  the  internal  spacecraft-radiation  environment. 
Radiation-damage  profiles, as shown in Figures 1 2  and 13 (Section 11) , show how 
the  anticipated  dose  from  the  total  environment  affecting a component  will  vary 
a s  a function of thickness of a  uniform  spherical  shell of aluminum  surrounding 
the component. Figure 2 (Section 11) is a pictorial representation of this ideal 
case.  The  geometry of the shielding surrounding a component within an actual 
spacecraft,  however,  being a function of the  spacecraft  structure  and  internal 
packaging, is highly irregular.  It is therefore  necessary  to  perform a "Sector 
Analysis"  to  determine  the  actual  range of radiation  levels  to  which  components 
at  various  locations within  the  spacecraft  will  be  exposed. 
A Sector  Analysis  requires knowledge of the  spacecraft  layout  and  physical 
characterist ics.  It is necessary  to know the location of sensitive components, 
the thickness of intervening walls, and the kinds of materials used. A stepwise 
integration of the  penetrating  radiation  over  the  full  solid  angle of 47r steradians 
i s  then  performed  to  determine  the  radiation  dose. A practical  method  for ap- 
proximating  this  integration is to  divide  the  total  solid  angle  into  small  sectors 
over which  the  shield  thickness  can  be  considered  uniform.  The  choice of the 
number of sectors  and  the  solid  angle  included  in  each is generally a matter 
of judgement.  Frequently,  the  major  part of the radiation flux reaching a 
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particular component enters through a relatively  small  solid  angle. By dividing 
this solid  angle  into  five  or  six  zones,  the  spectrum of the flux penetrating  each 
zone  can  be  determined  with  reasonable  accuracy. To verify this procedure,  
consideration  should  be  given  to  mapping a breadboard  or  prototype  spacecraft 
using  appropriate  detectors. 
The  availability of both a preliminary  circuit  analysis?  through  which a l i s t  
of critical  components  can  be  prepared,  and a prel iminary materials list, so that 
critical  materials  can  be  identified,  will  permit  evaluation of the  damage  levels 
to  which  each  component  will  be  exposed  through  the  working  tools of the  Sector 
Analysis  and  the  combined  radiation-damage  profiles (e. g . ,  by way of the  space- 
craft  layout,  the  proposed  location of a component is known, then by using  the 
resul ts  of the  Sector  Analysis,  the  equivalent  shielding  afforded  to a particular 
component or   mater ia l  by the  spacecraft  struct.ure  and  packaging  can  be  de- 
termined, and finally, once the equivalent shielding is known, the combined 
radiation-damage  profiles,  which  show  the  relationship  between  the  damage- 
producing  capability of incoming  particles  and  the  shielding  effect of intervening 
materials  and  structures?  can  be  used  to  determine  the flux to  which a component 
will  be  exposed). 
With  the  anticipated flux for  cri t ical   devices  and  materials  estimated,  the 
next  step  in  the  radiation  hardening  program .is to  radiation  test  both  materials 
and  devices  to  determine  the  extent of degradation at the  estimated  dose  levels. 
C. The Radiation  Test Program 
1. Reasons for Testing 
The  need  for  materials  and  device  testing  to  obtain  degradation  results  has 
been discussed in Section 111. Although there  is a large quantity of radiation 
test  data  available  these  data  should  be  used only RS a guide  in  the  initial se- 
lection of components and not as available  design  criterion. Due to rapid 
changes  in  the  processing  art  for  semiconductor  devices,  it   is  important  to 
continually update test data and to evaluate newly developed devices. There 
are various  reasons  for  this point of view: 
(1) The  persistence of use of a given solid-state device is very short, 
since new  and  improved  devices are being  made  available  at a rapid 
rate.  The  fact  that a new device  has  improved  electrical  performance 
characterist ics  does not  imply  that  its  response  to  the  effects of ir- 
radiation have also improved. The contrary is actually possible. 
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(2) Manufacturers are continuously working at improving processing tech- 
niques even in established, well-known electrical device types. A 
change  in  processing  can  radically alter the  radiation-effects  character- 
istics of a device,  possibly  for  the  worse,  even though the  nominal 
electrical  characteristics which  determine  its JAN "2N" classification 
have not changed. 
(3) Where established devices have undergone no change in manufacturing 
techniques,  there is still  the condition, due to poor reproducibility 
of semiconductor  surface  conditions and other  device  characteristics, 
that  devices  can vary from batch  to  batch  in  radiation-sensitivity. It is 
also well known (Refs. 9,  13, and 15) that  even  devices out of the  same 
batch and with  the same "day code" can  vary. 
(4) The same device type, manufactured by several different companies, 
can be distinctively different in response to irradiation. This difference 
can  be put to good advantage if the characteristics of that  device  type 
a re  highly desirable; while test  data on the  device  obtained  from the 
first  manufacturer  tried  might  indicate  undesirable  results, a broader 
collection of test  data  covering  other  manufacturers  could show from 
which manufacturer an acceptable device can be obtained. Thus, in 
planning a test  program, a sampling of products  from  several manu- 
facturers should  be  anticipated. 
(5) There is a serious anomaly that is also a continual cause for concern: 
Arising unheralded, except through test results, is the anomalous 
degradation of a  device  that could be of any type  number  or any manu- 
facturer.  These  "maverick1' type of degradations occur for no well- 
understood reason. The "maverick" device has been described in 
Section 111. The behavior of the "maverick" is s o  widely different 
from  the  norm  (in  the  direction of excessive  sensitivity to radiation) 
that  the  occurrence of such a degradation  effect  could  be  catastrophic 
to a spacecraft subsystem. Statistically, "mavericks" occur suf- 
ficiently  frequently  that  the  possibility of such  an  occurrence  cannot 
be  overlooked. 
(6) Certain "bulk" materials, such as thermal coatings, optical windows, 
and some  organics,  where  stability of properties is important,  must 
also  be  tested  carefully  for  damage  effects in the properties of interest, 
for  the following reason.  The  exact  chemical  mix of a commercial 
material will  often vary  from  lot  to  lot and produce  results  similar 
to those described in Items 1 through 5 above. Such batch variations 
can have an important bearing on radiation hardness. Organic pail1t.s 
and glasses are important  examples of such  materials. 
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Other  important  advantages  to  be  gained  from a test  program are discussed 
in  the  paragraphs  that  follow,  where  two  alternate  component test programs are 
described. 
2. Solid-state Device Testing Program Based on Worst-case Data 
Small  statistical  samplings of each  device (10, for  example)  must  be  ex- 
posed  to an appropriate  source of radiation  in a manner  to achieve the  dose 
levels of interest within a reasonable  time. As shown in  Figure 29, the  test 
results,  in  the form of degradation  predictions, are then  submitted  to  the  design 
engineer. Based on worst-case data, the design engineer must decide if the ' 
predicted degradation of the device is within  acceptable  limits.  The  order of 
magnitude of damage  to  beta  implied by a given  value of Al/p (explained  in 
Paragraph III-B) can be obtained by consulting Table 10. If the predicted 
degradation  levels  are  acceptable,  appropriate  quantities of the  same  device 
type from  the  same  manufacturer  can  be  purchased fo r  subsequent  circuit 
integration. 
If the  predicted  degradation  results  are not tolerable,  it  can  be  seen  in 
Figure 29 that  there is an a r ray  of options  available  to  the  systems and sub- 
systems  design  engineers. By way of example these options will be discussed 
as they  apply to  radiation  hardening  for  ionization  damage of a sensor  electronics 
chain shown in Figure 30. These options are- 
(1) Circuit redesign of the preamplifier. 
(2) Circuit redesign of the sensor electronics chain. 
( 3 )  Relocation of the chain o r  a particularly  sensitive  part of the chain to 
a zone more  protected  from  space  radiation. 
(4) Increase separation distance between the chain and the RTG's o r  
provide  shielding  for  the  chain. 
(5) Select "harder" component(s) for the chain circuits. 
For the esample noted, redesign of the preamplifier, option 1, can increase 
the  "hardness" by an order  of magnitude  above  the  hardness  level  before  re- 
design. Redesign of the electronics chain, option 2 ,  to accept a preamplifier 
gain of 175 as  compared  to 300 can  lead  to  an  additional  order of magnitude 
increase in hardness. If, however, the entire chain were relocated, option 
3 ,  f rom a lightly  shielded  zone of the  spacecraft,  such as might  be  represented 
by  zone 3 ,  to a zone  which is very  well  protected by other  components  or  sub- 
systems,  such as found in  zone  5,  then  approximately 2 orders  of magnitude 
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Table 1 0  
Determination of Final  Beta, Given Initial  Beta and  Damage Factor 
(Based on Al/,f3 = 1/P - l /Po)  
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increase  in  radiation  hardness would be  achieved without  any redesign of either 
the  preamplifier or the  remaining  circuits of the  electronics  chain.  To de- 
termine  the  value of option 4, increase  separation  distance  and/or  shielding 
from the  RTG's, it is necessary  to evaluate the  shield  weight  needed or  the 
added  weight accrued by lengthening  the RTG booms and  then  examine  the 
spacecraft  inertia  properties  resulting  from  either of these  modifications. An 
evaluation of these  factors  can then  be compared  with  other  available  options 
to judge its  suitability. 
The  selection of "harder"  components, option 5,  gives  the  system and 
design  engineers two choices: (1) select an alternate  device for  testing  in  the 
reasonable  hope of achieving  better  results  (possibly,  existing test data or 
device  design  principles*  can be used as a guide  in  selecting  an  alternate  that 
has  been shown to  be  "harder") and use  worst-case  predictions  for  that  device 
o r  (2) use a preselected  form of the  same  device.  This  preselection  technique 
was  described  briefly in Section IIIB and will be  covered in greater  detail in 
Paragraph C-3 of this  section. 
The worst-case  program would appear  to  offer  more  economy in 
terms of program  time and cost than the  alternate  preselection  program  de- 
scribed later in this section. There are, however, three possible penalties 
that  may be incurred  for  the  worst-case  program  that  must  be  seriously 
weighed against  the  advantage of testing  economy: (1) There is the  possibility 
of a requirement  for  overdesign  to  insure  reliability, which could mean  the 
use of redundant devices o r  expensive, extra-high-rated devices. Either ap- 
proach  infringes upon economy of another  sort-there is added  weight  (con- 
ceivably  several pounds throughout all the  circuitry), added power  drain, and 
added design time. Added design time could be significant since redesign of 
one circuit can necessitate  redesign of the  subsequent  circuits with  which  the 
first circuit is coupled, as shown in Figure 30. (2) There is also the possi- 
bility of having to accept reduced subsystem performance. (3) The third 
possibility arises from the fact  that  since  the  statistical population of "maverick" 
devices  seems  to  average about 1 in a sampling of 100, the  results of small 
sample  tests could miss  this  worst-case  possibility. 
3. Testing Program Based on Component Preselection 
a. The Preselection Concept. The "preselection" test program is 
predicated on testing  the  entire  quantity of any device  proposed  for use,  plus 
a percentage of extras. Then, based on test  results and design  criteria, in the 
form of specified allowable degradation, the acceptable devices are retained. , 
(those  that  degraded  within  acceptable  limits)  and  the  unacceptable  devices  set 
aside for  other.1ess  critical  uses.  The  samples  that  have been  selected  for 
* e.&, narrower base width leads to smaller degradation from bulk effects. 
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Figure 30. Hardening of Sensor Electronics Chain 
use  can  then,  through an annealing  process,  usually  be  restored  to  their  orig- 
inal  (pre-irradiation)  electrical  characteristics, without unacceptable loss of 
reliability. Any subsequent  irradiation  to  the  same  dose  levels,  which would be 
the  case  in  flight,  will  cause  the  devices  to  degrade  to  the  same  extent as during 
the test in  the  simulated  environment (Refs. 14 and 15). This  gives  the  engineer 
the  added  advantage of knowing in  advance,  exactly  what  the  degradation will  be. 
Before  describing a suggested  test  program  based on the  technique of 
component  preselection, it seems useful at this  time  to  discuss  the  basis  for 
the concept, as it applies to radiation hardening. 
Preliminary  experiments, as par t  of the  joint  BTL  and RCA ComSat  Study 
Program (Ref. 19)  showed  that  gamma-irradiated  transistors  could  be  restored 
to  very  nearly  their  original  beta by a baking process. When these  transistors 
were  irradiated  a  second  time,  their  behavior  followed  the  same  general  pattern 
observed  during  the  first  irradiation. A procedure of this kind obviously offered 
the  intriguing  possibility of forming  the  basis  for a preselection  process  whereby 
transistors  prone  to  degrade beyond  acceptable  levels  could  be  identified  and 
eliminated. Life tests were conducted on annealed samples and the results 
showed essentially no effects of the  irradiate-anneal  procedures (Ref. 19). 
More  experiments  to  evaluate  further  the  feasibility of an "irradiate- 
anneal"  preselection  technique of this  kind were  recently  conducted (Ref. 15). 
Groups of transistor  samples of various  type  were  exposed  to  gamma  radiation 
in the  normal  manner;  they  were  then  baked  overnight  at a constant  temperature 
of 25OoC and were  then  subjected  again  to  the  same  irradiation  conditions. 
It was  found  that  the  times  and  temperatures  used  during  annealing  were 
not critical  and  could  be  varied  over  relatively  wide  limits  without  producing 
major  differences  in the results.  Temperatures  were  generally  in  the  range 
from 200° to  3OO0C, time  from  4  to 24 hours (Ref. 15). Figure 31 shows 
typical  beta  versus  dose  curves  obtained by repeated  exposures of the  same 
transistor  to  gamma  radiation  with  an  annealing  process in between. Both of 
the  transistors shown a r e  low-power  silicon  planar  devices  with  gain-bandwidth 
products of about 400 MHz. The 2N2222A is an N P N  type and the 2N2907A is a 
P N P .  The  occurrence of a "maverick"  can  be  seen  in View A of Figure 31. 
For  both transistors,  the  behavior of the  test  samples,  including  the  "maverick, 
during  successive  irradiations  followed  the  same  pattern  with  generally  de- 
creased but with only minor  deviations. 
The  variation of behavior  within  batches of transistors of the  same  type 
is summarized in graphical  form  in  Figure 32. Differences  in  the  initial  values 
of beta  at  the  beginning of successive  exposures are indicated on the  left of each 
view, differences  in  beta  values  after  exposure  to  5 x lo4 rads on  the  right of 
each view. Each data point plotted along the horizontal axis, View A of 
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Figure 31. Comparison o f  Beta LossFrom Successive lrrodiations 
With Intermediate Annealing Step (Ref. 15) 
Figure 32, shows in percent  the  difference  in  beta  value of a transistor  sample 
measured  during  successive  exposure  cycles.  The  grouping of the  data  points 
in  these  graphs  indicates  that  most of the  samples followed their  original  degra- 
dation  pattern although a few  showed  slightly greater  susceptibility  to  radiation 
damage. 
Several  other  transistor  types  were  studied  in  the  same  manner,  including 
the 2N3244, 2N2979, 2N834, and the MD 1130 devices. The results of experi- 
ments  with  these  transistors are presented in View B of Figure 32 in the  same 
form as in View A. These  data  also show  that  the  irradiate-anneal  procedure 
provides a reliable  indication of the  behavior to be  expected  during a succeeding 
irradiation. 
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b. The Preselection Test Program. For the preselection test program, 
shown in block diagram  form  in  Figure 33, it is necessary  to test the  entire 
quantity of any device  proposed  for  use  plus a percentage of extras  considered 
necessary  to  achieve  the  required  number of acceptable  devices.  The  test 
results should  then be reviewed  in terms of the  design  engineer's  criteria, 
i. e., percentage of allowable degradation. The devices a re  then sorted to 
select all of those  that are  within tolerance.  These  devices would be  baked  to 
restore  their  initial  electrical  characteristics and supplied  to  engineering  for 
subsequent spacecraft integration. If this approach can be accomplished safely, 
without incorporating  reliability  risks  arising  from  the  additional handling of 
the  spacecraft-'destined  devices,  it may offer  a  technique  to  deal with the 
"maverick"  problem. 
There are two possible test results  other than  an  adequate  yield of acccpt- 
able  devices.  The  Brst is that  the  yield  might  be less than the  number of 
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Figure 33. Test Program Based on Preselection Technique, Logic Diagram 
devices required, thereby necessitating the radiating, testing, sorting, and 
annealing of an appropriate  number of devices to achieve  the  required  total. 
The  second  possibility is that  the  test  results  might be  generally so poor that 
a substitute  device  must  be  tested. Although this  last  possibility  indicates an 
undesirable  extension of cost and schedule,  it is worth  noting  that if a similar 
result  occurs  in  the  worst-case  program,  corrective  action  in  terms of the 
alternatives shown in  Figure 29 could  lead  to a commensurate  penalty in cost 
and schedule  with  the  additional  undesirable  situation  where  the  design  engineer 
is still working with predictions as a final  outcome  instead of space-qualified 
components. It is also  worth  noting  that  since  the  initial  component  selection 
would most  probably  be  based on existing  test  data,  the  component  choice 
would, of course, be  that with the  most  desirable  performance  history,  thereby 
almost  eliminating  the  number of tests  that  might  result in an unacceptable 
device.  This  aspect of statistical  probability  offers  further  interest in that, 
with wise initial  component  selection,  the  overriding  probability is that a 100- 
percent  yield  could  be  achieved  the first time. 
The  preselection  approach,  then,  claims  the  following  significant  advantages 
over  the  worst-case  approach: 
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High reliability,  in  that  the  devices  integrated  into  the  spacecraft are 
space  qualified for radiation  in  the same sense as all other  environ- 
mental tests such as vacuum, humidity, etc. 
Potential  weight  savings  in  eliminating  the  need  for  redundant  devices. 
Potential  power  savings  in  eliminating  the  need  for  redundancy o r  
highly  de-rated  devices. 
Reduced  overall  design  time  in  obviating  the  need  to  cope  with  cumber- ' 
some  tradeoff  techniques  and/or  circuit  redesign  in  those areas where 
degradation levels are predicted  to  be  either  marginal or  below toler- 
ance.  Reduced  design  time  accrues  also by virtue of not having to 
redesign  those  circuits  that are coupled  to  the  problematical  circuit 
in  order  to  accommodate  reduced  performance. 
Improved  accuracy  in  circuit  design  since  the  design  engineer  can  work 
with specific  degradation  levels  instead of performance  predictions 
where  allowance would have  to  be  made  for  variability. 
4. Comparison of Worst-case and Preselection Test Philosophies. 
The  worst-case  approach  offers a relatively  quick and economic way of hard- 
ening  an  existing  spacecraft.  Its  main  virtue is that  spacecraft  integration  does 
not have  to  await  the  performance of a somewhat  lengthy  screening  program  to 
acquire needed devices. In addition,  last-minute  circuit  substitutions of electri- 
cally  equivalent  devices  can be made  (assuming  that  there  are up-to-date 
predictions on the  substitute  device) without the  time  penalty  entailed by a 
radiate-test-anneal cycle. However, there is always the possible reliability 
risk of a "maverick"  device  being  incorporated  into a critical  circuit, and there is 
still the  batch-to-batch  variation to be  compensated  for  in  circuit  design.  The 
enonomy virtue  dwindles  somewhat  in  the  light of the  added  possible  burden  to 
design  time  in  those  cases  where  redesign of a circuit, and possibly  other re- 
lated  circuits, is necessary  to  accommodate  those  devices  where  worst-case 
levels are not acceptable and suitable electrically equivalent devices are not 
available. It appears  that  implementation of the  worst-case  test  philosophy- 
would be appropriate if the  expected  dose  levels are relatively low, e. g. , if 
a deployable RTG is used,  in which case  the 1/R2 law works  in  favor of the 
damage  levels  to  which  the  spacecraft  electronics  will be exposed, or  if the 
environment  model for Jupiter is lowered by virtue of  new scientific  findings. 
The  preselection  approach  offers  the option of high  reliability. Although 
the  costs  (schedule-money) would obviously  be greater,  these  costs could be 
obviated by a reduction  in  design  time in that  the  criterion  established by the 
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design  engineer would be  satisfied at the  outset,  relieving  him of the  problem 
of excessive  circuit  redesign and coping  with  difficult  alternatives.  The  reduced 
weight and power are also important  cost  considerations.  It  appears  that  imple- 
mentation of the  preselection  program would be  most  appropriate if anticipated 
radiation  doses are relatively  high, as would be the case if a close-to-body- 
mounted RTG is used  in  the  final  spacecraft  configuration, or  if conservatism 
in  anticipated  space and Jupiter  environment is maintained or  increased. 
If the  Sector  Analysis when augmented by radiation  mapping of the  space- 
craft  indicates a fairly wide range of device  problems,  from  minimal  to  critical, 
then a third "hybrid" approach  might  be  worthy of consideration as a compro- 
mise betwee.n the  disadvantage of the  possible  reliability  risks and reduced 
performance  inherent  in  the  worst-case  approach and the  disadvantage of greater 
costs  inherent in the  preselection  approach. It may  be  reasonable  to  worst- 
case test those  devices in protected  locations or  where  performance  deteriora- 
tion is only semi-critical. In exposed areas and where  failure  might  be  cata- 
strophic,  preselection  procedures  could  solve  the  reliability  problem. 
The  predicted  performance of a subsystem  based on component character- 
istics  derived  from  radiation  testing, while' generally  satisfactory,  does not 
exclude  life  testing of selected  subsystems.  These tests should be conducted 
as soon as a  prototype is available. 
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SECTION V 
CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. General  Conclusions Based on Radiation 
Susceptibility Analysis 
The use of a  carefully planned and controlled  radiation  hardening  procedure 
which is  already  implemented  during the  Definition Phase of the NEW MOONS 
Spacecraft  Program can ensure  survival of the spacecraft  over  the  postulated 
5-year  mission without excessive  degradation  from  exposure  to the  combination 
of space and RTG radiation.  This can be done successfully  even if  the two RTG 
units are mounted within 18 inches of electronic  subsystems  that  contain  semi- 
conductor  devices  sensitive to radiation  damage  effects.  Results of the study 
contributing to  these  conclusions include the following: 
Neutron  flux from  the RTG's will be the  principal  source of bulk- 
damage  effects in semiconductors,  particularly  transistors.  This 
difficulty  can be avoided to a large  extent by using only those  transistor 
types having a relatively  large gain-bandwidth product (fT > - 50 MHz). 
Space and  RTG radiation both contribute  significantly  to  the  anticipated 
ionization dose affecting sensitive components. The maximum antici- 
pated dose  is about a  factor of 5 below the  level  used  to  estimate 
damage  effects in typical  Earth  satellites  such as the TIROS series. 
In calculating the  ionization  dose,  a  major  difficulty is the  uncertainty 
involved in  the  estimates of the near-Jupiter  radiation  environment. 
As indicated by item (2), however,  an order of magnitude increase  in 
the  Jupiter  radiation flux could be accommodated without serious con- 
sequences. The electron flux  could, therefore, be an order of magnitude 
larger  since  it  predominates  over  the  proton flux. Alternatively, about 
the  same  effect would be produced by an increase  in  the  Jupiter  proton 
flux by about three  orders of magnitude. These  estimates  assume  that 
the  energy  distribution of the particles will not change  significantly. 
However, if the  spectra become harder, that is, having proportionately 
more  high-energyparticles,  then  the allowable increase  in  number will 
be reduced. 
With a  detailed  semiconductor component list, component layout, Land list of 
bulk materials,  it is possible  to  calculate  subsystem  degradation  rapidly and 
fairly  accurately and thereafter  to  assess  the  extent of component testing 
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necessary to  provide the  data needed to  predict component degradation or  
achieve component preselection. However, the prediction of subsystems  per- 
formance  based on component behavior  does not exclude  proof-of-principle 
testing o r  life  testing of selected  subsystem. 
To validate  shielding estimates provided by the  spacecraft  structure and 
intervening  subsystems, mapping internal  dose  patterns on a  breadboard  and/or 
prototype spacecraft should be considered.  This may be done for  a  selected 
sector  where  a  particularly  sensitive  subsystem is housed or  on the entire 
spacecraft. 
The degradation  predictions  arising  from the worst-case component test 
program will provide much of the  necessary  data  for a tradeoff study where 
the effect of degradation  situations  can  be  balanced  against  the  addition of 
shielding, component o r  circuit  alteration,  reduction of mission  demands,  etc. 
Preselected space-qualified  components can be obtained  through  a pre- 
selection  program  that employs  a radiate-test-anneal  cycle  for  most  solid- 
state  devices. 
It is recommended that  the choice between the  alternative component test 
programs outlined here be predicated on the  final  spacecraft-RTG  configuration 
which will be necessary  to  establish  the magnitude of the  radiation  effects 
problem. 
In general, however, while experience with similar radiation hardening 
programs  suggests  that, for the  radiation  levels  anticipated,  the impact of 
radiation on overall  spacecraft design will not be dominating, it should be 
considered  a "new environment''  subject  to  a  careful  consideration  as  a  design 
parameter , especially  in  subsystem layout, parameter  drift  considerations, 
materials choice and finally, test verification. 
6. Impact of Radiation Effects on NEW MOONS 
Program Time and Cost 
1. General 
The inclusion of radiation as a design parameter  in a  sophisticated, long- 
life  spacecraft  has, inevitably, some  time and cost  implications. Recent re- 
search and development makes it somewhat more  simple than in  the  past to 
assess  these  implications.  Engineering a "hardened" spacecraft  requires  the 
collaboration of engineers and physicists and  good general  dissemination of 
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unfamiliar  design  concepts  throughout a spacecraft  design  organization.  Once 
this basic understanding is present  in  an  organization,  the  cost  for a given  de- 
gree of "hardening"  can  be  approached  with a fair degree of accuracy. 
Several  important  functions of a radiation  hardening  activity are noted  in the 
following  paragraphs  with a very  brief  description of each  activity. 
2. Mission Analysis 
A  physicist  will  be  required  to assess the  radiation fluxes to  be  met  in  the 
mission  and  the  penetration  characteristics of these  fluxes  in  typical  spacecraft 
materials. 
Also needed is a determination of the  estimated  radiation flux from  the  RTG's 
that  will  reach  the  detector  subsystems  to  ensure  that  tolerable  "noise"  levels 
will  not  be  exceeded. 
3. Spacecraft Sector Analysis 
Information  derived  from  spacecraft  layouts  and  drawings showing  the  loca- 
tion of individual  subsystems as well as the  internal  construction of the  subsys- 
tems  will  form  the  basis  for  applying  the  "Sector  Analysis"  technique  to  estimate 
the  extent of the  "natural"  shielding  surrounding  radiation-sensitive  components 
at various locations throughout the spacecraft. If added  shielding  seems  nec- 
e s sa ry  then  the  amount  needed  can  be  determined  more  accurately  by  using X- 
ray  techniques t o  measure  the  extent of the  "natural"  shielding  surrounding a 
component.  This  effort  will start ear ly  in the  Definition  Phase of the  program 
and  will  continue as new and more  detailed  information  regarding  the  internal 
physical  arrangement of the  spacecraft  becomes  available. 
4. Component  Damage Analysis 
Determining  the  effect of the  anticipated  environment  on  each  spacecraft 
component,  particularly  the  semiconductor  devices known to  be  sensitive  to ra- 
diation;  will  constitute a cri t ical   part  of the  radiation  hardening  program.  In- 
formation of this kind will  form  the  basis  for  determining  the  measures  that  must 
be  taken as par t  of the  subsystems  design  effort  to  maintain'performance  within 
tolerable  limits  over  the  entire  mission  period. When bills of materials and 
parts  become  available,  an  extended  search for radiation test data on  such  parts 
will  be  needed  followed  by a test program  (item 6) to  fill gaps in existing knowl- 
edge.  Again,  this  effort  should start as soon as possible  during  the  Definition 
Phase of the  program when preliminary  parts  data  become  available. 
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5. Circuit/System  Degradation 
Design  engineers  must "add on" to  their  existing  design  time  an  allowance 
for  analyzing  the  impact of the  above  device/material  degradations on their  sys- 
tem.  Start of this  phase  may  be  delayed  by  lag in step 4. 
6.  Component Test Program 
The  identification of critical parts and materials on  which no adequate  test 
o r  prediction  datum exists leads  to  an  unavoidable  testing  effort  to  supply a basis 
for  prediction. A typical  program, as performed by AED for  the TIROS project 
is shown in  Figure 34. About 600 devices of over 100 different  types  were  tested 
to  establish  worst-case  degradation  levels  under Van Allen  belt  radiation. In 
the  present  case,  some  neutron  tests  may  also  be  required.  The  program shown 
involved engineers and physicists  continuously  for  several  months.  The  results 
and  implications of such a test may  be  disseminated  rapidly as obtained if the 
correct  background  analysis  techniques and working  relations are already set 
up  between  testing  device,  evaluation,  and  design  personnel,  thus  shortening 
time  delays  radically. 
7. Screening Test 
If, as is advisable,  each  flight  unit of certain  critical  devices is pre-tested 
o r  "qualified"  under  radiation  before  integration  into  the  spacecraft,  then  such 
tests must be scheduled into the device-procurement cycle. Allowing for  the 
need  for  recycling  certain  items  because of poor  yield or  catastrophic  failures, 
the  procurement  cycle  could  be  lengthened  by  well  over a month. A s  a rule ,   the  
device  vendor  cannot  supply  such a service and the  user  must  anticipate  the.need 
fo r  in-house  testing  and  resultant  added  lead  time in procurement.  Research 
and  development  on  the  preselection techrzique to be used  can, of course,  re- 
move  uncertainties as to  the  cycle  time involved. 
8. Final Corrective  Action 
A s  with step 5, the  ensurance of optimum  tolerance  to  radiation  in  the  final 
design  requires  the  cooperation of design  engineers and  radiation  physics  per- 
sonnel. An "add on" to  design  engineers'  time  is  thus  required as well as con- 
sulting  time  from  radiation  experts.  Proof-of-principle  overall tests of selected 
prototypes of a particularly  sensitive  subsystem  might  be  included  in  this part 
of the  program.  Finally, as mentioned ear l ie r ,  it may  be  thought  advisable  to 
design  monitors of dose  levels  in  selected  spacecraft  locations  in  the  same  sense 
as temperature is monitored on spacecraft. Such monitoring subsystems could 
be  designed  within a few  months  by  an  engineer-physicist  team. 
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Figure 34. Radiation Test Program for TOS Spacecraft (1965) 
9. Conclusions 
A well-planned  radiation  analysis  effort  need not add  greatly  to  the  time re- 
quired  to  bring a spacecraft from  concept  to  launch  phase,  since  the  work  involved 
can  be  dovetailed  with  the  routine  design  process.  However,  the  services of "ra- 
diation effects" personnel  grounded  to  some  degree in radiation  physics, test 
procedures,  and design engineering are required.  Several  engineers  will  prob- 
ably  be  required to share  the  tasks  described. Total labor involved  will  depend 
on (a) severity of "internal"  environment, (b) number of types of components in- 
volved,  and (c) degree of reliability  required  in  design. 
C. Development  Program 
1. Radiation Sensitivity of New Solid-state Components 
New solid-state  components, new junction  geometries, new semiconductors, 
and new insulators  will  be  considered  for use.. In particular,  the  incorporation 
of new dielectric  materials  (silicon-on-sapphire  substrates,  ceramic  isolation, 
photodiode/phototransistor optical links, silicon nitride encapsulation, etc. ),  is 
likely  to  bring with  it new radiation  problems (e. g. , trapped-charge  buildup  in 
sapphire substrate leading to inversion layers in semiconductor). Thus, to 
achieve  the  quick  reaction  time  demanded  in  making  device  evaluations, a steady 
radiation-testing  activity,  anticipating  the  radiation  susceptibility  work of NEW 
MOONS, is recommended. In this way, a l ist  of standard "space-qualified" 
components  can  be  kept  up  to  date,  and  problems  caused  by new effects  can  be 
followed  up  by  device-physics R&D work  before  the  effect  becomes a bottleneck 
to  efficient  and  timely  spacecraft  design. 
2. Device  Preselection 
The  work on screening  techniques  described  has  generated  an  understand- 
ing of "maverick"  and  batch  variability effects in t ransis tors  and established 
feasibility of the  technique.  However,  the  general  applicability of the technique 
to  all sensitive  but  otherwise  spaceworthy  devices  has  yet  to  be  studied,  while 
the  most  economical  and  reliable  method of applying  the  technique  must still be 
determined. 
3. Stable Exterior Coatings and Components 
a. General  Solar Wind "- Phenomenology.  The very  short  stopping  distances 
of interplanetary  solar wind particles  makes  the  analysis of effects  due  to  them 
difficult.  Further  basic  study on  the  interaction of these  particles with surfaces 
is required. Such questions as the  relative  amounts of atomic  displacement, 
sputtering, and  ionization  produced  must  be  addressed. 
112 
r 
b. Development of Stable External Materials. Materials directly exposed 
to  low-energy  trapped  and  solar  particleshave a special  materials  problem. 
Such materials as organic  binders  for  paints,  paint  pigments,  insulators  for 
cables,  potting  compounds  for  electrical  harness, etc. , will  receive  surface 
doses above lo8  rads.  The  problem  will  be  acute if white (low U / E )  coatings 
are required. For example, color-center formation in white pigments by 
protons  and U V  probably  caused  the  changes of a s  by a factor of 2 and corre- 
sponding temperature rises in  white  paints  observed  during  the  3-month  missions 
of Lunar  Orbiter.  Current technology has not  produced good space-stable 
coatings  which  will  retain  thermal,  optical,  and  electrical  properties  under 
such conditions. In addition, recent experiments indicate that the combined 
effect of particle  and  ultraviolet  radiation  may  be  very  much greater than  the 
effect  produced when the  two  different  types of radiation are applied in sequence. 
Thus,  further  development of such  materials is required and  recommended  for 
long interplanetary  missions. 
4. Experimental Mapping of Shielding Afforded by 
.Spacecraft  Structures and Components 
Statements  in  Sections IIC and N C  and the  material of Section IID indicate 
that  for  magnetically  trapped  electrons  and  protons of the  type  expected in NEW 
MOONS mission  environments,  the  role  played  by  component  box  covers,  device 
encapsulations, and the  neighboring  structures in providing  mutual  protection fo r  
the  active  solid-state  components  inside  them is very  significant.  This  being so,  
variations  in  the  layout of the  electronic  packages  can  have a strong  impact on 
the "hardness" of the overall system (see, for example, Ref. 13, Figure 10). 
Thus,  it is important  to  examine several different  layouts  in  order  to  determine 
the optimum layout for "hardness" in a given space situation. The mapping of 
radiation  doses in each  component  location, if done  by  individual  manual  calcula- 
tion, for many  space  situations would be extremely  time  consuming. 
An experimental  method  can  be  devised  which  conserves  time  and  effort. 
Equipment  mockups,  in  several  layouts,  could  be  constructed, a radiation  de- 
tector  placed  inside  various  component  boxes  and a suitable  radiation  source 
placed o,utside to simulate  the  space  radiation.  This  preliminary "mapping" of 
layouts  for  mutual  radiation  protection  could  ultimately  produce  significant 
savings  in  weight  by  eliminating  shielding  which  might  otherwise  have  to  be 
added  to  protect  sensitive but  under-protected  electronic  components. 
If it is decided  to  monitor  radiation  dose in flight,  lightweight,  low-power 
dosimetric  systems  should be developed at this  stage which  will telemeter ra- 
diation  damage  status of the  spacecraft  in a compact  data  format  which  does not 
occupy  telemetry  bandwidth unduly. 
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5. Computation of Shielding Effects 
The  experimental  mapping,  described in the  foregoing  section,  requires a n  
essential accompanying capability. This is the capability to compute, rapidly 
and accurately,  the  space  radiation  flux and doses which emerge after passing 
through a slab  shield of a given  material and thickness (see Section IIC-6). New 
computations a re  needed  for  every  change  in  spacecraft  trajectory  around  Jupiter. 
Thus,  the  process  should be computerized. Only a limited  range of programs is 
at present  available for this  purpose.  Furthermore, as accurate  prediction  curves 
for  the  degradation of key devices are evolved,  the  dose .and damage  levels  com- 
puted  above  could be  automatically  converted  into  degradation  levels for  devices 
behind 8 given  thickness of shielding. Such programs are not yet  available  for 
internal  electronic  components.  Finally,  the fact that,  in real life, shielding 
around a component is nonuniform  could  be  included in a computer  program by 
making  independent  shielding  calculations for several  sectors of the 477 solid 
angle  about a given  component  location.  Such  calculations would be particularly 
important  for  critical  components  such as MOS transistors and for  determining 
the  feasibility of certain  close-flyby  missions with respect  to  radiation  degra- 
dation of the  spacecraft  system as a whole. * 
6, Other Recommendations 
Radiation-hardened  products are being  pursued by the  Department of Defense 
(Reference Article in ELECTRONICS NEWS, Monday, Feb. 24, 1969, by Ron 
Williams,  Dallas,  entitled "Standing Up to  Radiation"). New study  contract for 
radiation-resistant  products  to  component and subsystem  companies are being 
released. Companies include Texas Instrument, Motorola, Fairchild Semi- 
conductor, and Signetics. It would seem  appropriate  to  coordinate with the 
government  agencies involved  and their  contractor  to  ensure  optimum  use of 
relevant  data for NEW  MOONS missions. 
* V. Danchenko, Goddard Space Flight Center, has previously indicated the importance of this re- 
quirement in mission analysis. 
114 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Program 
In  the  course of conducting  the  studies of the NEW  MOONS program  valuable 
assistance  has  been  provided by  many  people  representing  various  organizations. 
It is considered  appropriate  to  identify  those  whose  contributions  were  most  vital. 
Fred  Schulman, NASA Office of Advanced Research  and  Technology,  and 
Marcel  Aucremanne, NASA Office of Space  Science  and  Applications, both real- 
ized  the  necessity  for  the NEW MOONS studies and  provided  technical  guidance 
and  financial  support  throughout  the  program. 
Daniel G. Mazur,  Director of Technology, and Rudolph A. Stampfl, Deputy 
Director,  both of Goddard  Space  Flight  Center,  aided  in  program  initiation. 
William S. West directed  the NEW MOONS program. 
RCA Astro-Electronics  Division (AED) , the  prime  contractor,  recognized 
the  importance of the NEW MOONS program and has  given its support  and  co- 
operation toward realizing the objectives of the  program.  Herbert w. Bilsky of 
RCA-AED served as the RCA program  manager  and  technically  contributed  to 
the  program as well as provided  substantial  support in preparation  and  review of 
the  manuscripts. 
Report Preparation 
W. Poch, A .  Holmes-Siedle, and D. Carroll of RCA-AED prepared por- 
tions of the  original  draft and worked with H. W. Bilsky and W. S. West to 
complete  the  report. 
K. Campe  and A. Parker  of Hittman  Associates  provided RTG isoflux  maps 
and  fuel  data  developed  under  the  technical  direction of D. Harris of Goddard 
Space  Flight  Center. 
J ames  H. Trainor, Joseph Epstein, Dale Harris, Lawi-ence Kobren, R.S. 
Marriot ,  and  Thomas P. Sciacca, Jr. , of Goddard Space Flight Center each 
read  the  complete  draft of the  manuscript and  made  valuable  contributions  and 
comments. T. P. Sciacca, Jr. , and R. S. Marriot provided Appendix I. Other 
Goddard  Space  Flight  Center  personnel who have  provided  important  technical 
information, review, and comments include Emil W. Hymowitz, Joseph H. Conn, 
John E. Flynn, and Vitaly Danchenko. 
Goddard Space  Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Greenbelt, Maryland, January 22, 1970 
039-01-01-01-51 
115 
l11l11l11111111l111l1l111 lIl1l1111l1l111l I l l  I I I I 
REFERENCES 
1. Vette, J. I. , "Models of the  Trapped  Radiation  Environment, ' I  Volume I ,  
Inner  Zone  Protons  and  Electrons, NASA Special Publication 3024, 1966. 
2. Webber, W. R., "An Evaluation of the Radiation Hazard Due to  Solar- 
Particle Events, Boeing Report DZ-90469, The Boeing Company, Seattle, 
Washington, December 1963. 
3. Ness,  N. F . ,  "The Magnetosphere and Its Boundary Layer,'' in "Proceed- 
ings of the Second  Symposium on Protection  Against  Radiation  in  Space !' 
(ed. Arthur Reetz, Jr. ), Washington, D. C. , Oct. 12-14, 1964, NASA 
Special Publication 71, 1965. 
4. Space Materials Handbook s(ed. C. G. Goetzel, J. B. Rittenhouse, and 
J. B. Singletary), New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc. , 1965. 
5. Hamman, D. , et al. , "Space Radiation Damage to Electronic Components 
ana Materials," REIC Report No. 39, Battelle Memorial Institute, Colum- 
bus, Ohio, January 31, 1966. 
6. Holmes-Siedle, A. G., Liederbach, F. ,  and Poch, W. , "The Prediction of 
Space  Radiation  Effects  on  Transistors  and  Solar  Cells,"  IEEE  Catalog No. 
F63,  Institute of Electrical  and  Electronics  Engineers, New York, N. Y. , 
1966. 
7. Brucker,  G. J. , "Correlation of Radiation Damage in Silicon Transistors 
Bombarded  by  Electrons,  Protons,  and  Neutrons, If Toulouse  Conference  on 
Radiation  Effects  in  Semiconductors , March 1967. 
8. Cooley, W. C. , and Barret t ,  M. J. , "Handbook of Space Environmental Ef- 
fects on Solar Cell Power Subsystem,'' Exotech, Inc., Report No. TR-014, 
Exotech, Inc., Alexandria, Va., September 9, 1966, P. 12. 
9. TOS Radiation  Program  Report,  "Analysis  and  Evaluation of Test Results , '' 
RCA Corp. , Princeton, N.J .  , under  Contract No. NAS 5-9034 with  Goddard 
Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md. , September 1965. 
116 
10. Brown, R. R., Fogdall, L. B. , and Cannaday, S .  s., ''Electron Ultraviolet 
Radiation  Effects  on  Thermal  Control  Coatings,'' AIAA 3rd Thermophysics 
Cod .  , Los Angeles, Calif. , June 1968. 
12. Ross, R. , Krumbein, A. and Beaulieu, A. , "A Gamma Ray Probe System 
for  Determining  the Shielding  Effectiveness of the Apollo Vehicle,"  in  "Pro- 
ceedings of the Second  Symposium on Protection  Against  Radiation  in  Space " 
(ea. Arthur Reetz, Jr.), Washington, D. C. , Oct. 12-14, 1964, NASA Spe- 
cial Publication 71, 1965. 
13. Holmes-Siedle, A. G. , "Space Radiation-Its Influence on Satellite Design," 
RCA Engineer,  July 1965. 
15. Holmes-Siedle, A. G. , and Poch, W. J. , "A Prediction and Selection Sys- 
tem  for  Radiation  Effects  in  Planar  Transistors,' '   IEEE NSRECON, Missoula, 
Montana, July 1968, Trans. of IEEE on Nuclear Science, NS-15:213, 1968. 
18. Dennehy, W. J. , Holmes-Siedle, A. G. ,  and Zaininger, K. H. ,  "Interrela- 
tion of Space  Radiation  Sensitivity  and  Process  Techniques  in MOS Devices," 
RCA Corp. , Princeton, N. J. , Final  Report  under  Contract No. NAS 5-10177 
with  Goddard  Space  Flight  Center,  Greenbelt, Md. , July 1967. 
20. Holmes-Siedle, A. G., and Zaininger, K. H. , "A Survey of Radiation Ef- 
fects in MOS Devices," RCA Review, 18(2):208-240, 1967. 
117 
21. Gordon, F., and Wannemacher, H., "The Effects of Space Radiation on 
MOSFET  Devices  and  Some  Application  Implications on Those  Effects," 
Trans.  of the  IEEE on Nuclear Science, NS-13:262, 1966. 
22. Dennehy, W. J. , Holmes-Siedle, A. G., and Zaininger, K. H . ,  "Interrela- 
tion of Space  Radiation  Sensitivity  and  Process  Techniques  in MOS Devices," 
RCA Corp.,  Princeton, N. J., Final  Report  under  Contract No. NAS 5-10177 
with Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md. , July 1967. 
23. Dennehy, W. J . ,  Holmes-Siedle, A. G. , and Zaininger, K. H . ,  "Techniques 
for the  Reduction of Radiation  Sensitivity in MOS Structures, ' I  in "Solid State 
Device Conference, ' I  Manchester, England, Inst. Phys. , October 1967. 
24. Waxman, A. , and Zaininger, K. H. , "A1203-Silicon Insulated Gate Field 
Effect Transistors, 'Applied Physics Letters,  12(3):15,  1968. 
25. Holmes-Siedle, A. G. , and Zaininger, K. H. , "Physics of Failure of MOS 
Devices  Under  Radiation,''  Trans. of the  IEEE on Reliability, R-17(1):24, 
1968. 
26. "TIROS M Radiation Program, RCA Radiation Test Internal Report RAP- 
6811, RCA Corp., Princeton, N. J. , May 21, 1958. 
27. Messenger, G. C. , and Steele, E. L. , "Statistical Modeling of Semiconduc- 
tor  Devices  for  the  TREE  Environment,"  IEEE NSRECON, Missoula, Mon- 
tana,  July 1968, Trans. of IEEE on Nuclear Science, NS-15:133-139, 
1968. 
28. Poch, W. , and Holmes-Siedle, A. G. , "Evaluation of RCA Complementary 
Symmetry MOS Logic Devices, RCA Radiation Test Internal Report RAP- 
69B, RCA Corp. , Princeton, N. J. , February 1, 1969. 
29. Space Materials Handbook (ed. C.  G. Goetzel, J. B. Rittenhouse, and J. B. 
Singletary), New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. , Inc. , 2nd Edition, 
1965. 
30. The Boeing Co. , "Lunar-Orbiter V-Extended Mission  Spacecraft  Operations 
and Subsystem Performance," NASA Contractor Report 1142, August 1968. 
118 
APPENDIX I 
RADIATION ENVIRONMENT OF THE  JUPITER FLYBY 
FOR VARIOUS NEAR-JUPITER  TRAJECTORIES 
T. P. Sciacca, Jr . ,  and R. S. Marriott 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
Trajectory  Data 
by 
R .  Groves 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
The  postulated  space  radiation  environment  for  the  Outer  Planets  Explorer 
(OPE)  mission is based upon data from various  sources" and is tabulated in 
Table 1-1. The  radiation  environment  produced  by  four RTG's used as the  elec- 
trical  power  source  for  the  OPE  spacecraft is also included in Table 1-1 and is 
given  in  more  detail  in  Table 1-2. 
A study  was  made of the  change  in  accumulated  dose as a function of the 
near-Jupiter  trajectory.  The  various  trajectories  considered  relating  distance 
from Jupiter to time from closest approach are illustrated in Figure 1-1. To 
obtain f lux  curves   for  a specific  near-Jupiter  trajectory  Figure 1-1 is used  in 
conjunction  with  the  curves  in  this  report.  Figures 1-2 and 1-3 are examples 
*Discussed in sect ion I1 of this report. 
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Table 1-1 
Design  Fluence for the  Environment  Radiation 
of the  OPE  Mission 
T 
Electrons 
Protont Space 
Environment* 
RTG 
Environment' Neutrons 
Gammas 
I I 
Particles/cm2 
Adjusted 
(MeV) Fluence 
I I 
>5 .0  1.0 x 10'0  .0 x 1011 
2*5 I Approx. 3.0 x 10l1 3.0 X lo1' 
2.5  Approx. 4.0 X l0l2 4.0 X 10l2 
*The  radiation  totals include the 
Jupiter  environments. 
(1) near-Earth, (2) Earth-to-Jupiter, (3) near- 
t The proton estimate could vary as much as two to  three  orders of magnitude. 
3 The  adjusted  fluence  for  space  environment  includes a factor of safety of 10. 
ORTG Environment = 4 RTG for 8 years at approximately 1700 watts each. 
~~ 
of the  proton  flux  for a trajectory of 7 R J A *  and 7 . 4  R J A t  respectively.  Figures 
1-4, 1-5, and 1-6 are examples of the  electron  flux  for  trajectories of RJA,  5 RJA,  
and 3 R J A  respectively. The area under  these  flux  curves (i. e. , Figures 1-2 
through 1-6) represent a fluence  for a specified  trajectory;  hence, by  integrating 
and  multiplying  the  result  by 2 (the curve is actually  one half of the  flux as it is 
symmetrical  about  the  ordinate)  the  fluence as a function of a specific  trajectory 
is obtained.  Considering  the  uncertainties of the  Jupiter  environment  the  results 
obtained  indicate  that  the  fluence is relatively  insensitive,  within  an  order of 
magnitude,  to  changes in the  trajectories  considered. 
* R J A  is the altitude from Jupiter's surface in terms of Jupiter's  radius. 
tThe trajectory of 7.4  R J A  used in this report. 
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Table 1-2 
Radiation  Environment  Produced by RTG's 
Particle 
Neutrons 
Center  line of RTG to  nearest  electronic 
package 
Center  line of RTG to  center of spacecraft 
Center  line of RTG to experimental package 
on booms 
Gammas 
Center  line of RTG to  nearest  electronic 
package 
Center line of RTG to  center of spacecraft 
Center line of RTG to  experimental package 
on booms 
NOTE: No Shielding Assumed 
s/c 
Flux 
250 neutrons/cm2-sec. 
150 neutrons/cm2-sec. 
15  neutrons/cm2-sec. 
8 x lo3  gamma/cm2-sec. 
4.5 X 103 gamma/cm2-sec. 
1 X 103 gamma/cm2-sec. 
0 
Reference Geometry: 
RTG 
Fluence-8-Year Mission 
2.52 X 10" neutrons/cm2 
1.51 x 10" neutrons/cm' 
1.51 x 10" neutrons/cm' 
4.03 x 10" gamma/cm' 
2.27 x 10" gamma/cm' 
7.56 x loi2 gamma/cm' 
EXP 
MeV 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
12 
10 
8. 
6 
4 
2 
- 
ALL  DISTANCES ON THIS  GRAPH  ARE  IN R: 7 6 5  
1 
ARRIVAL C3 = 80 km2/sec2 
I I 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
TIME  FROM CLOSEST  APPROACH (hr) 
Figure 1-1. Distance From Jupiter vs.Time From Closest Approach 
1 
TIME FROM INSTANT OF NEAREST APPROACH (hr) 
Figure 1-2. Proton Flux v s .  Time for Trajectory of 7 R,, (Closest Approach) 
9 > 0.1 MeV = 4.24 x 1013 protons/cm 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 
TIME FROM INSTANT OF NEAREST APPROACH (hr) 
Figure 1-3. Proton Flux vs.Tirne for Trajectory of 7.4 R,A (Closest Approach) 
I 
2.6 
2.4 - IO 2 
9 > 5 MeV = 1.029 x 10 electrons/cm 
TIME FROM,CLOSEST APPROACH (hr) 
Figure 1-4. Electron Flux vs.Tirne for Trajectory of 7 R,, (Closest Approach) 
4s  5 MeV = 6.12 x 10 electrons/cm 9 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 
TIME FRCM CLOSEST APPROACH (hr) 
Figure 1-5. Electron Flux vs.Time fot Trajectory of Sf?,, (Closest Approach) 
TIME FROM INSTANT OF NEAREST APPROACH fir) 
Figure 1-6. Electron Flux vs.Time for Trajectory of 3R,, (Closest Approach) 
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APPENDIX II 
FUEL DATA AND DERIVATION  OFISOFLUX MAPS* 
Dale Harris 
Goddard  Space  Flight  Center 
K. Campe 
Hittman  Associates 
1. Introduction 
Among the  objectives of Task IIA are the  assessment of the  susceptibility 
of the  model  mission  configurations  to  the  nuclear  radiation  environment of an 
onboard  RTG  and  the  evaluation of the  possible  modifications  and  radiation 
hardening  programs which  may  be  required  for a successful  deep-space  flight. 
In  support of these  objectives, a study  was  performed  with  respect  to  the  Pu02 
fuel  properties  and  the  radiation  fields  surrounding a planar RTG. 
A compilation of the  physical,  chemical, and nuclear  properties of Pu02 
has  been  made on the  basis of the  latest  available  experimental and theoretical 
data.  The  properties are presented  in  tabular  and  graphical  form  in  Section 11. 
Section 111 contains a discussion of the  relative  biological  hazards of Pu02 
microspheres and PuO, cermets.  In  addition,  an  evaluation is made of the feasi- 
bility of Oi8 depletion  from pUOp and  the  associated  reduction  in  neutron  emis- 
sion rates. 
The RTG gamma and neutron  radiation  fields are given  in  Section IV. They 
are presented  graphically  in  the  form of isoflux  contour  maps. A separate  map 
was  constructed  for  each of the  three  selected RTG  power  levels, i. e. , 50, 75,  
and 100 watts(e).  The effect of Oi8 depletion is discussed in conjunction  with 
the  isoflux  data. A description of the  nuclear  fuel  data  and  the  method of analysis 
is also included  in  Section IV. 
* 
Prepared Under Contract by Hittman Associates for RCA AED. 
1. 
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Conclusions  and  recommendations  with  respect  to  Pu02  cermets, Oi8 de- 
pletion,  and  the  accuracy of the RTG radiation  field  analysis are presented  in 
Section V. A list of references  cited  in  this  appendix  appears on page 163. 
I I .  Pertinent Properties of Selected 
State-of-the-Art RTG Fuel 
A. Physical Characteristics of P I I ~ ~ '  Oxide Microspheres 
1. Composition 
a. Oxygen 
12 percent  by  weight  (calculated) 
b. Plutonium 
Depends  on age of fuel (see Figure II-1) 
c. Uranium 
Depends on age of fuel (see Figure II-1) 
Theoretical PuzS6O, densitv) 
a. 0.40 watts/g 
b. 12.13 Curies/g 
3. Power Densitv (Bulk Power Densitv) 
2.6 L watts/cm3 
4.  Mechanical  Properties 
a. Hardness of Sintered Pu23902 - 11  63 kg/mm2 
b. Crush strength of Pu23802 Microspheres 
1 t o  3 kg/sphere 
5. Thermophysical  Properties 
a. Density of Individual Microspheres 
Theoretical 11.46 g/cm3 
Production  grade 8.9  to 10.1 g/cm3 
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(Ref. 1) 
(Ref. 1) 
(Ref. 2) 
(Ref. 3) 
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NUMBER OF  HALF-LIVES CTx = 87.4 years) 
Figure 11-1 Moles of He or U234 ProducedFrom the Decay of 1 Moleof Pu238 
b. Linear Thermal Expansion Coefficient for 
P u ~ ~ ’ O ,  Microspheres (see Figure II-2) (Ref. 4) 
c. Bulk Density 
’6.2 g/cm3  (varies  inversely with particle  density and 
inversely with void volume between particles) 
d.  Heat Capacity (Ref. 5) 
16.4 cal/mole-% at 25OC for Pu~~’O,  microspheres 
e. Enthalpy (Ref. 5) 
H i g 8  - H i  = 2600 cal/mole for P u 2 3 9  0, microspheres 
f. Temperature of Phase  Tran formation (Ref. 6) 
Melting point for  microspheres is 224OoC L 3OoC 
g. Absolute Entropy 
19.7 cal/k-mole  at 298% 
h. Entropy of Formation 
= -416 cal/k-mole 
i. Latent Heats of Phase Transformation 
A H f u s  for P u ~ ~ ’ O ,  = 15.2 kcal/mole 
AH for = 133.8 kcal/mole 
v aP 
(Ref. 3) 
(Ref. 3) 
(Ref. 7) 
(Ref. 4) 
j. Vapor Pressure  fo  P u ~ ~ ’ O ,  (Ref. 4) 
log P (atm) = A - (B/T), where A = 8.072, 
B = 29240, and T, is  the  temperature in degrees Kelvin 
k. Thermal Conductivity for Pressed and Sintered P u ~ ~ ’ O ,  (Ref. 8) 
Figure 11-3 gives  thermal conductivity values as 
calculated  from  experimentally  determined  thermal 
diffusivity of pressed and sintered P u ~ ~ ’ O , .  The 
temperature  correction of the PuO, density is based 
on the  reported  coefficients of linear  thermal expansion. 
The specific  heat of PuO, is assumed  to  be  the  same  as 
uo2 
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Figure 11-2. Linear Thermal Expansion of  Pu23902 Microspheres 
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Figure 11-3. Thermal Conductivity of Two Densities of Pu23902 
1. 
m. 
n. 
0. 
Thermal Diffusivity for Pressed and Sintered P u ~ ~ ’ O ,  (Ref. 8) 
The thermal diffusivity  values of P u ~ ~ ’ O ,  .reported in 
Figure II-4 have an accuracy of k5 percent 
Viscosity of pu239 0, 
32 Centipoise (2  25 percent) at melting point (calculated) 
Surface  Tension of P u , ~ ’ O ~  
525 dynes/cm (k15 percent) 
Crystallography: P u 2 3 8  0, 
FCC structure 
Space group Fm3m 
Lattice  constant 5.400 
Ionic radius 0.90 
(Ref. 1) 
(Ref. 1) 
(Ref. 6) 
(Ref. 6) 
6. Electrical  PrapertieS 
Electrical  Resistivity of 0, 
800 ohm-cm at 1250°K 
4 x lo1, ohm-cm at 298°K by extrapolation 
B. Chemical Properties of Pu238 Oxide Microspheres 
1. Heat of Formation of PuZ3’Oxide 
-252.9 kcal/mole  at 25°C 
-253.3 kcal/mole  at 1200°C 
2. Free Energy of Formation of P u ~ ~ ’  Oxide 
-240.4 kcal/mole  at 25 “C 
-192.3 kcal/mole at 1200°C 
Free  energy of formation can be  calculated from  an  empirical 
equation 
(Ref. 3) 
(Ref. 9) 
(Ref. 9) 
AG; = (-253480 - 3.45T log T + 52.58T) cal/mole 
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Figure 11-4. Thermal Diffusivity of Two Densities of 
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Metal 
Ni 
Mo 
Fe 
W 
C r  
Nb 
Ta 
Ti 
Z r  
Be 
Th 
Table II-1 
Standard Free Energy Change for PuOz-Metal Reactions 
Between 1000" and 2000°K (Ref. 10) 
Temperature 
Range eo 
1000-1728 
1000-2000 
1000-1812 
1000-2000 
1000-2000 
1000-2000 
1000-2000 
1000-1933 
1000-1900 
1000-2000 
1000-1900 
1000-1556 
1000-1556 
1000-2000 
1000-1900 
Reaction 
Ni + 2Pu0,  - NiO + Pu,O, 
Mo + 4&0, - 2R1,0, + MOO, 
Fe + 2Pu0, - Pu,O, + FeO 
W + 4Pu0,  - - 2Pu,03 + WO, 
2Cr + 6-0, - 3Pu20,  + Cr,O, 
2Nb + 10Pu0, -+ 5Pu,O, + Nb205 
2Ta + 10Pu0,  - 5Pu20 ,  + Ta,O, 
2Ti + 6Pu0,  - 3Pu,03 + Ti,O, 
2Ti + Pu,O, - 2Pu + Ti,O, 
Z r  + 4Pu0, - 2Pu,O, + ZrO, 
3 Z r  + 2Pu,O, - 3Zr0 ,  + 4Pu 
Be + 2Pu0,  - Pu,O, + Be0 
3Be + Pu,O, - 2Pu + 3Be0 
Th + 4Pu0,  - Tho, + 2Pu,03 
3Th + 2Pu,O, --+ 4Pu + 3Th0, 
OF for 
Temperature Range 
Listed (kcal) 
4 2 ,  +57 
+96, +149 
+49, +39 
+98, +80 
+81, +58 
+134, +90 
+loo, +56 
-7, -28 
+34, +37 
-23,  -34 
+4, +28 
-23, -27 
-33,  -23 
-53,  -63 
-88,  -58 
3. Compatibility with Materials of Containment* 
Results  to  date show P u ~ ~ ~ O ,  microspheres to be compatible with all 
materials  tested on a short-term  basis.  Free  energy change  values for 
reactions between PuO, and metals  can be used as an aid  in  selection 
of potential  encapsulation  material  (Table II-1). 
Table 11-1 shows the  dissolution of PuOz in distilled  water and sea water. 
Table 11-2 
Dissolution of Microspheres  in  Distilled  Water and Sea Water (Ref. 1.2) 
Number 
of 
Particles 
446 
515 
628 
917 
518 
885 
Total 
Surface  Area 
(mm2) 
34.81 
43.58 
54.69 
82.69 
46.32 
76.79 
Type 
Water 
Florida  sea 
water 
Florida  sea 
water 
Florida  sea 
water 
Distilled 
water 
Distilled 
water 
Distilled 
water 
Temperature 
~~ 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Ambient 
"Rate of re lease   based on 22 months  exposure; test i s  continuing 
C. Nuclear Properties of Pu238 Oxide Microspheres With 
Natural 01* Content (Ref. 11) 
1. Radiation 
Tme 
Alpha 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Energy (Mev) 
5.495 
5.452 
5.353 
5.204 
5.004 
Sample 
Rate of Release* 
(wg/day-mmz) 
1.02  x 10-8 
1.23 X 
1.00 x 10-8 
1 .52  x l oV8  
1.27 x 
1.49 x 
Darticles/watt-sec 
",8.04 x l o 1  
-3.12 x lo1'  
1.45 X i o 9  
5.59 X 107 
7.82 X i o 4  
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Type Energy (Mev) 
Beta  Stable 
Gamma 1 0.810 
2 
3 
0.776 
0.203 
4  0.1531 
5 
6 
0.0998 
0.00435 
particles/watt-sec 
-2.24 X io5  
-5.59 X 105 
4.47 X i o4  
1.12 X lo7  
1.01 x lo8 
4.25 X lo8 
7 0.017 
8 6.45 (due to P u 2 3 8 )  
9 6.95 (due to P u ‘ ~ ~ )  
10 2. 61 (due to T1208) 
11 Other  low-energy  gamma 
rays due to impurities 
Bremsstrahlung Negligible 
Neutrons:  Neutron  emission  primarily  due  to (a, n) reactions 
with Oi8. Best available average value is 
“2 x l o4  neutrons/sec-g Pu238 (see  Figure 11-5 
and Table 11-3) 
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Lu 
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Lu 
-I 
0.1 
0.05 
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140 
Table 11-3 
Data  Plotted  in  Figure II-5 
Energy (MeV) 
0.48 
0.59 
0.80 
0.99 
1.34 
1.66 
1.96 
2.24 
2.48 
2.51 
2.78 
2.81 
3.03 
Neutron Intensity 
9.1 
6.8 
6.5  
4.5 
4.5 
6.5 
9.7 
10.0 
11.4 
12.1 
10.6 
9.9 
8.7 
Energy (MeV) 
3.12 
3.42 
3.72 
4.00 
4.28 
4.82 
5.3 
5.8 
6.3 
7.4 
8.3 
9 .1  
10 .o 
Neutron Intensity 
7. a 
5.6 
3.9 
2.4 
1.3 
0.62 
0.43 
0.30 
0.22 
0.16 
0.096 
0.062 
0.044 
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111. Fuel Form Modifications 
A. Cermets 
The current  status of Pu238 fuel forms is an area of major  concern  to  the 
NEW MOONS Program.  Presently, only the PuO, microsphere  form  is  available 
for  use. This fuel  has  a  number of unacceptable characteristics with regard to 
safety. It  has  been shown that if released  at high altitudes,  the  microspheres 
will break up into  inhalable size  particles which could result  in unacceptably 
high lung burdens.  Particle  degradation  also  occurs if the fuel is impacted or  
stepped upon. If released  at  ground  level,  the  fuel  can be suspended and carried 
by winds creating  an  inhalation  hazard and a highly contaminated downwind foot- 
print  pattern. A number of alternate  fuel  forms have  been postulated which pre- 
vent the  generation of inhalable particles and subsequent  atmospheric  transport. 
One promising  fuel is a matrix  consisting of PuO, microspheres and either 
a high melting point metal o r  a ceramic. The Battelle  Memorial  Institute,  under 
contract with the AEC, is presently engaged in  the  preliminary  investigation of 
such  cermet o r  ceramic  fuels.  Matrix  materials,  such as molybdenum and mag- 
nesia,  are being considered.  Little  information  has been reported on the  status 
of this development work, so nothing can  be  said as to when these  improved 
fuels will be  made  available. If successfully developed in time  to  be  factored 
into  the NEW MOONS Program,  such  fuels would provide  an  additional  safety 
backup of some  significance. 
B. Depleted Oxygen Fuel Form 
Plutonium-238 dioxide (PuO,) decays by alpha emission. Neutrons are  gen- 
erated by spontaneous  fission and by ( a ,  n) reactions between the  emitted  alpha 
particles and the oxygen atoms. 
The  neutron  emission  rate  for  Pu02,  made with naturally  occurring oxygen, 
can  be as high as 6 times that of high-purity P u 2 3 8  metal  for  equal  quantities of 
Pu238 (Ref. 11). Examination of the emission  spectra of aqueous solutions of Pozi0 
(Ref. 13) have  indicated  that Oi8 is the  major  source of (a , n) neutrons with Pozi0 
alphas. Polonium-210 experimental  results are applicable  to Pu238 since  the a ener- 
gies  are  very  similar  (5.3 MeV and 5.5 MeV, respectively).  The  cross  section  for 
the ( 0 ,  n) reaction with Oi8 exceeds  the  cross-section (a, n) reactions with all other 
materials except beryllium. Further examination of (a, n) cross  sections  has 
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revealed  that  the cross section of 0'' is less than  10  percent of the  cross  sec- 
tion  for 0". Therefore,  most of the  neutron  emission  from PuOz appears  to 
result  from  the (a, n) reaction  with 0". 
Based on the  above, it appears  that a substantial  reduction in neutron  emis- 
sion is possible if a major  portion of the 0'' isotope is depleted  from  the oxygen 
used  to  produce  the PuOz. 
One effective  method of preparing oxygen depleted  in 0' and 0'' is 
thermal diffusion of oxygen  gas.  The  required  apparatus is simple, and separa- 
tion  factors are large.  Since Oi6 is initially at a high concentration,  there are 
no initial transport  problems, and more  complex  distillation  methods  to  gain 
capacity at the  feed  end of the  system are not  necessary. 
Mount Laboratory  used a simple  thermal diffusion  column system to prepare 
oxygen depleted in Oi7 and Oi8 (Ref. 11). Two experiments were performed, 
Oxygen was depleted to an intermediate  composition in the first experiment and 
a portion of the  resultant  material  further  depleted  in  the  second  experiment. 
Using a portion of the first experiment  product, analysis utilizing a mass 
spectrometer  indicated a decrease in 0'' content  from  0.204  percent  to 0 .1  per- 
cent.  Carbon  dioxide (CO,) manufactured with the  depleted oxygen was  separately 
analyzed  to  determine  the  mass 46 content (C12016012). This  measurement  indi- 
cated  an Oi8 content of 0.15  percent and was felt to be more  accurate  than  the 
direct  measurement technique. 
Another  portion of the first experiment's  product  was  depleted  further  in 
0'' in a second  experiment.  Carbon  dioxide  samples,  prepared with this  pro- 
duct, indicated less than 0.005-percent 0'' content. National Bureau of Stand- 
ards  measurements indicated  that 0'' content  had  been  reduced  to 0.0016 * 
0.0005 percent. 
An estimate  indicated  that  the 0'' content  had  been  reduced  from a natural 
abundance of 0.039 percent  to 0.0033 percent. 
Oxygen samples  were  prepared with various  amounts of 0" content  ranging 
from  essentially no Oi8 to  the  natural  abundance of 0". 
Metal buttons of 80-percent Pu,~' were  measured  for specific neutron  emis- 
sion  rate.  The buttons were  converted  to  plutonium  hydride  and  immediately 
exposed  to  five oxygen samples. When the  reaction  was  completed,  each of the 
samples  was  encapsulated, and the  quantity of Pu,~' in each  sample  was  deter- 
mined by calorimetry. 
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The oxide samples  were counted individually using a  recently  calibrated 
detector. The results of the sample are  presented  in Table 11-4 and Figure 11-6. 
Note that oxide samples  prepared with negligible amounts of Oi8 showed very 
little  increase in specific  neutron count over the original  metal. The specific 
neutron count of samples containing Oi8 indicated  an  approximately linear in- 
crease in neutron  emission with increasing Oi8 content. 
The experiments  performed indicated that  a  substantial  portion of the 
neutron emission of Pu02 is due to the (CY, n) reaction of plutonium alphas 
with O'8. PuOz prepared with 0l8 depleted oxygen had a neutron emission 
rate about one-sixth of that from  natural oxygen fuel form. 
The  availability of 0l8 depleted Pu02 is dependent only on the  availability 
of 0'' depleted oxygen. There  are  several  feasible methods for depleting oxy- 
gen in the 0'' isotope, including the  previously  described method used by 
Mound. The increase  in  cost due to producing the fuel form would  be small when 
compared  to  the  total  fuel  cost. The physical,  chemical, and mechanical  proper- 
ties of the  fuel form should remain  essentially unchanged. The decrease  in neu- 
tron  emission will yield  an  equivalent decrease in neutron  dose  rate. 
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Table 11-4 
Neutron  Emission Rate From Pu238  Containing  Varying  Quantities of 01* 
I - I  
Source 
(neutrons/sec-g of ~ u ~ ~ ~ )  Isotope (g) Number 
Metal  Emission  Rate Weight of 
Oi8 
(%I 
Contents 
0.20 
0.103 
0.027 
0.0016 
0.101 
0.202 
T I 
~~ 
Oxide Emission  Rate 
(neutrons/sec-g of ~1,1238) - 
Measured 
1.5 X 104 
1.3 X 104 
4.2 X 103 
3.7 X 103 
1.2 X 104 
1.5 X 104 
Computed 
1.8 X 104 
1.1 X 104 
5.4 X 103 
3.7 X 103 
1.1 X 104 
1.8 X 104 
1.5 
1.2 
0.9 
0.6 
0.: 
0.05 0.10 0.15 
O’* CONCENTRATION (PERCENT ATOMIC ABUNDANCE) 
Figure 11-6. Neutron Emission Rate as a Function of 0l8 Concentration (17-Percent Error Bars) 
0.20 
, 
IV. RTG Radiation  Field Mapping 
A. Radiation Isoflux Data 
The radiation  analysis  was  performed  for  three  planar RTG power  levels: 
50, 75, and 100 watts(e).  The  results,  in  the  form of gamma and neutron  isofluxes, 
are presented  for  each  power level graphically  in Figures 11-7 through 11-12, A 
phantom  outline of a planar RTG is included in each  figure  for  orientation. The 
magnitudes  associated  with  each  contour  have  the units of particle flux, as indi- 
cated in Figures 11-7 through 11-12. 
The isoflux  contours  can be used  to  evaluate  the  total  gamma  and  neutron 
particle  fluxes  at any point  in  the  vicinity of an RTG. If the  point  in  question 
happens to lie  between a pair of contour  lines,  interpolation  can be used  to  esti- 
mate  the  magnitude of the  flux. 
The same  isoflux  contours  are  applicable  to  multiple RTG configurations. 
The  total  gamma o r  neutron  fluxes  at a selected  point  can be obtained by super- 
position.  The  procedure is to  determine  the  relative  positions of the  point  in 
question with respect  to  the RTG's. In effect,  the  same point will have several 
sets of coordinates, one for  each RTG. Every  coordinate  set  yields  a  flux  mag- 
nitude  on  the  isoflux  map,  and  the  summation of all  the  magnitudes  represents 
the  total  flux  at  the  point due to  all  the  RTGs  in  the  system.  Figure 11-13 gives 
an example of the method for a two-RTG system. 
A noticeable  feature of the  gamma  isoflux  lines is the  characteristic  contour 
indentation  in the "horizontal"  plane of the RTG. This  reflects  the  self-absorption 
effects of the PuO, fuel.  The overall  spatial  distribution of the PuO, fuel  among 
the  spherical  capsules  approximates  a  planar  configuration.  The  amount of self- 
absorption is greatest when viewing the fuel plane "on edge",  hence  the  indented 
contours. The neutron  isoflux lines are not indented  since  the  self-absorption of 
neutrons within the  fuel is not  significant. In fact,  the  neutron  calculations  did 
not include  any  neutron  absorptions  within  the  fuel o r  any of the RTG materials. 
Consequently,  the  shape of the  neutron  isoflux  contours  is  determined by the 
geometry of the fuel distribution. 
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Figure 11-7. Neutron lsoflux Contours for a 50-watt(e) RTG 
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Figure 11-8. Gamma lsoflux Contours for a 50-watt(e) RTG 
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Figure 11-9. Neutron lsoflux Contours for a 75-watt(e) RTG 
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Figure 11-10. Gamma lsoflux Contours for a 75-watt(e) RTG 
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PO I NT i 
a =  
a = 5 x  
FLUX A T P  DUE TO RTG #1 = 5 x lo4 
FLUX AT P DUE TO RTG #2 - 1 o5 
TOTAL FLUX AT P DUE TO BOTH RTGS 1.5 X 105 
Figure 11-13. Application of  lsoflux Maps to Multiple RTG Configurations 
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B. Effects of 01' Depletion 
It has  been  estimated (Ref. 14) that about 90 percent of all the  neutrons 
emitted by PuO, originate  in (a  , n) reactions involving the oxygen and some  light 
element  impurities, Lf the plutonium is compounded with naturally  occurring 
oxygen, the  resulting dioxide will contain several oxygen isotopes. Of these, 
0'' is the  principal  contributor  to (a, n) reactions. Experimental meas- 
urements (Ref. 11) have shown that  the  total  neutron  emission rate varies 
linearly with the 0'' content in  Pu02, and so it is possible  to  establish a 
simple  relationship between the two variables.  This  can  be done with a 
simple  multiplicative  constant  that  can  be  used  directly in  conjunction with 
the  neutron  isoflux  maps. 
An  approximate  relationship between the  neutron  emission  rate and the con- 
tent of 0'' can be written in the form 
N(x) = k x  f c ,  
where 
x = percent content of O'', 
N(x) = Pu02 neutron emission rate with x percent of O", and 
k ,  c = empirical  constants  based on the  best  available  upper  (natural 0'' 
content in Pu02) and lower ( P u ~ ~ '  metal)  neutron  emission  rates. 
The  best  available value of the  neutron  emission  rate for Pu02 with natural 
oxygen (0.201 percent 0'') is 2 X lo4  neutrons/sec-g (Ref. 1). The  cor- 
responding lowest value is about 3.7 X lo3  neutrons/sec-g Pu~~'. With this 
information, it is possible  to  define  an  emission  reduction  factor in the  form 
N(x) = k x  -t c 
2 x 104 R(x)  = N(O.201) 
( 4 . 0 7 ~  + 0.185) .  
To find the  neutron  emission  rate  for PuOz with  x percent of O", it is 
only necessary  to  multiply 2 X lo4 neutrons/sec-g Pu238 by the  reduction 
factor R(x). Since the  neutron flux  magnitudes a re  proportional  to  the PuO, 
neutron  emission  rate,  then it follows that  the  same  reduction  factor  can be ap- 
plied  to  the  isoflux  maps. Any neutron f lux  magnitude  obtained directly  from  the 
isoflw  maps  represents a maximum  value. The effect of 0'' depletion 
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can be  assessed  easily by using the  reduction  factor R(x) for a  .selected 0'' 
content. In brief, we have 
(Irutron flux from Neutron flux from 
PuO,  with x perceni) = R(x) ( PuO,  with natural 
content of Oi8 
C.  Nuclear Fuel Data 
The calculated RTG radiation  fields are based  on  the PuO, gamma and neu- 
tron  emission  rates  listed  in Table II-5. The gamma  emission  spectrum  repre- 
sents a synthesis of data  from  References  14 and 15. Reference  15  contains  a 
finely  resolved Pu02 gamma  spectrum below 1 MeV. However, it does not have 
quantitative  data above 1 MeV. High energy  data  were taken from  Reference 14 
and combined with those of Reference 15 to form a  composite PuO, gamma 
spectrum. 
As indicated in  Reference  14,  the  gamma  emission rates  at higher  energies 
(1 to 3 MeV) vary  significantly with time. In order tcj be conservative,  the  spec- 
trum with the  highest  emission rates (corresponding  to 5-year-old Pu02) was 
selected. 
The Pu02-microsphere neutron emission  rate  listed in Table II-5 represents 
the  product of the  "best-value" of the  specific neutron emission  rate (2 x lo4 
neutrons/sec-g Pu238, Ref. 15) and the specific power (0 .4  watts/g Pu02, 
Ref. 15). The emission  rate is based on Pu02 with the  natural 0l8 content 
(0.20 percent). 
D. Method of Analysis 
The RTG radiation  fields  were obtained with the ISOQAD shielding  code. A 
multizone nuclear mockup of the  planar RTG was generated  separately  for  each 
power level [ 50 watts(e), 75 watts(e), and 100 watts(e)] . The nuclear mockup, 
together with other  nuclear and geometric RTG data, was used as ISOQAD pro- 
gram input information. The program's output consisted of gamma and neutron 
fluxes as a function of distance and orientation with respect  to  the RTG. A 
graphical  technique was used  to  reduce  the output data  to a set of gamma and 
neutron  isoflux  contours for each RTG power  level. 
Figure II-14 shows the  zones  used in  the  nuclear mockup of each RTG. Due 
ta  the  relative  thinness of the RTG components and the absence of hydrogenous 
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Table 11-5 
Gamma and Neutron Emission  Rates For PuO, Microspheres 
".__;I. .. . ~ ~ 
GAMMAS 
- 
Energy (MeV) 
0.0435 
0.0998 
0.1531 
0.203 
0.776 
0.810 
1.5 
2.5 
4.0 
6.0 
Emission Rate (gammas/watt-sec) 
4.25 X l o 8  
1.01 x l o 8  
1.12 X 107 
4.47 X i o 4  
5.59 X l o 5  
2.24 X 105 
2.475 X l o 4  
3.0 X 105 
3.25 X l o 2  
5.5 x 10' 
NEUTRONS 
Energy (MeV) 
0-12 
Emission Rate* (neutrons/watt-sec) 
5 X lo4  
materials, it was possible to neglect  neutron  attenuation within the RTG. Conse- 
quently, the zones were  selected on the  basis of distinct  material  regions  perti- 
nent to gamma-ray attenuation. To avoid unreasonably long computation times, 
approximations  were  introduced in some of the zone descriptions. For example, 
the  thermoelectrics  were  represented  as a  single zone. Instead of having a 
separate zone for each  thermoelement,  the  entire  thermoelectric  assembly (i.e., 
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Figure 11-14. Nuclear Mockup of  a PuO, Fueled Planar RTG 
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thermoelements, hot shoes, cold shoes, hot straps, etc.) was described by a 
single equivalent material. The equivalent material is a  result of a mixing 
process  performed by ISOQAD. The program is supplied with a volume fraction 
for each  element within the  volumetric confines of the  thermoelectric  assembly. 
It uses  them  to  "reconstitute" a single  material with equivalent  radiation  attenua- 
tion  properties. 
A similar  smearing  process was applied to  the PuO, fuel  capsules. As 
shown in  Figure II-14 three  fuel zones  were defined.. The 19-capsule  configura- 
tion was approximated by a central  capsule, an intermediate  ring of six  capsules, 
and an outer  ring of 1 2  capsules. The cross  sections of the  capsule wall and 
the PuO, fuel are  rectangular. A circular  cross  section of the  spherical  capsule, 
when revolved about the RTG axis of symmetry, would generate  toroidal  surfaces. 
Toroidal  geometry cannot be described with the  current  version of the ISOQAD 
program. 
Figure 11-15 illustrates  the  distribution of detector  points with respect to a 
planar RTG. The gamma and neutron  fluxes  were  calculated with ISOQAD at  each 
detector point. The transition  from  the  radiation fluxes at  each  detector point to 
isoflux  contours was achieved by a  cross-plotting technique. A graphical plot of 
flux versus  distance was done along each  line of detectors  (see  Figure 11-16). A 
typical  plot is shown in Figure 11-16 for gamma  radiation along a 40" detector 
line.  Selection of a  particular flux magnitude, e. g. , l o 4  photons/cm2-sec,  yields 
a  distance,  as indicated in Figure II-16. The same flux magnitude generates 
other  distances with respect to flux versus  distance  plots  for 0", lo", 20", 30", etc. 
In effect,  a unique distance is associated with each angle for  a given flux magni- 
tude. This  information, when plotted in polar  coordinates, is transformed into an 
isoflux  contour, as shown in  Figure II-17. 
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Figure 11-15: Detector Distribution With Respect to the Planar RTG 
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Figure 11-16. Gamma Flux vs.Distance From RTG Along a Typical Detector Locus Line 
Figure 11-17. Method of Construction of the lsoflux Contours 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
A. Effect of 0l8 Depletion on Neutron Shield Weight 
A s  discussed in  Section IIIB, total Oi8 depletion  should  produce about a 
sixfold  reduction in the Pu02 neutron  emission rate. For a given neutron  shield 
configuration,  the 0'' depletion  can  be  translated into a decrease in shield 
thickness.  The  neutron  shield  thickness  curves  presented in "Task IV Weight 
Minimization can be utilized for that purpose. For example, suppose the 
ratio of the  shielded  to  bare  neutron f lux  at a selected  location with respect 
to  a planar RTG is 5 x Then, according to Figure 20, Infinite  Area  Shield, 
37.4 cm of lithium  hydride are  required.  Total Oi8 depletion would reduce 
the  bare neutron  flux by about a factor of 6 ,  so that  the  ratio of shielded to  bare 
neutron  flux would increase  to 30 X lom3.  Reference to Figure 20 ,  Infinite Area 
Shield,  shows  that  the  lithium  hydride  thickness would be reduced  to 26.5 cm. 
On a weight per unit area  basis,  the  neutron  shield weight reduction would amount 
to about 0.13 lb/in2. 
In practice, however,  according  to  the  best  available  data  for  PuZ3*O2 and 
PuZ3*  metal,  the  actual  neutron  emission  reduction by total Oi8 depletion in 
large  batch  quantities is only about threefold.  Thus,  the  shield weight savings in  
the above example would  be somewhat less than 0.13 lb/inz. 
B. Safety Aspects of PuO, Cermets 
Intensified  development  work in  the  area of improved Pu238 fuel  forms is 
recommended, The use of a chemically and thermally  stable,  non-degradable 
fuel  form  in  the NEW MOONS generator would provide  a  safety backup which 
would significantly  simplify  the  safety assessment and virtually  ensure a safe 
system  under  all  conceivable  accident  situations. 
C. Accuracy of Planar RTG Radiation Field Data 
The accuracy of the  radiation  isoflux  contours  presented in this  report is 
subject to analytic  approximations  inherent  in  the ISOQAD shielding code and, to 
some  degree,  because of fuel  data  variation  from one "fuel batch"  to  the  next. 
The isoflux  data are useful  in  establishing  preliminary  radiation  intensities and 
radiation  shielding  estimates.  This is especially  true when evaluating  the  possible 
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two-RTG configurations with respect  to  the  spacecraft, as discussed  in  Sec- 
tion IVA. 
Precise information on the  shielding  requirements,  in view of the  extremely 
low permissible  radiation flux levels at the  sensors,  can be  obtained  only with 
experimental  measurements and more  rigorous  analytic  methods with respect 
to  an  RTG-spacecraft  flight unit. A proposed  experimental  program is outlined 
in  "Task  IV-Test  Program  to  Verify RTG Shielding Requirements. More ac- 
curate  analytic  tools,  such as the Monte Carlo  Transport code SOBER, can  be 
applied to  an  RTG-spacecraft  system.  The code would permit an  evaluation of 
additional  radiation  considerations,  such as scattered  radiation,  secondary ra- 
diation  emission, and precise  spectral  data with respect  to  gammas and neutrons. 
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TYPICAL DESIGN CRITERIA ON PREDICTED DEGRAD'ATION 
FOR SEMICONDUCTORS UNDER  SPACE  RADIATION 
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Table III-1 
Typical  Radiation  Specification for  TIROS M Mission 
(Taken From: RCA-Astro Electronics Division, Drawing No. 1960811 Rev. 3) 
M ~ U -  
:acturer* ! 
I 
2N718A  NPNS 0.2pA 20 O.1pA 25 30 0.5 
70 
37 61  10 0 
32 48 
5.0 40 36 
65 .92 120 
51 66 80 
31 
2N722 PNPS 0.5pA 13 0.2pA 16  20 0.5 
40 
23 32  60 
19 25 
5.0 30  25 
41 57  90 
34 43 60 
22 
2N869A PNPS 0.5pA 25 0.2pA 27 30 0.5 
55 
52  65 85 
39 46 
5.0 40 38 
93 105  120 
67 73 80 
36 
2N916 NPNS 0.2pA 23 0.1pA 28 35 0.5 
70 
46 76 15 0 
34 48 
5.0 
100  140 20 0 
67 82 100 
40 45 50 
Location with Most 
Aver age Exposed 
Exposure Location 
Assumed 
Initial Transistor Operating 
Type 
ICBo Final ICBo Final  Beta 
IC (mA) 
Beta Change Beta Change - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
TIROS M Mission: 6 Months, 750 mi (nautical) , 82’ Orbit 
Doses For Most Exposed bcation: 1 x l o 5  rads: 1 X 10 l 3  DENI 
Dose For Location With Average Exposure: 2 x l o 4  rads: 5 X 10 l 2  DENI 
-~ 
*Manufacturer’s name deleted. 
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h X- 1 
FE 25 
1 .o - 
(TAKEN FROM: RCA-ASTRO ELECTRONICS DIVISION, DRAWING NO. 1960811 REV. 3) 
INITIAL  MIN hFE- 
0
.8 - AVERAGE DOSE 
.6 - 
I I I I 1 1 1 1  I I I I I I I I  I I I I 1 1 1 1  
0.1 1 .o '10 100 
COLLECTOR CURRENT, Ic(mA) 
Figure 111-1. Typical Specification for the Effect of Radiation on Gain in the TIROS M Environment 
Transistor Types 2N722 and 2N1132 (TakenFrom RCA-Astro Electronics Division, Drawing No. 1960811 Rev. 3) 
